Suchergebnisse

Two ambiguities in the theory of just institutions are explored. If the "fair value of political liberty" is given the weight Rawls claims it should be given, an egalitarian interpretation of justice as fairness emerges. In that case, the lexical ordering of the two principles of justice is impaired, & restrictions in the total system of liberties may be needed to maintain the fair value of political liberty. The difference principle is shown to have two interpretations: the familiar maximin rule & a principle of "compensating inequalities," which are derived from Rawl's contribution curve analysis. This is the principle Rawls uses in his theory of just institutions. However, it is the maximin rule that Rawls seeks to derive from the original position. This derivation is deficient, owing to Rawls's unconvincing argument for an "as-if" risk aversion of rational contractors. Given different "as-if" risk preferences, one can arrive at a utilitarian contract, within the framework of Rawls's original position. The relation between justice as fairness & Rawls's account of civil disobedience is analyzed. Rawls uses the lexical priority rules to decide when civil disobedience is justified, & excludes infractions of the difference principle. This exclusion, while possibly convincing in a strictly egalitarian interpretation of justice as fairness, cannot successfully be defended. Modified HA.