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View that armed forces involvement in politics will be determined by civilian government effectiveness in coping with problems of governance and not threatening military interests. Transition to civil rule, the military and the intelligence agencies, and the governments of prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

Students of civil-military relations, particularly those in the developing countries, admit having to work on myopic assumptions, meagre data, sloppy conceptualization and inelegant explanations. The relative newness of this area of studies could be one reason for this. The study of civil-military relations in the narrow sense referring mainly to military coups and interventions, has attained importance after World War II. But the study of civil-military relations in the broader perspective of multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military organizations and political personages and interests on the other, has begun to draw academic interest only in the last two decades or so. In the twentieth century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation's political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton's celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognized channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics. This paper seeks to attempt an overview of the existing scholarship on civil-military relations; second, it examines civil-military relations in the world with special reference to major political systems of the world; third, it surveys the literature on civil-military relations in general, and finally, it attempts to develop a general, complex, and hopefully fruitful causal model for analyzing the dynamics of civil-military relations; exploring implications for future research on civil-military relations.

Counterinsurgency strategies employed by the US military in Afghanistan have led to the US military embarking on civil governance reform. This has created new forms of civil—military relations with Afghan and international counterparts. These relations appear less dramatic than 'conventional' civil—military relations, in that they do not create the same visible alignment on the ground between military and non-military identities. In addition, the increased merging of civil and military work areas creates a new complexity that stems from semantic confusion. This complexity is mostly about norms and principles, in that the core puzzle is the more general question of what kinds of tasks the military should and should not do, rather than about violent consequences to civilians and questions of neutrality. This article proposes the term 'third-generation civil—military relations' to capture and examine the conceptual challenges that stem from the merging of military and civil work areas in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Describes the rise to power of the armed forces in the 1960s and 1970s, and the diminishment of military power and prerogatives in government, 1980-94.

This article accepts the norms related to civil-military relations that Don Snider et al. propose in this special issue as being the appropriate norms for professional military officers. It then reviews the curricula of the six war colleges to see what they are currently teaching about civil-military relations and about civilian society. Next, it examines the views about those relations that war college students report themselves as actually holding. Some of these, i.e., findings related to officers' views about not obeying directives they believe "unethical but legal" and their willingness to obey "unwise" commands may seem to contradict the norm of civilian control. Others that are related to officer responsibility to "advocate" and to "insist" on some policy matters also seem to contradict these norms. The article concludes with some recommendations for curriculum revision.

THE ISSUE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PRESENTS THE new Argentine government with several problems. One is the structuring of government, that is general staff relations. Moreover the new authorities must take a position in the short to medium term over the question of responsibility for the 'dirty war', the plundering of the public purse by the officer corps between 1976 and 1982 and the defeat in the war with Britain. And in the longer term they must confront the wider issue of how to both 'civilianize' the armed forces and 'demilitarize' civil society.

The best recent scholarship on Russian civil-military relations explicitly addresses this issue's importance for both domestic and external security. An inquiry into the present state of those relations under conditions of defense reform and the current international situation is of immense analytical and policy relevance for both domestic and external security in Russia. While the Russian regime is serious about military reform, it is encountering severe objections from the uniformed military, and the military has successfully persuaded the government to accept its expansive concept of the threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment. Therefore, we must closely follow those developments to understand more clearly current tendencies in Russian politics and policy as a whole. Specifically, this chapter examines issues pertaining to civil-military relations in several areas of Russian national security policies that suggest some disturbing trends for the future. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1586/thumbnail.jpg

While the president is the commander in chief, the US Congress plays a critical and underappreciated role in civil-military relations-the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian leadership that commands it. This unique book edited by Colton C. Campbell and David P. Auerswald will help readers better understand the role of Congress in military affairs and national and international security policy. Contributors include the most experienced scholars in the field as well as practitioners and innovative new voices, all delving into the ways Congress attempts to direct the military

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the "means of exercising civilian control" over the defense establishment was to "safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism." This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide "the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost," the report made it clear that this had to be achieved "without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment." Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a "Prussianized" military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

THIS ARTICLE IS A COPY OF FOUR REACTIONS TO RICHARCH H. KOHN'S ARTICLE IN THE SPRING 1994 ISSUE OF THE SAME JOURNAL. ALSO PRINTED IS A RESPONSE FROM THE AUTHOR. THE FIRST ARTICLE WAS ENTITLED, "OUT OF CONTROL: THE CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." THE FOUR AUTHOR'S RESPONSES CONSISENTLY DENOUNCE ANY CLAIMS THAT THERE IS A CRISIS IN AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, CITING EXAMPLES OF THE HARMONY BETWEEN THESE BRANCHES DURING THE BUSH AND CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS.

"Tanzania: Civil–Military Relations and Nationalism" published on by Oxford University Press.