Diplomacy in a social media environment: the bargaining model revisited
In: Canadian foreign policy: La politique étrangère du Canada, S. 1-15
ISSN: 2157-0817
In: Canadian foreign policy: La politique étrangère du Canada, S. 1-15
ISSN: 2157-0817
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 525
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: European journal of political economy, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 317-340
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12415
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In: APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
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Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
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In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 459-480
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: NBER Working Paper No. w2754
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In: Public choice, Band 176, Heft 3-4, S. 557-565
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. WP-2018-8
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In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3, S. 345-366
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3-4, S. 345-366
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: International negotiation: a journal of theory and practice, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 107-131
ISSN: 1571-8069
AbstractThis article examines various phases in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan using a Multi-Issue Bargaining Model ‐ a modified version of the traditional bargaining model. It offers micro-level and phase-by-phase analysis of the negotiation process, mediation efforts and proposed mechanisms for the settlement of the NK conflict. Issues on the negotiation table and the evolution of the Azerbaijani and Armenian positions over time constitute a central focus of the article. The multi-issue model is applied to each negotiation phase in the NK conflict from 1994 until 2009.
In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ; Volume 16 ; Issue 10
Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents&rsquo ; powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win&ndash ; win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent&rsquo ; s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.
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