In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 143-147
Abstract Post-communist states of East Central Europe face the authoritarian challenge to their young democracies, the sources of which are both historical and contemporary. Economic underdevelopment, the retarded process of nation-building and several decades of communist rul made countries of the region less well prepared for democratic transformation than their Western neighbors, but better than former Soviet Union. Combination of economic and social tensions, nationalism and religious fundamentalism creates conditions conducive tom the crises of democracy, but such crises can be overcome if liberal and socialist forces join hands.
Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several studies published in the 1960s and 70s. They focused on policy choices a small power faced when joining multinational alliances and within them. Recently, attention has focused on how many a small powers can influence political developments both within the alliances they belong to and outside them. Poland's involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and the European Union remained neutral in the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness to damage their relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged and Yushchenko's supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in a series of visits to Kiev, helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbour to chose a democratic solution to the crisis and continues to support Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland's interests but its immediate consequence has been a deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.
Do leaders make a differenceŒ Do they actually leadŒ There is a rich body of theoretical literature in which one can find many different responses.1 The question can be dealt with on the level of the philosophy of history as well as on the basis of empirical political sociology. The present paper takes the second road. Using data from the behavioral research conducted in Poland since 1966,1 particularly from the four studies conducted since the beginning of democratic reforms, I shall try to illustrate the importance of reformist leadership in Poland's local politics.
The author thinks that the consensus that used to exist in Poland regarding its membership in the European Union (EU) no longer exists after the parliamentary elections in Sept 2001. Two anti-European parties entered the parliament: the radical-populist Self-defense & the League of Polish Families, representing the fundamentalist Catholic Right. The author claims that the opponents of the Polish integration into the EU are too weak in the parliament to stop this process. Though Poland enjoys the support of the states such as Germany, France, & GB the outcome of the Polish referendum on joining the EU, scheduled for the end of 2003, is far from certain. The reason for this is an intensified political campaign of the parliamentary parties opposed to Poland's EU membership & the unfavorable economic situation. The author concludes that the success of the referendum to a large extent depends on the efficiency of the government's economic policy in the first two years of its term. 3 References. Adapted from the source document.
More than a decade has passed since the momentous events of 1989 that changed the world order & redefined the geopolitics of Central Europe. This is the right moment to assess the results of these changes & discuss the future of that region. A review of past & contemporary comparative studies indicates Central Europe differs from the postcommunist East (the former Soviet Union) & the Southeast (the former Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia) & Albania in several ways: (1) The Central European states overthrew their communist regimes earlier & in a more decisive manner than the USSR. (2) The economic transformation of Central Europe, though not completely smooth, is nevertheless much smoother than the transformation of the member countries of the CIS. (3) The postcommunist societies differ in the pattern by which their systems of social stratification changed after the collapse of their communist regimes. (4) There are big differences between the Central European postcommunist states, including the Baltic states on the one hand, & the CIS members & Yugoslavia on the other, regarding their international orientation. The author highlights three significant events that are going to leave their trace on the regional geostrategic situation: NATO's eastern expansion, NATO's campaign against SRY, & the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia. The regional geopolitical picture may become more stable with closer ties between the states of Central Europe & Germany. Adapted from the source document.
Part of the package of the democratic changes accepted at the Polish Round Table in 1989 was the reintroduction of the presidency, abolished in 1952 by the Constitution of the communist era. Since then, Poland has had three presidents & four presidential elections. General Wojciech Jaruzelski ran unopposed in the only presidential elections by the National Assembly in July 1989. In 1990, the Constitution was amended to introduce presidential election by universal ballot. "Solidarity" leader Lech Walesa was elected for a five-year period (1990-1995). In 1995 he lost the elections to the then leader of the Alliance of Democratic Left Aleksander Kwasniewski, who in 2000 successfully ran for reelection. During this period, the position of the President of the Republic evolved. The new Constitution of 1997 defines the system of the Polish Republic as a parliamentary-cabinet one but with broad prerogatives of the president. The actual position of the president depends not only on the norms of law but also on the political support he has in the society & on his relations with parliamentary parties. The Polish experience of the last ten years shows the possibility of a relatively strong presidency without the presidential control of the executive branch of government. It also argues against both extremes: presidentialism (the president being the chief executive or controlling the prime minister) & a weak, symbolic presidency. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.