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Coercion involves two or more parties who are in conflict and whose relationships are complex and uneasy. Generally speaking, people resent coercion and, when possible, rebel against it. This paper differentiates between circumstantial coercion and person-based coercion, between coercion and brute forms of oppression, and between benevolent and malevolent coercion. Government interference to combat murder for family honour serves as a clear example of benevolent coercion. The paper further discusses the coercer's intentions and specifically addresses the issues of paternalistic coercion, coercion via third-party, and self-coercion. Two further distinctions are offered: between internalised and designated coercion, and between coercion enforced by a minority versus coercion imposed by a majority.

Wertheimer attempts to move beyond previous theories of coercion by conducting a fairly extensive survey of the way in which cases involving coercion have been treated by American courts. This impressive project occupies the first half of the book, where he makes a convincing case that there is a fairly unified 'theory of coercion' at work in adjudication, past and present. This legal theory, however, is not entirely adequate for the purposes of social and political philosophy, and the last half of the book develops Wertheimer's more comprehensive philosophical theory. Originally publ.

This essay treats the concept of coercion in Leo Bersani's writings as a matter connected to questions of aesthetic form, mobility, and immobility. It reads passages from his work on Derek Jarman's film Caravaggio, among others, to argue for noncoercive modes of attention and relationality.

Background: It has long been debated whether coercion can be justified as paternalism in the field of mental health and it is still a continuing issue of controversy today. Aims: This study analyses whether coercive intervention in mental health can be justified by the basic assumptions of paternalists: the assumption of incompetence, the assumption of dangerousness and the assumption of impairment. Method: This study involved 248 patients: 158 (63.7%) were diagnosed with schizophrenia and 90 (36.3%) were diagnosed with mood disorder. In this study, experiences of coercion were divided into legal status, subjective (perceived coercion) and objective experiences (experienced coercion). Results: The assumption of incompetence was justified in all three categories of coercion whereas the assumption of dangerousness was not justified in any. The assumption of impairment was not justified in legal status and perceived coercion, but provided a partial explanation to serve as a basis for justifying experienced coercive measures. Conclusions: It can be noted that mental health experts who support paternalism without question must reconsider their previous methods. Above all, the reason why the assumption of dangerousness was not justified in any of the categories of coercion was because coercive intervention used to prevent harm to oneself and others must be very carefully carried out.

When a collective-choice situation places coercive pressure on individual participants, the law's traditional protection of individual autonomy against coercion must be reconciled with its necessary role in resolving problems of collective action. On the one hand, the law might seek to remove coercion from the equation so that individuals are free to make their own decisions. On the other hand, the law might empower a central authority to decide, thereby solving a problem of collective action in order to maximize the group's shared interests. The tension between these two approaches creates deep uncertainty for the regulation of collective-choice situations. It is palpable in the law's conflicted response to corporate takeover bids in that applicable federal and state laws simultaneously enhance and diminish shareholder choice. Elsewhere—for example, the structure of government buyout programs, or the imposition of mandatory fees for nonunion employees—the intersection of coercion and collective choice may be overlooked altogether. By situating the literature on coercion in the context of offers that exploit collective-action problems, this Article proposes a unifying framework for identifying and remedying problems of collective coercion.

Replies to Mark Haugaard's article (see abstract 9706229) on noncoercive-based power conflict operating in the democratic process, written in response to this author's 1994 article on such power conflict (see abstract 9503177). Haugaard's notion of two parties' mutual commitment to accept defeat under a set of rules is challenged. It is argued that this set of rules does not erase coercion. A distinction is made between raw & legitimized coercion, the latter representing a form dependent on compliance with rules. It is further contended that legitimized coercion is the most effective form because of its sociological & normative implications of fairness. This produces a seductive veil over the true coercive nature of such commitments & agreements. D. Bajo