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THE TWO VALUABLE COLLECTIVE VOLUMES1 UNDER REVIEW HAVE MUCH IN COMMON. THEY ASSEMBLE PREVIOUSLY UNPUBLISHED STUDIES; MOST OF THESE ARE SHORT MONOGRAPHS, BASED ON EXTENSIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS, AND CONSTITUTING SOPHISTICATED CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPECIALIST DEBATE; AND THEY RANGE OVER AN IMPRESSIVE VARIETY OF LOCALES. POLITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT OPENS WITH THE THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS OF ONE EDITOR (LEMARCHAND) AND TERMINATES WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER (EISENSTADT, WRITING TOGETHER WITH LUIS RONIGER, WHO ALSO PROVIDES A MOST USEFUL BIBLIOGRPHY OF OVER 500 ENTRIES). IN BETWEEN, IT CONTAINS ESSAYS EXPLORING CLIENTELISTIC POLITICS IN ITALY: (BY MARIO CACIAGLI AND FRANK BELLONI, AND BY JUDITH CHUBB); FRANCE (JEAN-FRANCOIS MEDARD); POLAND (JACEK TARKOWSKY); MEXICO (SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL); PERU (LAURA GUASTI); AND TURKEY (ERGUN OZBUDUN). THE VOLUME EDITED BY CLAPHAM ALSO OPENS WITH THE EDITOR'S OWN 'THEORETICAL' REFLECTIONS (I USE QUOTATION MARKS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO CLAPHAM HIMSELF THE PHENOMENON OF CLIENTELISM DOES NOT PROPERLY WARRANT A THEORY OF ITS OWN-AS IF THEORIES NECESSARILY HAD TO DEAL DEI MASSIMISISTEMI). THE ESSAYS THAT FOLLOW CONSIDER THE USSR (R. H. BAKER); BRAZIL (PAUL COMMACK); LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE (CLAPHAM HIMSELF); SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER DIEM (DENNIS DUNCANSON); THAILAND (JEREMY KEMP); IRELAND (MICHAEL HIGGINS); TROPICAL AFRICA (JEAN-FRANCOIS MEDARD-THE ONLY AUTHOR TO APPEAR IN BOTH COLLECTIONS); AND THE US (MARIE-FRANCE TOINET AND IAN GLENN). THE AUPY: 1983

Abstract: Studies of Irish politics have generally used a clientelist framework: voters in rural areas seem to obtain state benefits through a politician's interventions and, in return, become the politician's "clients". This article reports anthropological research on urban brokerage and clientelism carried out in Dublin from 1978 to 1981 which suggests that a more complex analytic model is required. Clientelism was relevant in the context of party politics, but voters who sought a broker's help did not necessarily become clients. Political brokerage did not guarantee individual voters' electoral support, and was largely used to enhance the politician's reputation in the community. It is thus useful to distinguish brokerage from clientelism; although the two are related, they are not interchangeable. In addition, the "currency" of brokerage was rarely politicians' influence over the actual allocation of state resources, but rather their information about bureaucratic procedures and their access to the bureaucrats themselves. There is no reason to presume that brokerage, based on such a monopoly over information and access, should necessarily decrease as Ireland becomes increasingly urban and industrial.

Despite its widespread currency in political science, the concept of clientelism has rarely found its way into the literature on communist systems. Students of communist politics regularly note the importance of personal ties, and many recognize the significance of informal bonds in economic and political spheres atalllevels of society. Some even apply the term "clientelism" to the political behavior they describe. Yet these studies are generally limited to elite-level politics, to factionalism, career mobility, recruitment patterns, and attainment of office at the top- to middle-level echelons of the bureaucracy.2Few have considered clientelism as a type of elite-mass linkage through which the state and the party exercise control at the local level, and through which individuals participate in the political system.

THE AUTHOR CHARACTERIZES THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AS CLIENTELISM IN WHICH THOSE OF HIGHER SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS PROVIDE FOR CLIENTS OF LOWER SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS WHO OFFER THE PATRONS REQUIRED SERVICES. ANALYZING THE SUPREME PATRON'S RULE, HE EXPLORES THE RESULTS OF MARTIAL LAW, THE AQUINO ASSASSINATION, POLITICAL OPPOSITION INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE ECONOMIC DETERIORATION,/AND UNITED STATES "QUIET DIPLOMACY". HE CONCLUDES THAT STABILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL REFORM AFTER REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ANALYZES THE PROSPECTS FOR THAT IN THE 1986 ELECTION.

In all societies, politics consists of the struggle for and allocation of scarce resources such as power, wealth, position and security. Although all societies set up governments to help resolve conflicting interests and demands of the citizenry, each state does so in a distinctive manner. In the Philippines, the manner can be described as clientelist, a form of societal organization in which political life centres on relationships that are largely person to person, informal, hierarchical and reciprocal. The heart of Philippine politics is in the interplay among and within patron-client groupings that pervade these groups, as well as the entire society from President Marcos down to the peasant in the village. The essay analyses the roots, strengths and weaknesses of President Marcos in the clientelist system. (DÜI-Sen)

This article assesses the state of research on political clientelism by examining two collections of recent articles on that subject. It finds that the collections include many descriptions of change in the nature of patron-client relationships as well as some models of political systems containing clientelist components and some two-case comparisons. But the collections contain no reports on attempts to test hypotheses concerning clientelism in a systematic fashion. This is explained in large part by the nature of patron-client relationships and other dyadic structures: They are amorphous, latent, elusive, and ubiquitous, and have certain problems of conception and explanation. The systematic testing of hypotheses will require ways to measure dyadic structures. Such measurement should first be carried out at the middle or institutional level of political systems. It is suggested that dyads may be identified and measured most easily if they are conceived as addenda attached to institutionalized relationships or structures.