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Working paper
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 0039-6338
World Affairs Online
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 1468-2699
In: Schriftenreihe volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 192
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 575
SSRN
Working paper
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality, but rather, on players' higher-order beliefs about the frequency of such deviations. We assume that there exists a probability p such that all players believe, with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy to compute, also for games of incomplete information. Importantly, they can be applied to observed frequencies of play for arbitrary normal-form games to derive a measure of rationality p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization. ; Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59225-P), as well as from the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant ECO2009-11213), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2012-31326) and from the Basque Government (Grants IT568-13 and POS-2015-1-0022).
BASE
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 203, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractEpistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to 'normality reliabilism', a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does.
In: Dahlem workshop reports
Rethinking rationality / Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten -- What is bounded rationality? / Reinhard Selten -- The adaptive toolbox / Gerd Gigerenzer -- Fast and frugal heuristics for environmentally bounded minds / Peter M. Todd -- Evolutionary adaptation and the economic concept of bounded rationality--a dialogue / Peter Hammerstein -- Group report : Is there evidence for an adaptive toolbox? / Abdolkarim Sadrieh ... [et al.] -- The fiction of optimization / Gary Klein -- Preferential choice and adaptive strategy use / John W. Payne and James R. Bettman -- Comparing fast and frugal heuristics and optimal models / Laura Martignon -- Group report : Why and when do simple heuristics work? / Daniel G. Goldstein ... [et al.] -- Emotions and cost-benefit assessment : the role of shame and self-esteem in risk taking / Daniel M.T. Fessler -- Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game / Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth -- Imitation, social learning, and preparedness as mechanisms of bounded rationality / Kevin N. Laland -- Decision making in superorganisms : how collective wisdom arises from the poorly informed masses / Thomas D. Seeley --Group report : Effects of emotions and social processes on bounded rationality / Barbara A. Mellers ... [et al.] -- Norms and bounded rationality / Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson -- Prominence theory as a tool to model boundedly rational decisions / Wulf Albers -- Goodwill accounting and the process of exchange / Kevin A. McCabe and Vernon L. Smith -- Group report : What is the role of culture in bounded rationality? / Joseph Henrich ... [et al.]
Although the challenge of enriching the psychology of decision makers in economic models has been at the frontier of theoretical research in the last decade, there has been no graduate-level, theory-oriented textbook to cover developments in the last 10-15 years. Thus, Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization offers a welcome and crucial new understanding of market behavior-it challenges conventional wisdom in ways that are interesting and economically significant, and which in the end effect the well-being of all market participants.
In: European journal of economics, law and politics, Band 6, Heft 1
ISSN: 2518-3761
In: ICMA public management magazine: PM, Band 91, Heft 5, S. 3-5
ISSN: 0033-3611
In: Modern Developments in Behavioral Economics, S. 35-106
In: Routledge advances in behavioural economics and finance 2