NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem
In: International security, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 1531-4804
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In: International security, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 1531-4804
In: International security, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: International security, Band 23, S. 78-106
ISSN: 0162-2889
Examines whether NATO can perform multilateral peace operations reliably and effectively; argues that member countries will be reluctant to use force to manage or settle disputes that occur outside their territories. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposal, and IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 195-209
ISSN: 1467-9248
This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.
In: European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 955/2024
SSRN
In: Data & policy, Band 5
ISSN: 2632-3249
Abstract
Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education—three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice—this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior.
In: Politics of the low countries, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 120-140
ISSN: 2589-9937
In: Research Handbook in the Law & Economics of Insurance (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) ( Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, eds.)
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SSRN
Working paper
In: Climatic Change, Band 110, S. 1047-1066
SSRN
In: Journal of development economics, Band 162, S. 1-17
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Development in practice, Band 24, Heft 7, S. 854-866
ISSN: 1364-9213
In: Journal of development economics, Band 162, S. 103072
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 449-471
ISSN: 1468-0491
With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 26, Heft 3
ISSN: 1468-0491
With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda-two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries-we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal-agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal-agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted. Adapted from the source document.