Suchergebnisse

The Evolution of Ideas About Freedom of Thought. Philosophical-Legal Approach "Thought is free," said Marcus Tullius Cicero in the first century BC. The international society managed to give legal content to the famous quote only at the end of the 19th century, the beginning of the 20th century. Thanks to the titanic efforts of the notorious personalities of all time, philosophers and jurists, mankind has included freedom of thought in the list of fundamental freedoms and civil rights, which belong to every person from birth and which the state cannot deprive. Freedom of thought is an essential condition of a democratic society, of a rule of law. Moreover, this absolutely justified can be considered as the most important value of a prosperous society. Being fully exploited freedom of thought brings benefits only to the individual and to society as a whole. "Gândirea este liberă" afirma Marcus Tullius Cicero în secolul I î.e.n. Societatea internaţională a reuşit să dea conţinut juridic celebrului citat abia la sfârşitul secolului XIX, începutul secolului XX. Datorită eforturilor titanice ale personalităţilor notorii ale tuturor timpurilor, filozofi şi jurişti, omenirea a înscris libertatea de gândire în lista libertăţilor şi drepturilor civile fundamentale, care aparţin fiecărei persoane din momentul naşterii şi de care statul n-o poate priva. Libertatea de gândire este o condiţie esenţială a unei societăţi democratice, a unui stat de drept. Mai mult, aceasta absolut justificat poate fi considerată drept cea mai importantă valoare a unei societăţi prospere. Fiind valorificată plenar, libertatea de gândire aduce doar beneficii, atât individului, cât şi societăţii în ansamblu.

The article shows the way in which the journal Conservatorul Constanţei illustrated the main subject of local political debate in 1909-1912: the issue of the political rights for the citizens of Dobrudja. This debate is significant as it unfolds in the same time as the consolidation of the local branch of the Conservative Party, as well as the participation of its representatives to the parliamentary elections in 1912. These are the first elections in which the citizens of Dobrudja take part, after they were reintegrated within the frontiers of the Romanian state (1878) and after they obtained political rights (1912).

By analyzing the parliamentary debates of 1866-1867 on foreigners' (notably Jews) requests for naturalization and property rights, this article tries to identify the parliamentarians' answers to the following questions: On what grounds were foreigners accepted as Romanian citizens? How did the parliamentarians define the foreigner? What was required from a foreigner in order to become a citizen? The overall objective is to identify some major themes that preoccupied the representatives of the nation, circumscribed around the primordial character of the "union" and of "nationality", with a special focus on the solutions proposed by the liberals. The argument is that the Parliament, by its vote, instead of granting citizenship rights, merely established the conditions according to which one could become a Romanian. In other words, the Romanian legislators considered it to be of outmost importance to recognize the quality of being a Romanian, that is, a member of an ethnic body, and not to define citizenship as a legal membership. "To be a Romanian" was more of an ethnic belonging, a "given", than citizenship or civic loyalty, defined through political and civic rights. It seems that citizenship was crushed by the primordial character of ethnic loyalty and by the weight of the state as expression and guarantor of the Romanian nation. In engaging the parliamentary debates about naturalization, the article attempts, first, to draw more nuanced conclusions about the lately much-debated character of citizenship in Romania and Eastern Europe during the mid-19th century. And second, such an analysis may provide a better understanding of the nature of political representation during the same period.

Such famous jurists as H. Kelsen, J. Chevallier, Giorgio del Vecchio, A. Hauriou, Mircea Djuvara, François Rigaux, Ion Deleanu, Tudor Drăganu etc. expressed their views on the principles of the rule of law, which persisted for several centuries. The rule of law is never a perfect reality and no country can claim to have achieved perfection, because the rule of law is not obtained easily, it is the joint effort of the state authorities, civil society, and all the citizens. José Manuel Durão Barroso stated that "The rule of law is the cornerstone of the European Union, there is no true democracy without the rule of law and without democracy the rule of law is just an instrument in the hand of the rulers". While the European Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding stated that "In parallel to the economic and financial crisis, we also have been confronted on several occasions with a true "rule of law" crisis. At the beginning of April 2014, in Innsbruck (Austria), was held the academic conference entitled "Strengthening the rule of law in Europe - from a common concept to mechanisms of implementation". On April 21, 2014, the European Parliament noted, according to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, as any European country can apply to become a member of the European Union, given that they realize the principles of democracy, the fundamentals of freedom, human and minority rights and ensure the rule of law. Thus, achieving the rule of law in Moldova was and will be a permanent and current task in the coming years.

More often than not, the State did not acknowledge the matrimonial norms as settled by the Church. This relation seems to have altered towards the end of the 19th century, when the State succeeded in imposing on the Church the respect for the general civil framework. Yet, the change was not radical. The Church and the State were still pretty connected. The State acknowledged the Church's right to be in charge with officiating marriages, with bed and home separation according to the requirements of each confession. However, the State had the right to supervise the civil and military status, the relationship between the spouses, legacy, legal guardianship, the issue of supporting children and spouses and many others. The Church admitted the involvement of the State in major demographic issues in an individual's life.
As time went by, the State became more and more complex while its legislation became ever more "lay". It is true that willy-nilly lay legislation borrowed norms and regulations belonging to Church's legislation. The frail State – Church dualism on family law was influenced by lay laws enforcing the lay legitimacy of important moments in man's life. Matrimonial laws as set out in 1894 were the most complex laws in the 19th century. Due to their clarity, they managed to put an end to misunderstandings between lay and Church authorities. Moreover, the matrimonial issues between different confessions were in favour of the State. Civil law very clearly favoured family and children's interests. They were all conceived to better supervise individual's education in a moral family where the Church would still have an influence.

The jurisdiction regulation applicable in the EU Member States has the vocation to
govern all civil and commercial legal matters, in the absence of express limitations provided in
its content. In addition to the general rule establishing the jurisdiction to settle a specific case
with internationality elements in favor of the courts of the defendant's domicile, the
Regulation also sets out a number of other special provisions, including, among others,
litigation arising out of consumer contracts. Special rules of jurisdiction have been set out in
this matter, in order to protect the consumer, who is considered the weaker part of the contract
from an economic and informational point of view. Exceptions to these special jurisdictional
rules have been also provided, given the significantly closer balance found in certain contracts
between the rights and obligations of the signatory parties, professional (economic operator)
and consumer.
This article aims to address the issue of the derogation from the special rules of
competence established in favor of consumers and, in particular, the interplay between these
derogations and the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts.

Divorce, common-law marriage and illegitimacy (irrespective of its forms) were, no matter the society typology as the phenomenon is approached, forms of social deviation that entailed the dilution of the family image and norms. We do not discuss here about a dilution of the traditional norms concerning family, as someone might misunderstand, it was an erosion of the idea of family in general. The "family" could acquire different forms as compared to the "official" one. Paradoxically, all these were not only the result of personal emancipation, when the youth broke from the traditional norms, which were strongly influenced by religious norms and values, and would have got involved in "dangerous and shameful relationships". The peasant "forgot" to marry his woman not out of emancipation. The theory of personal emancipation leading to the erosion of the idea of family through the dilution of traditional norms, which was valid from the urban perspective (here, due to the affirmation of modernity, the alterity of religious norms led to such relationships), was not supported in the peasant countryside.
The Church fought all these. In fact, the bishopric sent guidelines to priests to take steps against common-law marriages very often. Despite priests' endeavours, the results were not considerable. Few priests could boast (after the first recommendation) in their subsequent parish report to have significantly contributed to diminishing the number of common-law marriages in their parish. The Church faced another issue brought about by its long debate with the State to control the act of marriage. The marriage laws set out in 1894 were the most complex laws regulating the political-religious relations in the matrimonial field in the second half of the 19th century. Due to their clarity, they managed to put an end to the conflicts between the lay and church authorities. Moreover, the debate concerning matrimonial issues for different confessions ended, too, in favour of the State. The State managed to impose its authority in the matrimonial field. The Church was thus compelled to accept the increased competence of the State by introducing the civil documents. All these caused mutations that triggered very different behaviours. Nevertheless, the Church kept imposing religious marriage, divorce and re-marriage for all its parishioners. In such a situation, by analysing the evolution of common-law marriages from the perspective of the Church, we may notice that, on the level of the whole area we focused on, there was a greater easiness in approaching religious marriage after 1895, once the compulsory civil marriage was imposed. The perception of the divorce also changed when the civil matrimonial law was introduced at the end of 1894. Through a last effort, as the Church did not acknowledge lay divorce, they did not grant the right to a second marriage to the individuals. Moreover, from the perspective of the Church, the possible future marriage was considered as a mere common-law marriage, although the State approved of the divorce and the second marriage in which a divorced partner was involved.