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Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology represents the first systematic attempt to unpack the philosophical foundations of crime in Western culture. Utilizing the insights of ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics, contributors demonstrate how the reality of crime is informed by a number of implicit assumptions about the human condition and unstated values about civil society. Charting a provocative and original direction, editors Bruce A. Arrigo and Christopher R. Williams couple theoretically oriented chapters with those centered on application and case study. In doing so, they develop an insightful, sensible, and accessible approach for a philosophical criminology in step with the political and economic challenges of the twenty-first century. Revealing the ways in which philosophical conceits inform prevailing conceptions of crime, Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology is required reading for any serious student or scholar concerned with crime and its impact on society and in our lives

AbstractWhen mainstream parties accommodate radical-right parties, do citizens grow more concerned about immigration? Based on a rich literature, we argue that challenger parties' ability to affect mainstream party positions, particularly on immigration, is associated with greater public salience of immigration and voter positivity towards challengers exists. We use Comparative Manifesto Project and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data in order to show that challenger issue entrepreneurship, and mainstream accommodation are associated with greater public concern for challenger issues. These factors do not result in greater public positivity towards challengers. Our findings thus support the argument that a mainstream party accommodative strategy might not be as beneficial for them as often expected by pundit and political scientists alike. This has implications for understanding the effect of indirect party strategies on public attitudes, since mainstream accommodation changes public concern regarding issues, which may bolster challengers' positions, including radical-right parties.

AbstractBackgroundResearch regarding party behavior has often be understood through one of two models, (1) the Downsian proximity model, which supposes parties will change positions in order to be most competitive, and (2) the issue salience model, which understands parties to emphasize issues on which it is more competitive.ObjectivesThis study produces a theoretical framework explaining why parties, specifically in a two‐party system, emphasize one issue dimension over others. We argue that voter distributions differ across issue dimensions and take one of four general forms: (1) unimodal symmetrical, (2) bimodal symmetrical, (3) unimodal asymmetrical, and (4) bimodal asymmetrical. These distributions determine the nature of an issue dimension as approximating valence or positional. Combined with a party's issue ownership or positional advantage, this determines whether a party emphasizes an issue. An issue owner is expected to emphasize unimodal symmetrical issues, parties with positional advantage are expected to emphasize bimodal asymmetrical issues, and no party should emphasize a bimodal symmetrical issue. The decision to emphasize a unimodal asymmetrical issue is dependent upon whether the issue owner and the party with positional advantage are the same and the long‐versus short‐term electoral strategy of a party.MethodsData to test this theoretical approach do not yet exist. This theoretical framework is designed to apply to a two‐party system. In order to properly test the above expectations, we would need data regarding the distribution of voters along different issue dimensions, as well as the emphases placed on issues by parties. These data must be specific to a two‐party system.ConclusionThis theory attempted to build a synthesized theory of party behavior based on the Downsian proximity model and the issue salience model. This theory helps explain what issues parties will seek to contest, and which issues become politicized. However, this framework can be extended to explain many questions regarding polarization, party behavior, electoral strategy and political contestation.

As several commentators and researchers have noted since late spring 2020, COVID-19 has laid bare the connections between entrenched structurally generated inequalities on one hand, and on the other hand relatively high degrees of susceptibility to contracting COVID-19 on the part of economically marginalized population segments. Far from running along the tracks of race neutrality, studies have demonstrated that the pandemic is affecting Black people more than Whites in the U.S.A. and U.K., where reliable racially-disaggregated data are available. While the situation in Canada seems to follow the same pattern, race-specific data on COVID-19 are hard to come by. At present, there is no federal mandate to collect race-based data on COVID-19, though, in Ontario, at the municipal level, the City of Toronto has been releasing such data. This paper examines the entanglements of race, immigration status and the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada with particular emphasis on Black immigrants and non-immigrants in Toronto, using multiple forms of data pertaining to income, housing, immigration, employment and COVID-19 infections and deaths. Our findings show that the pandemic has had a disproportionate negative impact on Black people and other racialized people in Toronto and, indeed, Canada.

ObjectiveDemocratic governance requires that policy outcomes and public demand for policy be linked. While studies have shown empirical support for such a relationship in various policy domains, empirical evidence also indicates that the public is relatively unaware of policy outputs. This raises a puzzle: Why do policy outputs influence public attitudes if the public knows little about them?MethodsThis study seeks to address this paradox by examining the conditioning role of media coverage. We rely on data derived from the Policy Agendas Project in the United States, allowing us to analyze the relationship between policy outcomes, public preferences, and newspaper content across a long span of time (1972–2007).ResultsOur results indicate that public policy preferences respond to policy outputs, and that this relationship is strengthened by greater media attention to a policy area. Importantly, our findings also indicate that without media attention to a policy area, there is no direct effect of policy outputs on public demand for policy.ConclusionsMedia coverage appears to be a key factor for public responsiveness to occur. In the absence of policy coverage by the media, public responsiveness to policy outputs is greatly reduced.

Abstract: "Do parties respond to voters' preferences on European integration in elections to the European Parliament (EP)? Following recent research that shows political party responsiveness to Eurosceptic attitudes during EP elections is conditioned by party characteristics, this article seeks to understand how party unity on European integration affects party responsiveness to Euroscepticism. It argues that when Eurosceptic attitudes among voters are high and the parties are divided in their position on European integration, parties will be more responsive to voters and take a more Eurosceptic position. To test the theoretical expectations, the study uses data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Euromanifestos Project, and European Election Study for 1989-2009 for over 120 parties across 20 European Union member states. The findings have important implications for understanding the nature of democratic representation in the European Union." (Seite 741)

Do parties respond to voters' preferences on European integration in elections to the European Parliament? In this article, we argue that political parties do respond to voters' Euroskeptic attitudes, but that party type conditions responsiveness. In particular, we posit that larger parties are more responsive and that governing parties are less responsive to aggregate Euroskepticism. To test our theoretical expectations, we use data from the Euromanifestos Project and European Election Study from 1989 to 2009 for 252 parties across 26 European Union Member States. Our findings have important implications for understanding democratic representation in the European Union and the second-order nature of elections to the European Parliament.