AbstractThe theoretical literature on representation tends to read the work of Edmund Burke as a defence of a functional-corporatist conception of society, in which the groups relevant for political representation are stable and objective economic "interests" whose cooperation in and contribution to the life of nation and empire are essential for the status of Britain as a pre-eminent commercial power. This article presents an alternative, contractarian Burke that emerges out of his defence of the interests of non-economic "descriptions" of citizens such as Irish Catholics, a Burke who offers us an illuminating perspective from which to assess the claims of historically marginalized groups in contemporary liberal democratic societies.
THE RECENT LITERATURE ON EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE EVINCES TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE TASK OF DEFINING JUSTICE IN A MANNER THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO SOCIAL DIFFERENCE. THE FIRST, THE JURIDICAL MODEL OF JUSTICE TOWARD GROUPS, ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF LIBERAL IMPARTIALITY. ON THE BASIS OF THAT IDEAL, THE JURIDICAL MODEL BEGINS WITH THE PREMISE THAT JUSTICE SHOULD BE DEFINED THROUGH A PROCESS OF REASONING THAT IS SHIELDED FROM THE TUG AND PULL OF PARTICULARIST POLITICAL INTERESTS. IN CONTRAST, THE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE REJECTS THE NOTION THAT JUSTICE CAN BE DEFINED PRIOR TO POLITICS. INSTEAD, ITS ADVOCATES MAINTAIN THAT STANDARDS OFJUSTICE CAN ONLY AVOID REPRODUCING INEQUALITY IF THEY ARE DEFINED WITHIN A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS' PERSPECTIVES TO BE EXPRESSED AND HEEDED. IN THIS ESSAY, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THE POLITICAL APPROACH TO DEFINING JUSTICE TOWARD GROUPS NOT ONLY HAS IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES OVER, BUT IS ACTUALLY IMPLICIT (ALTHOUGH UNDEVELOPED), IN THE JURIDICAL APPROACH. THE CLASH BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES TO RECONCILING EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE BRINGS TO LIGHT A PROFOUND NEED TO RECONCEIVE THE ASPIRATION TO IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND, IN THE PROCESS, TO RECONSIDER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL SPHERES WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES.