Suchergebnisse

THE CHINESE INTELLECTUAL DIASPORA, WHICH HAS GROWN SINCE THE 1989 TIANANMEN SQUARE VIOLENCE, IS WRESTLING WITH FACTIONALISM AND A CRISIS OF MEANING HAUNTINGLY SIMILAR TO THE CRISIS THAT THEIR PREDECESSORS FACED 100 YEARS AGO. TODAY'S CHINESE INTELLECTUAL EXILES ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE A MAJOR ROLE IN THEIR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE UNLESS THE SYSTEM IS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED.

Problems and prospects for China's exiles, particularly those involved in the 1989 protest movement. Some reference to Eastern Europe's impact on China.

Until quite recently most commentators assumed that the international relations and political economy of the Pacific region would be dominated by the US-Japan relationship for the forseeable future. Two new factors have emerged in recent years to upset that judgement. The first is undoubtedly the rapid rise to economic prominence of China as a result of the post 1985 'economic miracle'; the second is the arrival of Chinese diaspora business as major players in the Asia-Pacific. This is evidenced by their ablity to outinvest Japan in the region by a consistently large margin since 1992 but particularly by their important role in the re-industrialisation of China and the latter's emergence as a major exporter. The Chinese diaspora presents a particular problem for International Political Economy (IPE): a series of highly integrated manufacturing, trading and investing networks operating throughout the region and beyond but lacking the backing of a powerful state. This purpose of this article is to begin the task of trying to conceptualise this phenomenon within IPE.

Throughout the second half of this century, many forces have come to erode the autonomy and sovereignty of states, both at the supranational and the subnational levels. At the supranational level, transnational organizations, both official and non-governmental, exert pressure on states to conform to their collective policies and standards. Multinational growth triangles also reject the nation-state as a fundamental economic unit. At the subnational level, the state faces the challenge of managing various regions in a manner that allows regional governments the flexibility to form policies corresponding to local conditions while the center continues to maintain sufficient power to deal with national problems.

Between the end of 1993 and the spring of 1994, about 5000 Mainland Chinese rejected refugee (MCR) claimants mobilized themselves in Canada to lobby the Canadian government to make a special policy for them so that they could be considered for landed immigration status. The mobilization, launched by the Mainland Chinese Refugee Organization (MCRO), won wide sympathy and support from the Chinese community and mainstream society in Canada. The MCRs stated their goals and demands through Chinese ethnic media and mainstream media, started a dialogue with the Canadian government and even staged a protest in front of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. On July 7,1994, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada issued a policy, known as the Deferred Removal Orders Class (DROC) program, designed for claimants in similar situations. In this paper, we examine the process of the movement, analyze its features, and discuss its effects on the Chinese diaspora community in Canada. The movement emerged out of the 'fear" of a group of Chinese claimants, caused by the threat of being deported from Canada. The success of the movement was based on the mobilization of ethnic and social resources by the MCRO.

The problem of diasporas -- The Jewish diaspora -- The Armenian diaspora -- The Gypsy diaspora -- The Black diaspora -- The Chinese diaspora -- The Indian diaspora -- The Irish diaspora -- The Greek diaspora -- The Lebanese diaspora -- The Palestinian diaspora -- The Vietnamese and Korean diasporas