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Existing research suggests that peace is more stable after military victories than it is after peace agreements. This article challenges this conventional wisdom. By applying survival analysis, we demonstrate that peace agreements exhibit just as strong of a relationship to enduring peace as military victories do. Moreover, we investigate the assumptions that underpin the aforementioned claim. These assumptions link peace survival to the type of civil war termination and refer to intervening variables. Using time-series data for 48 civil wars that ended between 1990 and 2009, the empirical analysis finds support for only two underpinning assumptions in favour of victories.

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coupproofing is so dangerous, why do we observe leaders engaging in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing–purges–deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. The strategic and intentional nature of purges signals to opposition forces that the regime is capable of not only identifying its enemies but also eliminating these threats. Furthermore, the removal of high-profile officers often leads to their elimination from forums in which they could join existing rebel groups or mount new resistance to the regime, additionally decreasing the risk of renewed fighting. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969-2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that military purges of high-ranking officials do in fact help the regime to avoid further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.

"Bargaining Theory, Civil War Outcomes, and War Recurrence: Assessing the Results of Empirical Tests of the Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

Abstract
This article examines the interactions of two under-theorised means to forestall recurrence of violence and human rights abuses after conflict with two very different, but by no means mutually incompatible, logics. The first of these is guarantees of non-recurrence (gnr s), a branch of transitional justice characterised by a deeply formalist, institutionalised logic. The second is political settlements characterised by a highly informal logic. This article explores the conceptual terrain between these two logics of non-recurrence. It demonstrates a mismatch between the faith of transitional justice policy-makers in the centrality of gnr s to non-recurrence, on the one hand, and the actual process of guarding against conflict resumption as it is shaped extra-institutionally by the informal practices that underpin settlements, on the other. Post-conflict states generally place greater faith in the informal logic of settlements than the institutionalist logic of gnr s. Arguing that the prospects for non-recurrence are not fully captured if we focus only on the legal and institutional attributes of the state, it shows that settlements evolve or disintegrate incrementally over time. This critically conditions when gnr s are essential and efficacious. Put another way, the fate of gnr s in particular institutions depends on how settlements in general maintain the peace. Transitional justice theorists should be open to the possibility that guarantees of non-repetition are the fruit, not the precondition, of social order.

AbstractThis article attempts to answer why some countries experience the recurrence of civil war and others do not. One of the most significant differences between civil war onset and its recurrence is thatthe latter has once experienced termination of civil war,while the former has not. To find the cause of recurrence, this article examines how different war termination types influence the duration of post-civil war peace. Duration analysis of the civil wars between 1944 and 1999 shows that military victory, supported by peacekeeping operations or power-sharing arrangements, leads to the most durable peace in a post-civil war country. Contrary to the accepted wisdom, negotiated peace settlement, even when supported by peacekeeping operations or power-sharing arrangements, is not positively related to post-conflict peace.

There is a large research field focusing on the recurrence of civil wars, yet this literature has omitted to seriously consider religious dimensions and ideational features of armed conflicts. To address this gap, we provide the first global study exploring whether, and why, Islamist civil wars—armed conflicts fought over self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations—are more or less likely to recur compared to other conflicts. We argue that civil wars fought over Islamist claims are more likely to relapse because the ideational features of these conflicts increase the uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the warring actors in terms of the extent and nature of transnational support that may be forthcoming, for rebels as well as the government. In line with our argument, we find that Islamist civil wars are significantly less likely to be terminated and more likely to recur once ended. Thus, our results demonstrate that Islamist civil wars represent a particular challenge with regard to the goal of achieving durable peace.

There is a large research field focusing on the recurrence of civil wars, yet this literature has omitted to seriously consider religious dimensions and ideational features of armed conflicts. To address this gap, we provide the first global study exploring whether, and why, Islamist civil wars—armed conflicts fought over self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations—are more or less likely to recur compared to other conflicts. We argue that civil wars fought over Islamist claims are more likely to relapse because the ideational features of these conflicts increase the uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the warring actors in terms of the extent and nature of transnational support that may be forthcoming, for rebels as well as the government. In line with our argument, we find that Islamist civil wars are significantly less likely to be terminated and more likely to recur once ended. Thus, our results demonstrate that Islamist civil wars represent a particular challenge with regard to the goal of achieving durable peace.