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Whether they target Chinese vessels directly or not, attacks on Red Sea shipping by Houthi rebels threaten to undermine China's economic recovery. But, viewed through the lens of its rivalry with the US, the current turmoil in the Middle East is not bad news for China.

Whether they target Chinese vessels directly or not, attacks on Red Sea shipping by Houthi rebels threaten to undermine China's economic recovery. But, viewed through the lens of its rivalry with the US, the current turmoil in the Middle East is not bad news for China.

Until very recently, China had been seen as an important and constructive force in the crisis management in South Asia in the event of an India-Pakistan military crisis. Part of the perception originated from historical evidence, such as China's shuttle diplomacy between India and Pakistan after 1998, and such as after the 2008 Mumbai attack. But more importantly, the perception is based on the belief that China, with its vast stake in the region's peace and stability, will be objective in its assessment and management of the crisis, even if it may not be completely neutral between India and Pakistan. Following that logic, the increasing risk to which China is exposed due to its Belt and Road investments and infrastructure development in the region will draw China even more into third-party crisis management in South Asia. This belief has become increasingly challenged due to the shifting power balance in the region and, more broadly, among China, the United States (U.S.), and India in their trilateral interactions. Although China is interested in preventing a nuclear war, under that threshold, its interest in crisis management is constantly subject to its definition of its national interest in the changing regional power balance and great power dynamics. With the deepening U.S.-China great power rivalry, the growing signs of alignment between the U.S. and India, as well as a weakening Pakistan, the foundation of China's policy towards South Asia—a perceived balance of power between India and Pakistan and China's advantage as a superior third party—is disappearing rapidly. With the deteriorating U.S.-China relations and great power competition, China's instinct is to preserve its strategic leverage. In addition, with the border skirmishes between China and India continuing to flare up, China itself might become a party to the regional conflict. ; publishedVersion

Rarely has any issue been more polarising than the assessment of Sino-Russia relations in recent years. Analysts and observers are either convinced of another emerging Sino-Russia alliance against the West, or dismissive of any meaningful, sustainable strategic relationship between the two while citing their 'peril of proximity', painful historical record and the strategic distrust. Neither description accurately reflects the nature of Sino-Russia relations under the Xi Jinping administration in China. In the past three years, China and Russia have forged new foundations for a third option- a strategic alignment primarily based upon a shared sense of vulnerability and threat perceptions regarding their external environment. This is largely the result of the heightened confrontation both China and Russia have encountered vis-à-vis the United States due to their assertive foreign policy in the Western Pacific and in East Europe, (especially in Ukraine), respectively. Furthermore, the personality and preferences of the Chinese top leader and the general public have also played an important role in constructing the strategic alignment as well.

"The author argues that the democratic reform in Myanmar is rooted in profound internal and external factors. Since the beginning of the reform, the changes in Myanmar have taken tolls in a series of China's existing interests inside the country. Economically, Chinese investments have come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and even oppositions, threatening the viability of strategic projects such as the oil and gas pipelines. Politically, the initial success of the democratic reform in Myanmar raises questions about Beijing's continuous resistance to reform. Strategically, the changes in Myanmar undercut China's original blueprint about the strategic utilities of Myanmar for China at ASEAN, in the Indian Ocean and more broadly in the region. In light of the changes, China has adjusted its policy toward Myanmar. Not only has Beijing dramatically reduced its economic investments in Myanmar, it also cooled down the political ties while established relations with the democratic oppositions. At the same time, China also launched massive public relations campaigns inside Myanmar aimed at improving its image and relations with the local communities." (author's abstract)

The author argues that the democratic reform in Myanmar is rooted in profound internal and external factors. Since the beginning of the reform, the changes in Myanmar have taken tolls in a series of China's existing interests inside the country. Economically, Chinese investments have come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and even oppositions, threatening the viability of strategic projects such as the oil and gas pipelines. Politically, the initial success of the democratic reform in Myanmar raises questions about Beijing's continuous resistance to reform. Strategically, the changes in Myanmar undercut China's original blueprint about the strategic utilities of Myanmar for China at ASEAN, in the Indian Ocean and more broadly in the region. In light of the changes, China has adjusted its policy toward Myanmar. Not only has Beijing dramatically reduced its economic investments in Myanmar, it also cooled down the political ties while established relations with the democratic oppositions. At the same time, China also launched massive public relations campaigns inside Myanmar aimed at improving its image and relations with the local communities.

Yun Sun argues that China's policy failures on Myanmar in 2011 are rooted in several strategic post-election misjudgements. Following President Thein Sein's inauguration in March 2011, the Sino–Myanmar relationship was initially boosted by the establishment of a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership," and China sought reciprocation for its long-time diplomatic support in the form of Myanmar's endorsement of China's positions on regional multilateral forums. A series of events since August have frustrated China's aspirations, however, including Myanmar's suspension of the Myitsone dam and the rapid improvement of its relationship with the West. Several strategic misjudgements contributed to China's miscalculations, including on the democratic momentum of the Myanmar government, on the U.S. –Myanmar engagement and on China's political and economic influence in the country. China's previous definition of Myanmar as one of China's "few loyal friends" and the foundation of its strategic blueprint has been fundamentally shaken, and China is recalibrating its expectations regarding future policies.

The author argues that the democratic reform in Myanmar is rooted in profound internal and external factors. Since the beginning of the reform, the changes in Myanmar have taken tolls in a series of China's existing interests inside the country. Economically, Chinese investments have come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and even oppositions, threatening the viability of strategic projects such as the oil and gas pipelines. Politically, the initial success of the democratic reform in Myanmar raises questions about Beijing's continuous resistance to reform. Strategically, the changes in Myanmar undercut China's original blueprint about the strategic utilities of Myanmar for China at ASEAN, in the Indian Ocean and more broadly in the region. In light of the changes, China has adjusted its policy toward Myanmar. Not only has Beijing dramatically reduced its economic investments in Myanmar, it also cooled down the political ties while established relations with the democratic oppositions. At the same time, China also launched massive public relations campaigns inside Myanmar aimed at improving its image and relations with the local communities. (JCSA/GIGA)

Yun Sun argues that China's policy failures on Myanmar in 2011 are rooted in several strategic post-election misjudgements. Following President Thein Sein's inauguration in March 2011, the Sino-Myanmar relationship was initially boosted by the establishment of a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership," and China sought reciprocation for its long-time diplomatic support in the form of Myanmar's endorsement of China's positions on regional multilateral forums. A series of events since August have frustrated China's aspirations, however, including Myanmar's suspension of the Myitsone dam and the rapid improvement of its relationship with the West. Several strategic misjudgements contributed to China's miscalculations, including on the democratic momentum of the Myanmar government, on the U.S. -Myanmar engagement and on China's political and economic influence in the country. China's previous definition of Myanmar as one of China's "few loyal friends" and the foundation of its strategic blueprint has been fundamentally shaken, and China is recalibrating its expectations regarding future policies. Adapted from the source document.