Suchergebnisse

This report examines the media scene in Hungary and how it serves as a tool of radicalisation. It traces mediatisation of certain events that we call first migration related and second cultural legacies related radicalisation and follows the depiction of these issues both in legacy and social media. We interpret such two mechanisms as resonators of micro events to reach macro audiences. In the first instance, the issue relates to what appears as a racially incited attack by a tv camerawoman against an irregular migrant that happens to cross the Hungarian-Serbian border and enter Hungary. In the second instance, we review the general cultural scene in Hungary in order to depict more specifically how certain legacies are circulated and presented for general public consumption. In this instance, we depart from the politicisation of theatre and its consideration as a particular reflection of Hungarian national culture. We delineate more general cultural memes that replicate existing historical legacies in order to maintain theatre in particular and culture in general as pinnacles of keeping historical grievances alive and polarising the society along the themes that continue to serve as a currency of radicalisation. The conclusion wraps up our discussion as to why culture as a topic of research relates to understand the relationship between I-GAP spectrum as an instrument of radicalisation.

This report reviews the unfolding of the future of Europe and external migration related narratives in Hungary, and the liberal/conservative dilemmas that Hungarian politicians proposed since 2015. Its particular scope is the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speeches and how they were quoted by or referred to in the Hungarian media. The abrupt increase in the number of irregular migrant arrivals to Hungary prepared the conditions for Orbán to project the course that he foresaw for the conservative transformation for Hungary to transform Europe. After his victory in 2010 and 2014 at Hungarian general elections, Orbán presented his country as the vanguard for the conservative transformation that Europe also needed. In this respect, external migration from those countries where Islam was the majority religion presented Orbán the context whereby he could project the historical other for Europe as the future danger. The report is empirically focused first and foremost on Viktor Orbán's speeches regarding external migration and Europe; introduce quotations from 25 speeches extracted from mostly Orbán's as well as other Fidesz politicians. The report also looks at the conservative (Magyar Hírlap), centrist (hvg.hu), and liberal (Népszava) media outlets in Hungary in order to see how they have embedded narratives, slogans and tropes from these speeches.

This report reviews the unfolding of the future of Europe and external migration related narratives in Hungary, and the liberal/conservative dilemmas that Hungarian politicians proposed since 2015. Its particular scope is the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speeches and how they were quoted by or referred to in the Hungarian media. The abrupt increase in the number of irregular migrant arrivals to Hungary prepared the conditions for Orbán to project the course that he foresaw for the conservative transformation for Hungary to transform Europe. After his victory in 2010 and 2014 at Hungarian general elections, Orbán presented his country as the vanguard for the conservative transformation that Europe also needed. In this respect, external migration from those countries where Islam was the majority religion presented Orbán the context whereby he could project the historical other for Europe as the future danger. The report is empirically focused first and foremost on Viktor Orbán's speeches regarding external migration and Europe; introduce quotations from 25 speeches extracted from mostly Orbán's as well as other Fidesz politicians. The report also looks at the conservative (Magyar Hírlap), centrist (hvg.hu), and liberal (Népszava) media outlets in Hungary in order to see how they have embedded narratives, slogans and tropes from these speeches.

This article shows how similar humanitarian narratives of states can travel across different geographies in response to refugee crises. Empirically, it follows Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Syrian and Rohingya refugee crises. Considering Turkey's migration management practices, humanitarian activism narrative, and its political ambition to foster domestic and international audiences for this narrative, this article elaborates on how Turkey has become a humanitarian actor responding both to Syrian and the Rohingya crises. In both cases, the Turkish political discourses have been very resonant of each other, despite Syria and Myanmar being in different geographies and proximities to Turkey. The article also shows how Turkish politicians and the civil servants aspired to enhance visibility and credibility of Turkey as a humanitarian actor. Delineating Turkey's humanitarian narrative shows the role of political agency in forging sympathetic domestic and international audiences. Overall, the Turkish case presents how states operate migration regimes at the cusp of discourses and institutions affecting their forced migration management and humanitarian engagements.

This article deals with the political responses of the Turkish Republic when faced with incursions of refugees from its neighboring countries forced to migrate due to conflicts. It develops a general argument that the restrictive Turkish asylum regime and averse Turkish public philosophy to immigration have enforced political authorities to continuously resort to discursive rather than institutionalized means to handle impacts of forced migration. Responding to increasing cases of forced migration and the resulting influx of refugees from the bordering countries, therefore, the Turkish political authorities have pursued selective policy responses resting on narratives. Via strategic discourses, these narratives have expressively embedded the Syrian as an "acceptable refugee" in political responses to forced migration. The acceptable refugee in this instance is the one that implies historical and social responsibilities for Turkey, given its history. The outcome is the discursive construction of some as acceptable rather than extending institutionalized refugee rights for all.

This article scrutinizes how the Syrian crisis affects the management of Turkey's refugee regime. It also analyses how the Turkish government has treated the Syrian refugees preferentially in comparison to refugees of other nationalities. The article illustrates that the current Turkish humanitarian assistance to refugees is selective, and it predominantly welcomes those that have religiously, ethnically and politically acceptable backgrounds to the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) ideology in government. This attitude is merely in line with the selective application of what remains as the anomaly of the Turkish asylum regime, that is, it limits itself to accepting asylum applications only from European nationals. This geographical limitation dates from the time when Turkey adopted the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1961, while having published a declaration that it would admit only aliens coming from Europe due to the geographical region in which Turkey is located. Non-European asylum seekers who qualify for the internationally accepted 'refugee' definition are granted the right of temporary asylum (Asylum and Migration Legislation, 2005, pp. 13-14) in Turkey, while the UNHCR deals with their cases to find a country of settlement. This process can take years in many instances, and these refugees can neither leave their places of temporary residence nor be afforded any employment rights while waiting.

The paper discusses the salience of the Finno-Ugric links in substantiating intra-EU cooperation among Finland, Estonia and Hungary. The focus is on investigating evidence of such cooperation in the EU's human rights and minority rights related policies towards the Russian Federation and other eastern neighbourhood states. The paper gives an account of institutionalised forms of cultural and political co-operation among the three countries under study. It discusses whether small EU states can coalesce under constructive policy alliances or not. The paper presents the current foreign policy narratives in Finland, Hungary and Estonia and locates the Finno-Ugric narrative in this general framework.

Korkut, Umut (Dogus Author) ; The author argues that in democracies a strong state and strong civil society are not mutually exclusive. Only a democratic, legitimate, and strong state can provide the environment for civil society activities to flourish; in return, only a strong and a participatory civil society can outline the reach of state strength vis-`a-vis the society. The author discusses the need for civil society organizations to collaborate with policy-making institutions, in which they can negotiate policy concerns with ministers and officials while retaining an independent distance from the state and the political parties. Further, the author argues that an environment as such would provide for the transformative capacity of human agency to manifest itself in full in a globalizing world. The author discusses how participatory state and çivil society structures will enhance the role of the human agency in order to dissolve elite rule, especially in new democracies.

Korkut, Umut (Dogus Author) ; This paper has two main goals. First, it illuminates continuities between the ideas of "true Romanian-ness" as held by both the Romanian cultural elite and the Romanian political regimes in the interwar and communist periods. A manufactured definition of a "true" Romanian—as a Romanian Orthodox Christian, natively Romanian-speaking, and ethnically Romanian—formed the core of Romanian nationalism, regardless of the ruling ideology. This definition did not include the Roman and Greek Catholics of Romanian ethnicity on the grounds that they were not Orthodox Christians. It goes without saying that these criteria also excluded Hungarians, Germans and other ethnic minorities on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion. Second, the paper demonstrates that the principal ideas of Romanian nationalism developed in overt contrast to the internationalist ideological movements of both periods. Both the liberals and the Marxists misunderstood nationalism, claimed Ernest Gellner in 1964: liberals assumed that nationalism was a doomed legacy of outmoded irrationalism, superstition and savagery, and Marxists considered it a necessary but temporary stage in the path to global socialism.1 Gellner's comments are evidently appropriate to Romania, where nationalist responses developed first to the Westernization of the interwar period and second to communist internationalism after 1948.

This paper has two main goals. First, it illuminates continuities between the ideas of "true Romanian-ness" as held by both the Romanian cultural elite and the Romanian political regimes in the interwar and communist periods. A manufactured definition of a "true" Romanian—as a Romanian Orthodox Christian, natively Romanian-speaking, and ethnically Romanian—formed the core of Romanian nationalism, regardless of the ruling ideology. This definition did not include the Roman and Greek Catholics of Romanian ethnicity on the grounds that they were not Orthodox Christians. It goes without saying that these criteria also excluded Hungarians, Germans and other ethnic minorities on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion. Second, the paper demonstrates that the principal ideas of Romanian nationalism developed in overt contrast to the internationalist ideological movements of both periods. Both the liberals and the Marxists misunderstood nationalism, claimed Ernest Gellner in 1964: liberals assumed that nationalism was a doomed legacy of outmoded irrationalism, superstition and savagery, and Marxists considered it a necessary but temporary stage in the path to global socialism. Gellner's comments are evidently appropriate to Romania, where nationalist responses developed first to the Westernization of the interwar period and second to communist internationalism after 1948.

How do states present themselves as inclusive towards migrants and their citizens? This article traces the discourse-to-audience framework through an analysis of the Scottish government's rhetoric on Scottish distinctiveness and its effect on how young migrants see Scotland. In order, we examine how the discourse of Scottish distinctiveness is constructed and conveyed through a close examination of Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's public speeches. Through the examples given we see how an image of Scotland as open, inclusive and outward-looking is invoked. We then examine how the discourse fosters its audiences through narrative interviews conducted with young adult migrants living in Scotland. We operationalise Foucault's theory of governmentality to this extent and argue that the macro narrative of distinctiveness directs the 'conduct of conduct' of young migrants in Scottish society.

This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.

This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.

Turkey under the AKP governments constitutes an exemplary case for understanding how centralized religion, authoritarianism, and economic logic of neoliberalism interrelate. AKP uses state-guided religion to legitimize its neoliberal economic policies and create docile, economized citizens. This article specifically focuses on how pious Muslims resist AKP's religious neoliberalism by focusing on actions and deliberations of Labor and Justice Platform members. Our discussion, which consists of face-to-face interviews with the members of this social movement, delineates the group's justice-oriented, egalitarian, and pluralist orientation of Islam and depicts their dialogues with power – embodied in AKP's domination of Islamic discourse in Turkey. We discuss how group members reinterpret religious concepts such as kader (fate), kısmet (destiny), and sabır (patience) that the AKP uses as micro-discursive mechanisms to create economically compliant citizens. We also discuss the specific frames of resistance they develop in order to break out from the resilience and adaptation that AKP has embedded in its narratives of economy and work. These frames include a sharp criticism of market Islam, a challenge to political Islam and dissent against state Islam. Theoretically, the article refers to neoliberal governmentality and explores its contestation – an understudied concept in Foucauldian studies.

This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.