Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism -- Chapter 2: Clientelism and distributive politics in Australia: comparing partisan pork barrel with contingency-based vote-buying -- Chapter 3: Administrative clientelism and policy reform failure: the Western Canada Integrated Land Management experience 1990–2015 -- Chapter 4: Authoritarian clientelism: the case of the president's 'creatures' in Cameroon -- Chapter 5: Coordinating the machine: subnational political context and the effectiveness of machine politics -- Chapter 6: Political parties and clientelism in transition countries: evidence from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- Chapter 7: Does clientelism hinder progressive social policy in Latin America? -- Chapter 8: Conclusion.

Introduction : the art of raccomandazione -- The ethnographic setting -- Patronage/clientelism : some theoretical considerations -- Towards a poetics of patronage -- Raccomandazione, tangente and mafia : an "amoral" family of genres -- Raccomandazione, class relations and the southern question -- Employing the 'little shove' : raccomandazione and work -- "We're not Uganda, but almost" : raccomandazione and southern identity -- Conclusion : raccomandazione and the bourgeois-liberal world order -- Epilogue : what happened when they read what I wrote : Mediterranean clientelism and corruption revisited

This book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures in Latin America and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing

This book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures in Latin America and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing.

Since the third wave of democratization research on clientelism has experienced a revival. The puzzling persistence of clientelism in new and old democracies inspired researchers to investigate the micro-foundations and causes of this phenomenon. Though the decline of clientelistic practices - such as vote buying and patronage - in democratic contexts has often been predicted, they have proven to be highly adaptive strategies of electoral mobilization and party building. This volume seeks to contribute to this new line of research and develops a theoretical framework to study the consequences of clientelism for democratic governance. Under governance we understand "all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power or language

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates. Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous have argued.

"In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are widespread, will local politicians ever voluntarily abandon them? Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, an original public opinion survey, and cross-municipal data in Argentina, this book illustrates how clientelism works and documents the electoral gains and costs of the practice. In doing so, it points to a possible subnational path towards greater accountability within democracy"--