Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
In: Journal of political economy, Band 108, Heft 5, S. 1006-1021
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 108, Heft 5, S. 1006-1021
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 459-479
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 59-61
ISSN: 1467-8586
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 371-375
ISSN: 1460-3667
Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from document analyses.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 371-375
Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from document analyses. 18 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]
In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, Band 2006, Heft 1, S. 65-114
ISSN: 2150-8372
In: FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. WP-2018-8
SSRN
Working paper
In: CESifo working paper series 2178
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2178
SSRN
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 819-837
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 371-376
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Economica, Band 62, Heft 248, S. 551
In: American journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 819
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: Economica, Band 62, Heft 247, S. 313
SSRN
Working paper