Bounded Rationality
In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, S. 297-322
ISSN: 1094-2939
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In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, S. 297-322
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 297-321
ISSN: 1545-1577
▪ Abstract Findings from behavioral organization theory, behavioral decision theory, survey research, and experimental economics leave no doubt about the failure of rational choice as a descriptive model of human behavior. But this does not mean that people and their politics are irrational. Bounded rationality asserts that decision makers are intendedly rational; that is, they are goal-oriented and adaptive, but because of human cognitive and emotional architecture, they sometimes fail, occasionally in important decisions. Limits on rational adaptation are of two types: procedural limits, which limit how we go about making decisions, and substantive limits, which affect particular choices directly. Rational analysis in institutional contexts can serve as a standard for adaptive, goal-oriented human behavior. In relatively fixed task environments, such as asset markets or elections, we should be able to divide behavior into adaptive, goal-oriented behavior (that is, rational action) and behavior that is a consequence of processing limits, and we should then be able to measure the deviation. The extent of deviation is an empirical issue. These classes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and they may be examined empirically in situations in which actors make repeated similar choices.
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 205-230
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Zeuthen lecture book series
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 811-817
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Decisions in economics and finance: a journal of applied mathematics
ISSN: 1129-6569, 2385-2658
AbstractThis note in the Milestones series is dedicated to the paper "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", written by Herbert Simon and published in 1955 on the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
In: The Aaron Wildavsky forum for public policy, 6
In Bounded Rationality and Politics, Jonathan Bendor considers two schools of behavioral economics--the first guided by Tversky and Kahneman's work on heuristics and biases, which focuses on the mistakes people make in judgment and choice; the second as described by Gerd Gigerenzer's program on fast and frugal heuristics, which emphasizes the effectiveness of simple rules of thumb. Finding each of these radically incomplete, Bendor's illuminating analysis proposes Herbert Simon's pathbreaking work on bounded rationality as a way to reconcile the inconsistencies between the two camps. Bendor sho.
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 354-372
ISSN: 1537-5943
Two bounded rationality theories of federal budgetary decision making are operationalized and tested within a stochastic process framework. Empirical analyses of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson domestic budget data, compiled from internal Office of Management and Budget planning documents, support the theory of serial judgment over the theory of incrementalism proposed by Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky. The new theory highlights both the structure of ordered search through a limited number of discrete alternatives and the importance of informal judgmental evaluations. Serial judgment theory predicts not only that most programs most of the time will receive allocations which are only marginally different from the historical base, but also that occasional radical and even "catastrophic" changes are the normal result of routine federal budgetary decision making. The methodological limitations of linear regression techniques in explanatory budgetary research are also discussed.
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 0039-6338
World Affairs Online
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 1468-2699
In: Schriftenreihe volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 192
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2
ISSN: 0003-0554
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality, but rather, on players' higher-order beliefs about the frequency of such deviations. We assume that there exists a probability p such that all players believe, with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy to compute, also for games of incomplete information. Importantly, they can be applied to observed frequencies of play for arbitrary normal-form games to derive a measure of rationality p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization. ; Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59225-P), as well as from the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant ECO2009-11213), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2012-31326) and from the Basque Government (Grants IT568-13 and POS-2015-1-0022).
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