Suchergebnisse

PurposeTo explore the mechanism that shapes firms' supply chain learning (SCL) practices, this study examines the relationship between firms' knowledge network embeddedness and their SCL practice in a supply chain network, as well as the moderating role of supply chain network cohesion in this relationship.Design/methodology/approachUsing patent application data and supply chain partner information from 869 listed firms between 2011 and 2020 in China, this study uses fixed-effect regression models to reduce endogeneity problems by controlling for individual heterogeneity effects that cannot be observed over time.FindingsFirms' knowledge network embeddedness has an inverted U-shaped effect on their SCL, and this non-linear relationship is conditional on supply chain network cohesion, which strengthens (weakens) the positive (negative) effect of knowledge network embeddedness on SCL.Practical implicationsThe findings show that managers can reconcile the downsides of knowledge network embeddedness on SCL by fostering greater supply chain network cohesion.Originality/valueDrawing from the network pluralism perspective, this study contributes to supply chain literature by extending the research context of the antecedents of SCL from a single-network setting to a dual-network setting. It extends the network pluralism perspective by showing that not only positive effects but also negative effects of network embeddedness can transfer from one network to another.

How to balance the central government and local governments' political authority relating to environmental governance has long been a topic of intense debate in China. Since both environmental and economic regulations are regulatory tools of governments, political authority and systems must be considered in deciding to what extent to empower local governments. Central government needs to find a tradeoff point when being placed under the dual pressure of environmental protection and maintaining the economic growth rate. Based on a two-level principal–agent model, our research compares the effects of centralized and decentralized governance on the efficiency of environmental regulation. Our results suggest that under decentralized environmental governance, the local governments' incentives increase, which results in either "race to the top" or "race to the bottom" competition in environmental regulation. Moreover, such governance prompts local governments to reduce their investment in economic development and environmental protection. However, decentralization in environmental governance will become more beneficial to the central government if the benefits of reducing information asymmetry surpass enhanced agency costs; otherwise, centralized environmental governance is preferred. Our research proposes a hybrid model of centralized and decentralized environmental governance to help cushion firms against high agency costs and local government–firm collusion.