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In: International political science abstracts: IPSA, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 144-144
ISSN: 1751-9292
Im vorliegenden böll.brief wird zunächst der Aufstieg des autoritären Populismus im Kontext der (politikwissenschaftlichen) Cleavagetheorie beleuchtet. In einem zweiten Teil werden ökonomische, kulturelle und politische Ursachen dieser skizzierten Entwicklung diskutiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden im abschließenden dritten Teil politische Handlungsempfehlungen vorgestellt: Was müssen die Verfechter/innen einer offenen Gesellschaft tun, um in der Auseinandersetzung erfolgreich bestehen zu können?
BASE
In: Global policy: gp, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 138-145
ISSN: 1758-5899
AbstractThis article aims to contribute to the third generation of global governance research by unfolding the concept of a global governance system consisting of normative principles and patterns of authority relationships and legitimation. The goal is to formulate a positive theory that goes beyond the negative descriptions of global governance as post‐internationalist and helps to move global governance beyond its embryonic state. The major theoretical claim is that the features of the current global governance system have endogenously produced the politicization and counter‐institutionalization of international authorities. Internal tensions of the system fuel legitimation problems and demands for change, which in the end lead – in some cases – to the decline of global governance arrangements or – in other cases – to its deepening via appropriate institutional responses.
This book offers a major new theory of global governance, explaining both its rise and what many see as its current crisis. The author suggests that world politics is now embedded in a normative and institutional structure dominated by hierarchies and power inequalities and therefore inherently creates contestation, resistance, and distributional struggles. Within an ambitious and systematic new conceptual framework, the theory makes four key contributions. Firstly, it reconstructs global governance as a political system which builds on normative principles and reflexive authorities. Second, it identifies the central legitimation problems of the global governance system with a constitutionalist setting in mind. Third, it explains the rise of state and societal contestation by identifying key endogenous dynamics and probing the causal mechanisms that produced them. Finally, it identifies the conditions under which struggles in the global governance system lead to decline or deepening. Rich with propositions, insights, and evidence, the book promises to be the most important and comprehensive theoretical argument about world politics of the 21st century.
World Affairs Online
Im vorliegenden böll.brief wird zunächst der Aufstieg des autoritären Populismus im Kontext der (politikwissenschaftlichen) Cleavagetheorie beleuchtet. In einem zweiten Teil werden ökonomische, kulturelle und politische Ursachen dieser skizzierten Entwicklung diskutiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden im abschließenden dritten Teil politische Handlungsempfehlungen vorgestellt: Was müssen die Verfechter/innen einer offenen Gesellschaft tun, um in der Auseinandersetzung erfolgreich bestehen zu können?
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 343-366
ISSN: 1469-9044
Human rights violations by international organisations (IOs) are a possible side effect of their growing authority. Recent examples are the cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers and violations caused by IMF austerity measures. In response, IOs increasingly develop safeguards to protect human rights from being violated through their policies to regain legitimacy. We argue that this development can be accounted for by a mechanism we call 'authority-legitimation mechanism'. We test this theoretical expectation against ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policies, UN and NATO peacekeeping and World Bank and IMF lending. Next, we demonstrate inductively that the authority-legitimation mechanism can evolve through different pathways, depending on which actors get engaged. We label these pathways legislative institution-building if parliaments in member states put pressure on their governments to campaign for human rights safeguards in IOs, judicial institution-building if courts demand human rights safeguards, like-minded institution-building if civil society organisations, middle powers and IO bodies with little formal power push for human rights safeguards, or anticipatory institution-building if IOs adopt such safeguards from other IOs without having violated human rights themselves. Finally, we argue that which of these pathways are activated and how effective they are depends on specific conditions.
World Affairs Online
Human rights violations by international organisations (IOs) are a possible side effect of their growing authority. Recent examples are the cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers and violations caused by IMF austerity measures. In response, IOs increasingly develop safeguards to protect human rights from being violated through their policies to regain legitimacy. We argue that this development can be accounted for by a mechanism we call 'authority-legitimation mechanism'. We test this theoretical expectation against ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policies, UN and NATO peacekeeping and World Bank and IMF lending. Next, we demonstrate inductively that the authority-legitimation mechanism can evolve through different pathways, depending on which actors get engaged. We label these pathways legislative institution-building if parliaments in member states put pressure on their governments to campaign for human rights safeguards in IOs, judicial institution-building if courts demand human rights safeguards, like-minded institution-building if civil society organisations, middle powers and IO bodies with little formal power push for human rights safeguards, or anticipatory institution-building if IOs adopt such safeguards from other IOs without having violated human rights themselves. Finally, we argue that which of these pathways are activated and how effective they are depends on specific conditions. ; Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
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The DFG research group, "Overlapping Spheres of Authority and Interface Conflicts in the Global Order" (OSAIC), focuses on the rise of interface conflicts within and across overlapping spheres of authority. The increased institutional production of norms in the international realm leads to both horizontal interface conflicts at the same level of governance (e.g. across two or more international spheres of authority) and vertical interface conflicts across spheres of authority on different levels (e.g. international and national spheres of authority). Under which conditions become such conflicts manifest? What are the responses to conflicting rules originating from overlapping spheres of authority? To what extent are these responses guided by normative principles? If responses are justified with reference to normative principles, what are these principles and how are they operationalized concretely? What consequences do the different ways of responding to interface conflicts have for the global order as a whole? With these questions, the research group moves beyond the study of issue-area specific international institutions or organizations, and targets the question of the international order understood as a system of overlapping and interacting spheres of authority. In order to answer these questions, the research group proceeds in four steps. First, we utilize different methods for identifying such conflicts in order get a better understanding of the extent and content of interface conflicts. Second, we develop an empirically validated typology capable of grasping systematically the variety of responses to interface conflicts. Third, we use this typology as a basis for explaining variance in the responses to interface conflicts and for analyzing the consequences of different responses for the global political order. Fourth, we seek to reconstruct existing normative practices and develop standards for their evaluation. ; Die DFG Forschungsgruppe "Overlapping Spheres of Authority and Interface Conflicts in the Global Order" (OSAIC) untersucht immer häufiger auftretende Schnittstellenkonflikte innerhalb sowie zwischen überlappenden Autoritätssphären. Die angestiegene institutionelle Erzeugung von Normen in der internationalen Politik führt zum einen zu horizontalen Schnittstellenkonflikten auf dem gleichen Governance-Level (z.B. zwischen zwei oder mehreren internationalen Autoritätssphären) und zum anderen zu vertikalen Schnittstellenkonflikten zwischen Autoritätssphären auf unterschiedlichen Levels (z.B. internationale und nationale Autoritätssphären). Unter welchen Bedingungen manifestieren sich solche Konflikte? Was sind die Antworten auf sich widersprechende Regeln, die aus den sich überlappenden Autoritätssphären hervorgehen? Inwiefern sind diese Antworten von normativen Prinzipien geleitet? Falls Antworten mit Verweis auf normative Prinzipien gerechtfertigt werden, um welche Prinzipien handelt es sich dabei genau und wie lassen sie sich konkret operationalisieren? Welche Konsequenzen haben die unterschiedlichen Antworten auf Schnittstellenkonflikte für die globale Ordnung insgesamt? Durch diese Fragestellungen beschäftigt sich die Forschungsgruppe mit mehr als nur der politikfeldpezifischen Analyse internationaler Institutionen oder Organisationen. Sie zielt vielmehr auf ein Verständnis der internationalen Ordnung als System von sich überlappenden und interagierenden Autoritätsfeldern ab. Um die Fragen beantworten zu können, geht die Forschungsgruppe in vier Schritten vor. Zuerst nutzen wir verschiedene Methoden, um Konflikte dieser Art identifizieren zu können und um somit ein besseres Verständnis für das Ausmaß und den Inhalt von Schnittstellenkonflikten zu entwickeln. Im zweiten Schritt entwickeln wir eine empirisch valide Typologie, die in der Lage ist, systematisch die Vielzahl von Antworten auf diese Konflikte zu erfassen. Im dritten Schritt nutzen wir diese Typologie als Ausgangspunkt, um die Varianz der Antworten auf Schnittstellenkonflikte zu erklären und um die Konsequenzen der verschiedenen Antworten für die globale politische Ordnung zu analysieren. Zuletzt ist es unser Ziel, existierende normative Praktiken zu rekonstruieren und Standards für ihre Evaluierung zu entwickeln.
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Der Band setzt sich mit den Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten internationalen oder globalen Regierens in einer sozialen Umwelt (Weltgesellschaft) unter drei Perspektiven auseinander: der Perspektive von Theorien globaler Ordnung, der Perspektive spezifischer Formen globaler Ordnungsbildung und der Perspektive die Normativität globaler Ordnung. Die Beiträge des Bandes besetzen Schnittstellen in einer Reihe von Diskussionen, die in den Internationalen Beziehungen zu Ordnung und Ordnungsbildung in der internationalen Politik, zum Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates, sowie zur Stellung internationaler Politik in der Weltgesellschaft geführt werden.
World Affairs Online
In: International theory: a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 261-285
ISSN: 1752-9727
This article develops a reason-based social foundation of new forms of authority, which often are liquid and sectorally limited. The recognition of authority hinges, in this view, on reflexive actors who are aware of their own limits of rationality regarding the lack of either information or a perspective that allows for the pursuit of common goods. In such a reflexive concept of authority, authority takers tend to monitor the authorities closely, and the internalization of the subordinate role is not a necessary part of it. Reflexive authority is embedded in the acceptance of a knowledge order that reproduces the authority relationship. In spite of a tendency toward institutionalization, reflexive authority often comes in a liquid state of aggregation, and almost always with a restricted functional scope. Moreover, this new set-up of authority creates social dynamics that add to liquidity. First, the encompassing constitutionalized rule with majoritarian decision making as major source of legitimacy is increasingly undermined by loosely coupled spheres of specialized authorities, which are most often justified on the basis of expertise. We can observe both the rise of international authorities in the absence of coordination between them, and the rise of similar authorities within the nation state that escape control of the democratic core institutions. As a result, authority gets fragmented and different authorities need to adjust to each other. The second implication of the argument is that democratic legitimation narratives become rare, leading to an ongoing legitimatory contestation of authorities. Both these processes make authority even more liquid.
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 390-392
ISSN: 1747-7093
This article develops a reason-based social foundation of new forms of authority, which often are liquid and sectorally limited. The recognition of authority hinges, in this view, on reflexive actors who are aware of their own limits of rationality regarding the lack of either information or a perspective that allows for the pursuit of common goods. In such a reflexive concept of authority, authority takers tend to monitor the authorities closely, and the internalization of the subordinate role is not a necessary part of it. Reflexive authority is embedded in the acceptance of a knowledge order that reproduces the authority relationship. In spite of a tendency toward institutionalization, reflexive authority often comes in a liquid state of aggregation, and almost always with a restricted functional scope. Moreover, this new set-up of authority creates social dynamics that add to liquidity. First, the encompassing constitutionalized rule with majoritarian decision making as major source of legitimacy is increasingly undermined by loosely coupled spheres of specialized authorities, which are most often justified on the basis of expertise. We can observe both the rise of international authorities in the absence of coordination between them, and the rise of similar authorities within the nation state that escape control of the democratic core institutions. As a result, authority gets fragmented and different authorities need to adjust to each other. The second implication of the argument is that democratic legitimation narratives become rare, leading to an ongoing legitimatory contestation of authorities. Both these processes make authority even more liquid. ; Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
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International organizations (IOs) develop institutional provisions to make sure that their policies do not violate human rights. Accordingly, whilst IOs have a greater scope of action and ability to promote collective goods than ever before, they also have a greater capacity to do harm. Based on ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policy, UN and NATO peacekeeping, and World Bank and IMF lending, this book examines human rights violations which can arise from the actions of IOs rather than those of states. It further explains how powerful IOs have introduced human rights protection provisions and analyzes the features of these provisions, including differences in their design and quality. This book provides evidence of a novel legitimation strategy authoritative IOs draw on that has, as yet, never been systematically studied before
In: International Politics and Institutions in Time, S. 93-116