Of the 79 countries that experienced civil wars (1944-2008,) only 33 had one, and only one, civil war. If civil war recurrence is the norm rather than the exception, there is an apparent postwar reconstruction problem. To address this problem, this study asks "how long does post war peace last?" and "what are the determinants of civil war recurrence?" Using survival analysis on an originally extended dataset of civil wars (1944-2008,) this study expands the scope of a small number of previous studies done on recurrence and gives the most updated findings. The analysis suggests that per capita income growth, the presence of UN peacekeepers, countries that experienced territorial wars, and peace settlements over time reduce the risk of recurrence and foster a more enduring peace. But, if the country's previous war was fought on ethnic lines and was highly violent, the risk of recurrence increased, decreasing the durability of peace. Significant factors from previous studies of risk reduction, the type of regime and if the previous war ended in a victory, were insignificant in this study. This study prescribes peace settlements with UN peacekeeping forces acting as third-party enforcers of peace together with high per capita GDP growth.
Civil war is the predominant form of armed conflictin the world today, and the risk that a civil war will recur ismuch greater than of a new conflict beginning in a society thathas not experienced one. This paper explores the importanceof respect for human rights in post-conflict countries as a fac-tor that reduces this risk of recurrence. When governments donot respect the citizens' right to life, liberty, and security, asdeclared in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights (UDHR), then a country will not be able to re-establishthe necessary trust in politics and between former enemiesto consolidate a stable peace. An analysis of all civil wars be-tween 1946 and 2013 shows that the risk that peace fails issubstantively greater when human rights are violated, and thisis consistent across a large range of post-conflict scenarios.The implication of these findings is that the protection of hu-man rights is not only a positive end in itself, but also a meansto prevent large-scale violence.
Violence after civil war is a challenge to sustainable peace. Many armed conflicts today are recurrences of previous wars and much of the literature on violence after war explains why armed groups return to the battlefield. But even if peace prevails, many other types of violence take place in postwar environments. This postwar violence is likewise subject to a growing multidisciplinary literature. Using citation network analysis, we show that research on war recurrence and postwar violence has developed in relative isolation from each other?although these phenomena are interrelated. This compartmentalization leads us to overlook important similarities and differences in the drivers of different forms of violence after war. We demonstrate this by reviewing the literature in both of these closely related fields. While war recurrence and postwar violence share a set of common risk factors, some factors can have opposite effects on the two outcomes. Because these insights only emerge when systematically comparing the two strands of literature, we propose a novel framework for the study of violence after wars that aims at overcoming the compartmentalization of research within these two fields. The framework serves both as a conceptual lens and an analytical tool to categorize and compare different forms of violence after war. We then outline how the framework aids scholars in pursuing an integrated research agenda, with concrete suggestions for research questions that should be studied to expand our understanding of violence after wars.
This dissertation explores the factors associated with and the mechanisms that produce civil war recurrence. I argue that the variation in the government's use of violence after the war as a means of counterinsurgency explains the likelihood of the recurrence of a given civil war. More particularly, I argue that indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime increases the incentive amongst civilians, who formally participated and/or supported the rebellion in the original war, to return to actively supporting the rebels once again, thus, increasing the likelihood of war recurrence. This is due to the fact that when ordinary individuals believe that their choice to remain neutral or being pro-government threatens their personal security, they may decide to reenlist in the rebel movement, thus increasing the likelihood of a renewed war. By employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, I show the presence of postwar violence by government, especially the indiscriminate variety, is associated by increased likelihood of civil war recurrence.
Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coupproofing is so dangerous, why do we observe leaders engaging in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing–purges–deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. The strategic and intentional nature of purges signals to opposition forces that the regime is capable of not only identifying its enemies but also eliminating these threats. Furthermore, the removal of high-profile officers often leads to their elimination from forums in which they could join existing rebel groups or mount new resistance to the regime, additionally decreasing the risk of renewed fighting. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969-2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that military purges of high-ranking officials do in fact help the regime to avoid further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.
There is a large research field focusing on the recurrence of civil wars, yet this literature has omitted to seriously consider religious dimensions and ideational features of armed conflicts. To address this gap, we provide the first global study exploring whether, and why, Islamist civil wars—armed conflicts fought over self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations—are more or less likely to recur compared to other conflicts. We argue that civil wars fought over Islamist claims are more likely to relapse because the ideational features of these conflicts increase the uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the warring actors in terms of the extent and nature of transnational support that may be forthcoming, for rebels as well as the government. In line with our argument, we find that Islamist civil wars are significantly less likely to be terminated and more likely to recur once ended. Thus, our results demonstrate that Islamist civil wars represent a particular challenge with regard to the goal of achieving durable peace.
This thesis argues that the different reactions of the population and rival elites to executive attempts to extend term limits in Rwanda and Burundi reflect the different ways civil wars ended in these two countries. In Rwanda, a military victory resulted in institutions that placed less constraint on the ruling party, while in Burundi, a negotiated settlement placed comparatively greater constraints on the ruling party. As a result, the major party in Rwanda was more powerful than the major power in Burundi, and thus more capable to co-opt or coerce the opposition. This paper uses a most-similar case design to test the hypothesis that civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to become unstable than a civil war that ends in a military victory when executives attempt to extend their term limits and finds that the civil war outcome was instrumental in explaining the divergent reactions in both countries. This paper has important implications for those interested in post-conflict situations and executive term-limit extensions. ; 2017-12-01 ; B.A. ; College of Sciences, Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
Quantitative research on the "durability" of peace following civil wars typically captures the breakdown or survival of "peace" in a binary manner, equating it with the presence or absence of civil war recurrence. In the datasets that underpin such studies, years that do not experience full-scale civil war are implicitly coded as "peaceful." Yet, post-civil war environments may remain free from war recurrence, while nevertheless experiencing endemic violent crime, state repression, low-intensity political violence, and systematic violence against marginalized groups, all of which are incongruent with the concept of peace. Approaches to assessing post-civil war outcomes which focus exclusively on civil war recurrence risk overestimating the "durability" of peace, implicitly designating as "peaceful" a range of environments which may be anything but. In this article, we discuss the heterogeneity of violent post-civil war outcomes and develop a typology of "varieties of post-civil war violence." Our typology contributes to the study of post-civil war peace durability, by serving as the basis for an alternative, categorical conceptualization of "peace years" in conflict datasets.
Agraïments: The authors are partially supported by MCYT through grant DPI2008-06699-C02-02 (second author) and MTM2009-10359 (third author). The authors are also supported by the Government of Catalonia through the SGR program. ; Consider the celebrated Lyness recurrence xn+2 = (a + xn+1)/xn with a ∈ Q. First we prove that there exist initial conditions and values of a for which it generates periodic sequences of rational numbers with prime periods 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or 12 and that these are the only periods that rational sequences {xn}n can have. It is known that if we restrict our attention to positive rational values of a and positive rational initial conditions the only possible periods are 1, 5 and 9. Moreover 1-periodic and 5-periodic sequences are easily obtained. We prove that for infinitely many positive values of a, positive 9-period rational sequences occur. This last result is our main contribution and answers an open question left in previous works of Bastien & Rogalski and Zeeman. We also prove that the level sets of the invariant associated to the Lyness map is a two-parameter family of elliptic curves that is a universal family of the elliptic curves with a point of order n, n ≥ 5, including n infinity. This fact implies that the Lyness map is a universal normal form for most birational maps on elliptic curves.
For the purposes of this work, the terrorism is understood as a method of political violent action, which tends to be articulated in processes of long duration (terrorist campaigns), in order to compensate asymmetries in the context of a conflict. As method, the terrorism operates provoking a destruction or chaos, according to an eminently transitive model and whose psychological effect is superior to his material effects (since it chooses aims with high symbolic value), to effects of transmitting a message and affecting big audiencies, in order to promote (principal though not exclusively) certain political pretensions (Molano-red, 2010). One of the most remarkable characteristics of the terrorist method is his trend to appear in big waves of global coverage. A pioneering investigator (Rapoport, 2004:47) defined these big waves as " a cycle of activity in a certain period - a cycle characterized by phases of expansion and contraction … (whose) fundamental feature is his international character; similar activities that happen in several countries, orientated by a common predominant force that determines the characteristics and mutual relations between the groups participants ". Following this hypothesis, has been suggested in another part (Molano-red, 2009b) the existence of three global cycles of terrorism, that is to say, momenta (more than periods) during which the use of the terrorism as favorite method for the political action for diverse groups in the whole world was intensified and extended: a " revolutionary cycle " (that goes from 1870 until 1914, approximately), a "explanatory" (that would take place between 1948 and 1980), and the more recent one, the "milenarist", which dates back of the decade of 1990 and nowadays it would be in full expansion. ; Para efectos de este trabajo, el terrorismo se entiende como un método de acción política violenta, que tiende a articularse en procesos de larga duración (campañas terroristas), con el fin de compensar asimetrías en el contexto de un conflicto. Como método, el terrorismo opera provocando una destrucción o caos suntuario, según un modelo eminentemente transitivo y cuyo efecto psicológico es superior a sus efectos materiales (por cuanto elige objetivos con alto valor simbólico), a efectos de transmitir un mensaje y afectar grandes audiencias, en aras de la promoción (principal aunque no exclusivamente) de determinadas pretensiones políticas (Molano-Rojas, 2010). Una de las características más llamativas del método terrorista es su tendencia a presentarse en oleadas de cobertura global. Un investigador pionero (Rapoport, 2004: 47) definió estas oleadas como "un ciclo de actividad en un periodo determinado –un ciclo caracterizado por fases de expansión y contracción… (cuyo) rasgo fundamental es su carácter internacional; actividades similares que ocurren en varios países, orientadas por una fuerza común predominante que determina las características y relaciones mutuas entre los grupos participantes". Siguiendo esta hipótesis, se ha sugerido en otra parte (Molano-Rojas, 2009b) la existencia de tres ciclos globales de terrorismo, es decir, momenta (más que periodos) durante los cuales se intensificó y extendió el uso del terrorismo como método predilecto para la acción política por diversos grupos en todo el mundo: un "ciclo revolucionario" (que va desde 1870 hasta 1914, aproximadamente), uno "emancipatorio" (que se produciría entre 1948 y 1980), y uno más reciente, el "milenarista", que data de la década de 1990 y actualmente estaría en plena expansión. ; Le terrorisme est défini comme une méthode d'action politique violente qui s'articule avec des processus de longue durée (campagnes terroristes) afin de compenser les asymétries dans le contexte d'un conflit. En tant que méthode, le terrorisme provoque une destruction à grande échelle qui suit un modèle transitif dont l'effet psychologique est supérieur à ses effets de matière, étant donné que les terroristes choisissent des cibles à haute valeur symbolique, pour transmettre un message qui touche la société de manière significative, afin de bien promouvoir ses prétentions politiques (Molano-Rojas, 2010). Une des caractéristiques les plus frappantes de méthodes terroristes est leur tendance à se produire dans des vagues d'une couverture mondiale. Un pionnier de la recherche (Rapoport, 2004:47) a identifié ces vagues comme «un cycle d'activité dans une période donnée, un cycle caractérisé par l'expansion et la contraction . dont la principale caractéristique est son caractère international ; activités similaires qui se produisent dans plusieurs pays, par une force conjointe qui détermine les caractéristiques et les interrelations entre les groupes participants». En suivant cette hypothèse, Molano-Rojas, 2009b a suggéré ailleurs, l'existence de trois cycles mondiaux du terrorisme, au cours des quelles le terrorisme a été utilisé comme méthode de choix pour l'action politique par divers groupes à travers le monde: un «cycle révolutionnaire» (en cours d'exécution de 1870 à 1914, environ), une «émancipation» (qui a eu lieu entre 1948 et 1980), et une plus récente, le "millénaire" datant de la fin des années 1990 et qui est actuellement en pleine expansion. ; Para efeitos deste trabalho, o terrorismo é entendido como um método de ação política violenta, que tende a se articular em processos de longa duração (campanhas terroristas), com a finalidade de compensar assimetrias no contexto de um conflito. Como método, o terrorismo opera provocando uma destruição ou caos sucinto, segundo um modelo eminentemente transitivo e cujo efeito psicológico é superior seus efeitos materiais (tanto que escolhe objetivos com alto valor simbólico), com intuito de transmitir uma mensagem e afetar grandes audiências, em trabalhar a promoção (principal, ainda que não exclusivamente) de determinadas pretensões políticas (MolanoRojas, 2010). Uma das características mais chamativas do método terrorista é sua tendência a se apresentar em ondas de cobertura global. Um pesquisador pioneiro (Rapoport, 2004:47) definiu estas ondas como "um ciclo de atividade num período determinado – um ciclo caracterizado por três fases de expansão e contração.(cuja) característica principal é seu impacto internacional; atividades similares que ocorrem em diversos países, orientadas por um força comum predominante que determina as características e relações mútuas entre os grupos participantes". Seguindo esta hipótese, foi sugerido em outra parte (Molano-Rojas, 2009b) a existência de três ciclos globais de terrorismo, que dizer, momenta (mais que períodos) durante os quais se intensificou e estendeu o uso do terrorismo como método predileto para a ação política por diversos grupos em todo mundo: um "ciclo revolucionário" (que vai de 1870 até 1914 e 1980), e um mais recente, o "milenarista", que data da década de 1990 e atualmente estaria em plena expansão.
In the Republic of Korea (ROK), military antimalarial chemoprophylaxis was initiated in 1997. Although chemoprophylaxis reduces malaria cases, long-term chemoprophylaxis could increase resistance. In this study, the recurrence rate of vivax malaria was investigated. All vivax malaria cases that occurred before 31 December 2003 among soldiers and veterans who entered the ROK army between 1 January 1998 and 28 February 2001 were reviewed. Of the 3881 reported cases (2375 soldiers and 1506 veterans), 62 (1.6%) experienced a second attack and 2 (0.05%) experienced a third attack. Fifteen cases (24.2%) recurred 180 days after the start of initial treatment. Most of the second attacks (54/62) were exposed to malaria risk after initial treatment. Among 1506 veterans, 5 (0.3%) recurred and they had not been exposed to malaria risk after retirement; 1 recurred 43 days and 4 recurred >180 days after the start of initial treatment. All recurring cases were completely cured using the same dosage and regimen used for the first or second treatments. In conclusion, few cases of vivax malaria recurred after standard treatment. It is suggested that recurrences of vivax malaria are effectively prevented by the current treatment regimen and dosage ; open
Maģistra darba uzdevums ir analizēt pilsoņu karu atkārtošanās iemeslus Kotdivuārā, Lībijā un Mali. Pētījuma centrā ir arguments, ka vāja institucionālā leģitimitāte, vāja trešo pušu iesaiste un sasteigts atbruņošanās, demobilizācijas un reintegrācijas process saasina drošības dilemmu starp konfliktējošām pusēm, kas noved pie atkārtota pilsoņa kara. Lai pierādītu autores argumentus, darba teorētiskā bāze tika balstīta uz pilsoņu karu teorijām, kas ir prakses vispārinājumi, kā arī uz drošības dilemmas koncepta aplūkošanu pilsoņu karu ietvaros. Kā analīzes metode ir fokusētā salīdzināšanas metode. Iegūtie rezultāti tika apkopoti secinājumos, un autore izvirzīja arī rekomendācijas tālākiem akadēmiskiem pētījumiem, kā arī lēmumu pieņēmējiem. ; The main task of this Master thesis is to analyze the reasons for the recurrence of civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Mali. The study focuses on the argument that the weak institutional legitimacy, weak third-party involvement and rushed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is exacerbated by the security dilemma between the conflicting parties, which leads to recurrence of civil war. In order to demonstrate the author's arguments, the theoretical basis of the work are based on the civil war theories that are generalizations of practice, as well as the security dilemma concept within the civil war context. Author chose the structural focused comparison method in order to analyze selected cases. The results were summarized in the conclusions, and the author also put forward recommendations for further academic studies, as well as for the decision-makers.
Objective: To discover, by using metabolomics, novel candidate biomarkers for stroke recurrence (SR) with a higher prediction power than present ones. Methods: Metabolomic analysis was performed by liquid chromatography coupled to mass spectrometry in plasma samples from an initial cohort of 131 TIA patients recruited ,24 hours after the onset of symptoms. Pattern analysis and metabolomic profiling, performed by multivariate statistics, disclosed specific SR and large-artery atherosclerosis (LAA) biomarkers. The use of these methods in an independent cohort (162 subjects) confirmed the results obtained in the first cohort. Results: Metabolomics analyses could predict SR using pattern recognition methods. Low concentrations of a specific lysophosphatidylcholine (LysoPC[16:0]) were significantly associated with SR. Moreover, LysoPC(20:4) also arose as a potential SR biomarker, increasing the prediction power of age, blood pressure, clinical features, duration of symptoms, and diabetes scale (ABCD2) and LAA. Individuals who present early (,3 months) recurrence have a specific metabolomic pattern, differing from non-SR and late SR subjects. Finally, a potential LAA biomarker, LysoPC(22:6), was also described. Conclusions: The use of metabolomics in SR biomarker research improves the predictive power of conventional predictors such as ABCD2 and LAA. Moreover, pattern recognition methods allow us to discriminate not only SR patients but also early and late SR cases. ; Supported by the Autonomous Government of Catalunya (2009SGR- 735), the Spanish Ministry of Health (FIS 11-02033), and the Marató of TV3 Foundation (95/C/2011). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Samples were obtained with the support of IRBLleida biobank and RETICS BIOBANCOS (RD09/0076/00059)
Cancer recurrence and disease-free survival are key outcomes for measuring the burden of illness, assessing the quality of cancer care, and informing decisions about increasingly costly cancer therapies. Yet information about recurrence is not collected in cancer registries or other population-based data sources. To address the lack of population-based recurrence information, researchers are increasingly using algorithms applied to health claims to infer recurrence. However, the validity of these approaches has not been comprehensively evaluated. In this commentary, we review existing studies and discuss options for improving the availability of recurrence data. We found that the validity of claims-based approaches appears promising in small, single institution studies, but larger population-based studies have identified substantial limitations with using claims to identify recurrence. With the increasing availability of health data, there are potential options that can be implemented to enhance information about recurrence. These options include design of software for the electronic medical record that enables rapid and standardized reporting of recurrence, use of electronic pathology reports to facilitate streamlined collection of recurrence by cancer registries, and mandates by insurers to require reporting of recurrence on health claims submitted by physicians. All of these options will require that governmental agencies, health insurers, professional societies, and other groups recognize the importance of population-based recurrence data and determine that this information is a priority for assessing cancer outcomes and costs.
