Suchergebnisse

The paper discusses the role of the European Parliament in the inter-institutional quest for power on the ground of the effectiveness of its control over the supra- national institutions and bodies with the intelligence function as well as in the protection of the right to privacy. The starting assumption is that, despite the Lisbon reform, the powers and jurisdiction of the European Parliament are still quite limited with a view to oversight of the EU policy implementation and the performance of the EU institutions, respectively. The author examines the following cases: the recently revealed practice of massive electronic surveillance of the EU citizens' communication, the unselective processing of personal data, and the semi-secretive set up of a supranational intelligence function out of the MEPs' reach. The analyzed cases show that the European Parliament's control powers are weak when it comes to the issues that demand a narrow technical expertise, but still can endanger civil rights. The author concludes that the protection of the right to privacy can indicate the real power of the Parliament in future dynamics of the supranational institutional framework.

The author constrasts the normativity of Europe with the center-periphery issue. He argues that the normativity of Europe has been challenged by the center-periphery problem. In the first part of the article, the author discusses the normativity of Europe and proposes a new concept – embeded normativity. In the second part, he presents several theories on the center-perifery relations and stresses the relevance of structural assymetries. In the third part, Central and Eastern Europe is compared to Latin America in three historic sequences. The last part is a summary of the arguemts and their relevance for the present crisis that can be understood as an ensemble of structural and systemic tendencies. ; U članku se kontrastira normativnost Evrope sa problematikom centar/periferija. Tvrdi se da je normativnost Evrope izazvana pomenutom problematikom. Shodno tome, u prvom delu se razmatraju elementi normativnosti u Evropi i pokušava se promisliti kategorija utkane normativnosti. U drugom delu se tretiraju teorije o odnosima između centra i periferije, te naglašava se relevantnost teorija koje artikulišu strukturalne asimetrije. U trećem delu se logikom komparativne metode stavljaju u odnos postignuća Srednje i Istočne Evrope i Latinske Amerike, i tematizuje se analitička relevantnost pomenute komparacije s obzirom na tri izabrane istorijske sekvence. U poslednjem delu se rezimira izvedena argumentacija s obzirom na sadašnju krizu i pokazuje da se reperiferijalizacija krize može razumeti kao sklop između strukturalnih i sistematskih tendencija.

In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights. ; In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights.

In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents results of the research in contemporary trends of international economic inequality. The author argues that international economic inequality is a bidirectional and complex concept. The bidirectionality and complexity of the concept is reflected in the fact that there are countries that concurrently converge to or diverge from the most developed countries in terms of their economic development. The key finding presented here is the rise of economic inequality between countries, especially between the poorest and the richest countries. The exceptions are some countries that have made significant progress in the period from 2000 to 2014 in reducing the economic inequality in comparison to the richest countries. The most important factors that have contributed to their progress are distinctive economic institutions and development policies of those countries, as well as the effects of the financial crisis since 2007-2008, which caused a decade-long stagnation in the most developed parts of the world. ; Rad je posvećen istraživanju savremenih trendova međunarodne ekonomske nejednakosti. Namera autora u ovom radu jeste da ukaže da je međunarodna ekonomska nejednakost dvosmeran i složen koncept. Dvosmernost i složenost tog koncepta se ogleda u činjenici da istovremeno postoje zemlje koje se u pogledu razvoja udaljavaju ili približavaju najrazvijenijim državama. Ključni zaključak rada jeste da ekonomska nejednakost između država raste, posebno između najsiromašnijih i najbogatijih država. Izuzetak su pojedine zemlje koje su u periodu od 2000. do 2014. godine učinile značajan iskorak u smanjenju ekonomske nejednakosti u usporedbi sa najbogatijim državama. Najvažnije faktore koji su doprineli tom napretku čine osobene ekonomske institucije i razvojne politike tih država, kao i finansijske krize i višedecenijska stagnacija u najrazvijenijim delovima sveta.

Despite the progress in all fields, modern society is facing the development of the means of political violence. Technological development also has its dangerous side. Many researches in the field of science are often carried out for the sake of military needs, and scientific researchers are often misused in military purpose. Political violence represents one of the greatest threats for the democratic development and human rights in contemporary society. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the position of political violence in contemporary society, particularly focusing on its covert use by the great powers, which is often justified by the struggle for democracy and achieving human rights. In that sense this paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the globalization process, underling that this process has double face, whose negative side can significantly contribute to the spread of political violence. In the second part the author deals with the relations between policy and violence in contemporary society. The paper underlines the need for critical approach to political violence. This critical approach is crucial for understanding of political violence which is the first step in the fight against it. Political violence is not always negative and sometimes can have a positive role, especially when it comes to defensive war and combating terrorism. But the main problem here is that this can be misused to justify political violence in general. What is positive and what is the negative role of political violence often depends on the perspective of observation. Unfortunately, it seems that the privilege to enforce the standard today is reserved only for great powers, and they have become main judges who decide when political violence is to be approved of or not. This is the way in which a war becomes humanitarian interventions, protection of human rights, etc. That is why it is of great importance to encourage and initiate all actions in science which aim to understand and counter this complex phenomenon.

The subject matter of research in this paper is theoretical controversy related to the definition of right-wing extremism. Given the fact that extremism is a variable, amorphous and insufficiently researched phenomenon, largely conditioned by time, space, political and cultural differences, there is a great confusion in the field of political science when defining right-wing extremism. The problem of researching right-wing extremism is additionally complicated by various terms that are being used in the contemporary literature as its synonyms, such as right-wing radicalism, neo-Fascism, ultra-radicalism, etc. In order to provide the most valid theoretical determination of right-wing extremism, the author provides a detailed analysis of all the components constituting this phenomenon and examines their causality. In the political praxis, the term extremism is extensively abused, which additionally complicates its determination. Videlicet, politicians often use term 'extremist' in order to discredit their political opponents. While during the French revolution aristocracy saw the bourgeoisie as extremists, the members of the working class later stated that the bourgeoisie were extremists. The problem lies in the fact that, in politics, extremists are not only the ones who use violence as modus operandi; indeed, it is also used by political opponents who do not belong to the extreme political option. Another aggravating factor in defining right-wing extremism is that many administrative and academic definitions do not make a clear distinction between extremism and related phenomena, such as terrorism, radicalism and populism. Extremism is most often equaled with terrorism, which gives rise to another problem in defining this phenomenon. The relation between extremism and terrorism is the relation of general and specific. Namely, every act of terrorism is concurrently considered to be an act of extremism, but not vice versa, given the fact that every act of extremism does not lead towards a higher level of political violence (i.e. towards terrorism). Even in the terms of legal sanctioning, it is much easier to incriminate terrorism in comparison to extremism. The Serbian criminal legislation envisages relevant punishment for committing an act of terrorism, without even mentioning extremism, which implies that there is no penalty prescribed for committing an act of extremism. Despite numerous academic and administrative definitions on the concept of extremism, there is still a lack of a balanced approach to defining right-wing extremism, which is also largely conditioned by political definitions. The most prominent problem in addressing the social phenomena such as right-wing extremism lies in the fact that these social phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically objective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial and socio-political context.