Cyclical wages in a search-and-bargaining model with large firms
In: NBER working paper series 12415
In: NBER working paper series 12415
In: CESifo working paper series 2178
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.
In: Discussion paper series 6424
In: International trade
In: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems 170
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games
In: Warwick economic research papers 186
Introduction / José María Miranda Boto and Elisabeth Brameshuber -- Collective bargaining and the gig economy : reality and possibilities / José María Miranda Boto -- The boundaries between collective agreements and statutory legislation in the gig economy / Piera Loi -- A long road towards the regulation of platform work in the EU / Luca Ratti -- Collective bargaining for platform workers and the European Social Charter / Barbara Kresal -- The role of national courts in protecting platform workers : a comparative analysis / Jeremias Adams-Prassl, Sylvaine Laulom and Yolanda Maneiro Vázquez -- Why collective bargaining is a 'must' for platform workers and how to achieve it / Tamás Gyulavári and Gábor Kártyás -- Voluntary commitments as alternative instruments for standard-setting? The example of the German 'code of conduct - paid crowdsourcing for the better' / Judith Brockmann -- The 'smart' Trade Union : new strategies for a digitalised labour market / Felicia Roşioru -- Algorithms, discrimination and collective bargaining / Teresa Coelho Moreira -- Protection of gig workers against contract termination : not for everyone? / Jakub Tomšej -- The personal dimension of collective bargaining in the gig economy : the Spanish perspective / Daniel Pérez del Prado -- The shortcomings of the North American collective bargaining model with regard to platform workers : the Turkish perspective / Kübra Doğan Yenisey -- Extending the personal scope of collective bargaining as a chance for gig workers? The Polish Case / Marta Kozak-Maśnicka and Łukasz Pisarczyk -- (A fundamental right to) collective bargaining for economically dependent, employee-like workers / Elisabeth Brameshuber.
In: NBER working paper series 13142
In "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families.
In: Springer eBook Collection
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored
In: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 518
The book investigates bargaining between two agents. It presents the history of bargaining analysis from Francis Y. Edgeworth's first formal study, followed by cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models, to recent stochastic evolutionary investigations. Connections between the results obtained by different methodology are highlighted. The established theory is generalized with respect to its underlying rationality assumptions. Links between usually neglected psychological factors - e.g. the persistence and capriciousness of an agent - and average bargaining success are identified. Applications of bargaining models contribute to the measurement of decision power and to the discussion of distributive justice
In: The Peace science studies series
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