Suchergebnisse

"Clientelism in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)

Abstract: Studies of Irish politics have generally used a clientelist framework: voters in rural areas seem to obtain state benefits through a politician's interventions and, in return, become the politician's "clients". This article reports anthropological research on urban brokerage and clientelism carried out in Dublin from 1978 to 1981 which suggests that a more complex analytic model is required. Clientelism was relevant in the context of party politics, but voters who sought a broker's help did not necessarily become clients. Political brokerage did not guarantee individual voters' electoral support, and was largely used to enhance the politician's reputation in the community. It is thus useful to distinguish brokerage from clientelism; although the two are related, they are not interchangeable. In addition, the "currency" of brokerage was rarely politicians' influence over the actual allocation of state resources, but rather their information about bureaucratic procedures and their access to the bureaucrats themselves. There is no reason to presume that brokerage, based on such a monopoly over information and access, should necessarily decrease as Ireland becomes increasingly urban and industrial.

The organizational training method designed by Cladomir Santos de Morais, which has been successfully applied in Honduras, Costa Rica, Portugal, Botswana, South Africa, & other countries may be useful for undercutting the clientelism so prevalent in many Latin American countries. Clientelism interferes with the ability of certain nations to function as postindustrial states, because these states require greater citizen empowerment & participation. Morais's method however, emphasizes autonomy & therefore results in individual & group empowerment, making it an effective strategy for breaking clientelism's power. Issues of action vs rhetoric, & the process of mass organized training in autonomy are explored. 16 References. D. Weibel

This paper aims to highlight the role of clientelism in the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) electoral dominance in Turkish politics. Based on intensive fieldwork in Istanbul's one of the poorest and conservative districts of Bağcılar, it argues that the expansion of clientelist networks under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of dominance. First, it strengthened clients' partisan identification. Second, it changed clients' ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal reforms that extensively undermined their well-being.

"Electoral Clientelism and Vote Buying" published on by Oxford University Press.

Armed clientelism is a particular form of patronage in which politicians and non-state armed groups establish a symbiotic relationship where the former provides economic resources, judicial protection, or other benefits, while the latter provides political support and votes. In this paper a theory of armed clientelism is presented, which shows that when politicians establish illegal alliances with armed groups and mafias, they face a political tradeoff: illegal alliances augment the probability of being elected, but generate the risk of being removed from office. The model predicts that in a context in which a mafia controls a district or a town, armed clientelism is more likely when social diversity among the constituency is high, the judicial system is inefficient, party identification of citizens to clientelistic parties is low, and candidates are highly budget-constrained. It also shows that armed clientelism is more likely when the illegal group and the machine are ideologically aligned.