This Working Paper investigates the challenges South Sudanese returnees and displaced persons face from their very own perspective. Building on field research in the autumn and winter of 2015 , it analyses the patterns of return and coping strategies of returnees, as well as any assistance that aid agencies can provide. The findings indicate that return is neither a simple, linear nor necessarily durable solution. From the viewpoint of the returnees, the main challenges of return are the lack of physical security, food, water, education and jobs. As resources in South Sudan are very scarce overall because of a collapsing economy and continued fighting, competition over resources between returnees and local communities, as well among returnees, is common. The easy access to small arms, ethnic divisions and mistrust between groups further exacerbate these tensions. The sustainability of return seems to depend largely on how well returnees can access resources at their return location and thus secure a livelihood for them and their families, which, in turn, is not only influenced by the social network and political access the returnees have but also the economic situation at the return location. Aid agencies therefore should support livelihood opportunities and early development programmes at the preferred return locations, including local communities and youth groups in their efforts, to reduce feelings of inequality between groups. Besides diversified and long-term economic development initiatives, higher education opportunities as well as psychological support must also be provided to guarantee self-sufficiency of returnees and prevent renewed displacement.
There are still large deficiencies in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and conventional ammunition (CA) storage and management in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states. Particularly state capacities to plan and implement physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) interventions remain limited. Addressing these capacity shortfalls, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG, with Germany as the lead nation), in collaboration with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, has implemented a PSSM train-the-trainer project since 2014. This report provides an overview of the project's achievements and challenges, and gives recommendations on the way forward to enhance PSSM capacity in the region. The information provided is mostly drawn from interviews with training participants.
The Greater Sahel region has never experienced such a high-level of arms availability. Given the large array of efforts now in place across the region to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), it is pertinent to take stock, assess who is doing what, and reflect on opportunities to reduce programmatic duplication through enhanced co-ordination. This Working Paper is a first step in this regard and provides an overview of small arms control efforts in the Greater Sahel region for 2015 to 2016. The information presented is drawn from a practitioner survey and accompanying literature review, and outlines not only current small arms control projects in 12 countries but also current capacity shortfalls. Produced as part of a joint African Union-Germany project on enhanced SALW control, this Working Paper aims to serve as a continually updated reference document, which will eventually become a comprehensive repository of SALW projects in the Greater Sahel.
The proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa is partly attributable to weak national controls, the porosity of state borders, and ongoing armed conflict on the continent. To address these problems a number of initiatives have been undertaken by states, regional organisations, and other various implementing agencies with the aim of enhancing small arms control. This report examines these initiatives over a ten year period (2005–2015) in sixteen countries across the Greater Sahel region and generates a set of lessons learned. These lessons cover topics such as project duplication, the impact of internal donor restructuring, and the importance of identifying the needs and implementing capacities of local partners. While these lessons are intended to contribute to the existing body of research on small arms control, they are also, more importantly, intended to help donors and practitioners improve project design and impact.
As the numbers of returnees in many regions of South Sudan increase, and livelihood opportunities need to be established to foster development and prevent new causes of displacement, aid agencies should address the full cycle of displacement to reintegration at a given location. Programmes therefore have to focus on issues beyond emergency aid and be long-term until returnees have indeed become self-sufficient. Young people are very influential in stabilizing the peace process. To promote local economic development, jobs and higher education, for instance, should therefore be offered not only to returnees, but also to hosts to provide alternatives to engaging in violence. Besides vocational training, "spaces" for recreational activities should also be established. Trainings are particular successful when communities participate in designing the programmes. A diversification of income activities (e.g. rural and urban) also promotes the sustainability of return. Local dynamics have to be studied beforehand to prevent the failure of programmes and enhance sustainability. Dialogue platforms help to share information about the peace process and the situation at the return location. Radio broadcasts, in particular, have proven to be a good practice to share information and spread the word of peace. The media thus can be an important tool for fostering communication between groups and, consequently, the reintegration of returnees.
Auffanglager dürfen nur eine Übergangslösung darstellen. Mittelfristig ist ein rascher Übergang zu "Cash for Rent"-Modellen unter dem Dach einer internationalen Organisation, wie zum Beispiel den Vereinten Nationen, nötig. Um langfristig integrative wirtschaftliche Anreize zu schaffen, sollten Mietzuschüsse von Anfang an gewährt und mit beruflicher Bildung, Hochschulbildung und "Cash for Work"-Modellen kombiniert werden. Die Bewertung der regionalen oder lokalen Daseinsvorsorge muss mit profunden Konflikt- und Marktanalysen verknüpft werden. Darauf basierend sollten Erwerbsgrundlagen und Märkte (neu) aufgebaut werden. Statt zu einem ineffizientem Wirtschaftssystem zurückzukehren, gilt es kleine und mittlere Unternehmen besonders zu fördern. Maßnahmen der Regionalregierungen zu Förderung von lokaler Integration und Reintegration sollten gefördert werden. Dafür muss in den Aufnahmegemeinschaften die erforderliche zusätzliche Infrastruktur (Wohnungsbau / Bildung / Gesundheit) geschaffen werden. Dadurch würde die Solidarität mit den Geflüchteten honoriert werden, anstatt soziale Spannungen durch Beschränkung von Hilfe auf besonders schutzbedürftige Gruppen zu erhöhen. Minderheiten- und Menschenrechtsgarantien, (Wieder-)Eingliederungsprojekte und gute Regierungsführung sollten zur Voraussetzung für Hilfeleistungen gemacht werden. Um die Aussöhnung voranzutreiben, sollten alle Aktivitäten mit vertrauensbildenden Maßnahmen verknüpft werden. Im Rahmen von Infrastrukturprojekten sollten Räume der Begegnung zwischen Aufnahmegemeinschaften und Vertriebenen ausgebaut werden. Dabei sind allerdings traditionelle Strukturen ethnisch- religiöser Koexistenz zu berücksichtigen. Traumata sind weit verbreitet und müssen bei allen Projekten in entsprechenden psychosozialen Maßnahmen Berücksichtigung finden.
Camps can only be a strictly short-term solution. In the mid-term, cash-for-rent schemes under the roof of an international organization such as the United Nations are necessary. Add rent subsidies from the beginning and combine vocational training, higher education and cash-for-work schemes in parallel to create inclusive economic incentives in the long run. Connect profound conflict and market analyses to (re-)build sustainable livelihood activities and markets. Rather than returning to an inefficient economic system, small- and medium-sized enterprises ought to be promoted. Foster local integration and reintegration policies of regional governments by creating the necessary additional infrastructure (housing/education/health) in destination communities as a compensation for the solidarity of hosting populations rather than increasing social tensions by targeting specific groups - such as vulnerable persons. Reward minority/human rights guarantees, (re-) integration projects and good government practice by making them a prerequisite for assistance. Frame all activities with inter-community trustbuilding activities intended to foster reconciliation. Infrastructure projects should create spaces that connect hosts and displaced persons while respecting traditional structures of ethno-religious co-existence amongst different communities. Traumata are prevalent and have to be addressed in all projects by providing respective psychosocial support.
The number of beneficiaries is not an indicator of the quality of programmes. Short-term measures that try to reach large number of people, such as cash assistance, create dependency and cannot enhance sustainable livelihoods. If applied, they need to be embedded within long-term approaches. Different livelihood programmes, from vocational trainings to work programmes, should thus build on, rather than compete with, each other as well as take into account the existing skills of refugees. Job opportunity is one of the main reasons, next to security and social ties, why people move to the southeast of Turkey. This suggests that incentives for employers to hire refugees should be increased. The way forward includes measures to build databases on demand and supply, to assist the development and implementation of business plans in collaboration with refugees, and to roll out market-aligned trainings. At least six months on-the-job trainings can, furthermore, establish trust between employer and employee as well as lead to long-term contracts that will stabilize the livelihoods of refugees. Many refugees, aid agencies and local authorities have no or misleading information about the livelihood activities being offered locally, a situation that causes frustration and mistrust. Fostering more exchange between national and local bureaus of authorities and aid organizations can increase transparency. Livelihood programmes should also extend their reach to nonSyrian refugee groups, local communities and those outside of community centres to prevent resentment between groups.
Before considering cantonment, it is of utmost importance to reach widespread agreement in society and parliament on political principles guiding the mid-term transformation of the country's security sector (e.g. ethnic inclusion, militia integration and professionalization) as these will guide the reorganization and demobilization of armed forces. Since many opposition groups are not represented in the current peace process, the cantonment of forces that are party to the peace agreement would be of limited effect as main conflict drivers are left out. On the contrary, the process can even deepen exclusion. To avoid this, the High-Level Revitalization Forum needs to generate inclusive dialogue with the opposition movements - even those that are non-signatories to the ARCSS. Force assembly applies to the opposition as much as to the SPLA-In Government. The ongoing debate in Juba about cantonment, however, only addresses the assembly of SPLA-In Opposition. The transitional government needs to send a strong signal that it is serious about force assembly by moving its troops back to the barracks. From an economic perspective, resource-intensive, long-term programmes linked to cantonment are not feasible. These may also have adverse consequences from a peace perspective as they encourage new armed groups to join the fighting.
NATO member states should expel Turkey from membership unless, it withdraws its troops from Syria. To secure the northern border, the UN could offer the immediate deployment of troops to Afrin, which could be extended to a Grand Bargain for other oppositioncontrolled areas. This deal would have to include Russia. Provided that major alliances among the armed opposition consent, shared responsibility for protection by the UN and Russia provides an opportunity for ceasefires, the deployment of UN blue helmets, a reformed state system without Assad and deradicalization programmes. It could be achieved through a Grand Bargain. If Russia is to change its role from an aggressor to that of a mediator, the attacks in eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Hama countryside and elsewhere must stop with immediate effect. The strategic forced relocation of radical fighters by the regime alliances to areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), for instance, leads to local populations being terrorized. Growing poverty and financial incentives draw fighters towards extremist groups. Expertise by Russia and the United Nations must be combined to develop and implement de-radicalization programmes if further escalation of terror is to be stopped locally and globally. The moderate civil-political opposition, e. g. Higher Negotiation Committee should be a key actor to shape political reform in the Grand Bargain and to create an internationally acceptable democratic and inclusive framework. Donors should, therefore, continue the financial and ideational support of the opposition. This support, however, ought to be coordinated and allow for self-determined prioritisation of needs (e.g. legal advice, negotiation training).
In fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS), largescale infrastructure projects often connect areas under various forms of rule. Donor agencies and development banks should demand from contractors conducting feasibility studies to include conflictsensitive employment (CSE) strategies for those parts of the infrastructure project that are affected by violent conflict. In addition to available international procurement guidelines, donor agencies and development banks should require bidders to outline a CSE strategy. They should demand from bidders a convincing calculation of the costs of CSE, especially in comparison to the costs of anticipated security measures for the duration of the project, its maintenance and protection for a specified period (at least five years) after completion. The CSE framework (Grawert et al., 2017) should be attached to the tender as a guideline. As changes in control over areas and settings of armed conflict are common in FCAS, conditions for company operations in large-scale infrastructure building will change, too. While bidders' contingency plans should include such potential changes, donor agencies or development banks should allow for budget adjustments if these changes exceed the anticipated volume of the project. Local companies often are familiar with local power relations and able to assess project risks in local areas realistically. Donor agencies and development banks should require from bidders an initial outline of units that will have to be constructed by local companies, and bidders should detail the envisaged CSE strategies. Donor-funded skills upgrading measures could enable local companies to carry out part of the operations required for the large-scale infrastructure project. Such projects will thus become development corridors that enhance mobility and communication as well as professional qualification of the local inhabitants.