Static Bargaining Models
In: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Union Wage Bargaining and Economic Growth, S. 13-21
In: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Union Wage Bargaining and Economic Growth, S. 13-21
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 626-629
ISSN: 1537-5935
ABSTRACTThis article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model's core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to focus on different aspects of the model's logic.
In: Cornell International Affairs review: CIAR journal, Band 9, Heft 1
From the Ku Klux Klan's lynchings to al Qaeda's World Trade Center attacks, terrorist organizations have historically exploited fear and destruction to achieve their end goals. Attacking both a nation's government and population, terrorist organizations inflict damage on their intended audiences, or targets. This paper explores how terrorist organizations interact with their targets. In my analysis, I assume complete rationality and build an infinite bargaining model of political concession between both actors. I claim that terrorist organizations bargain with targets in the long run by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation.
In: American political science review, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 73-88
ISSN: 0003-0554
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural & preference parameters, & equivalence of equilibrium outcomes & the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, & it yields a "continuous" generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings & provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative & parliamentary politics. 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 77 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 27-43
ISSN: 1537-5927
The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.(Übernahme aus DE, SWP-Wdr)
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 73-88
ISSN: 1537-5943
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a "continuous" generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.
SSRN
Working paper
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 626
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 626-639
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 27-43
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 7, Heft 1, S. 21-25
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: The European Union Decides, S. 86-123
In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 1-34
ISSN: 1469-3569
This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes.