Introduction -- Regime complexity and main argument -- Dramatis institutiones -- Euro crisis in a nutshell -- Greece 2010 -- The Troika, Ireland, and Portugal -- Spain and Italy -- United States and International Monetary Fund -- New facilities and institutions -- Greece 2012 and Cyprus 2013 -- Greece, the crisis continues -- Lessons and conclusions
in: C. Randall Henning, "The ECB as a Strategic Actor: Central Banking in a Politically Fragmented Monetary Union," in Europe's Crises: Economic and Political Challenges of the Monetary Union, edited by James A. Caporaso and Martin Rhodes (New York: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).
Existing explanations of European monetary integration, emphasizing economic interdependence, issue linkage, institutions, and domestic politics, take a predominantly regional approach. In the international monetary thesis developed here, I argue that U.S. policy disturbances, transmitted through the international monetary system, created compelling incentives for European states to cooperate on exchange-rate and monetary policy. I develop a general theory of macroeconomic power, based on open economy macroeconomics, and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration. This article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the European Union by examining four periods in which the United States acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system. European governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the United States supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption. The evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal.