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While governing data as an organizational asset has clear benefits, mobilizing an organization to implement data governance remains elusive for practitioners. On that account, this paper examines why governing data is difficult in local government organizations. Based on a literature review and an empirical case study, we establish the inherent challenges and build on the notion of collective action to theorize the problem of data governance. Following an engaged scholarship approach, we collect empirical material through six group interviews with 34 representatives from 13 different Danish municipalities. We extend existing data governance research with our problem triangle that identifies and explicates the complex relations between six distinct challenges: value, collaboration, capabilities, overview, practices, and politics. We demonstrate the value in theorizing data governance as a collective action problem and argue for the necessity of ensuring researchers and practitioners achieve a common understanding of the inherent challenges, as a first step towards developing data governance solutions that are viable in practice.

Fiscal consolidation confronts federal states with a collective action problem, especially in federations with a tightly coupled fiscal regime such as Belgium. However, the Belgian federation has successfully solved this collective action problem even though it lacks the political institutions that the literature on dynamic federalism has identified as the main mechanisms through which federal states achieve cooperation across levels of government. This article argues that the regionalization of the party system, on the one hand, and the rationalization of the deficit problem by the High Council of Finance, on the other, are crucial to understand how Belgium was able to solve the collective action problem despite its tightly coupled fiscal regime and particularly high levels of deficits and debts. The article thus emphasizes the importance of compromise and consensus in reducing deficits and debts in federal states.

Antimicrobial resistance is a global collective action problem with dire consequences for human health. This article considers how domestic and international legal mechanisms can be used to address antimicrobial resistance and overcome the governance and political economy challenges that accelerate it.

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability

How do dissident, far-right groups overcome the collective action problem inherent to political organisation in order to recruit sufficient activists willing to bear the costs of participation and not free-ride on the participation of others? An original ethnographic study of the UK anti-Islamic street protest organisation, the English Defence League (EDL), shows that it solved the collective action problem by supplying selective incentives to members in the form of the club goods of access to violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity. These benefits were offset against the costs of stigma, time, money and unwanted police attention that also accompanied EDL membership. The personal benefits the EDL provided to its members enabled it to supply what Olson termed the first unit of collective action, but limited its ability to supply the additional units required to build a broader, more mainstream movement.

Recent electoral outcomes have challenged the notion that elections in the Balkans are not able to bring about change. How has the public responded? It is argued that, in spite of the manifest obstacles for challengers to prevail over incumbents, public opinion is contingent upon the recent experiences in each country. Once shown the way, and in spite of a long period of stasis (or even state capture), citizens start believing that change is possible. The findings of the brief indicate that, in relation to electoral participation, the 'collective action' problem in the Balkans – characterised as lack of confidence in the possibility of change, leading to disillusionment with the democratic process and individual unwillingness to act to bring about change – might not be as difficult to break as previous research had indicated.

The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the political solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the motivational solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the rational expectation solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.

Through collective action, forest users, fishers, irrigators, herders, and other rural producers improve and sustain resources vital for their lives. In cases where it has weakened or seems absent, citizens, non-government organizations (NGOs), and government agencies can work to stimulate, strengthen, or sustain collective action. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI4; CAPRi ; EPTD

This paper first formulates a model of how the politicians in a local government collectively lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local government. The model identifies a relationship between council size and grants received. I then study this relationship empirically using the distribution of intergovernmental grants to the Swedish local governments. I use a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design that exploits a council size law to isolate exogenous variation in council size and find a large negative council size effect. This pattern provides indirect evidence for the occurrence of lobbying. The direction of the effect could be explained by free-riding incentives in individual lobbying effort contribution caused by a collective action problem in grant-raising among local government politicians.

Marx discussed institutional innovations in the context of a complex dynamic between inter versus intra-group opportunism, which contains clues for understanding how capacity for class agency develops. His lengthy discussion of the English Factory Acts in his Vol. I of Capital is an important case in point, which the paper revisits for its broader lessons not only for how institutions solve collective action problems but also how they become self-enforcing when third party enforcement is ineffective. The paper gives an account of how the Acts could have become self-enforcing at a time when the state enforcement capacity was rudimentary at best. The argument focuses on the dynamic between inter versus intra-class opportunism, shedding analytical light on how organized labor could help capitalists bolster their capacity for class agency.

Abstract We examine the role of collective actions as supporting elements of a long-lasting sustainable food supply chain. This article's main contribution is to link the idea of sustainable supply chains and the collective action problem (horizontal coordination) that may be required in order to deal with externalities related to the provision of sustainable products. In addition, we analyze how the presence or absence of government incentives shapes collective action in the food industry. We base our analysis in a simple formal argument inspired by case studies regarding sustainable farming in Brazil and the Netherlands. Results show that horizontal mechanisms of cooperation maintain positive levels of sustainability, even in the absence of direct payments by the government.

32 pages.-- JEL-Classification: D70, D72, D74. ; We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size. ; This paper is part of the Polarization and Con ict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. J.E. is member of the Barcelona GSE Research Network funded by the Government of Catalonia. Financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. E.H. acknowledges financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-01717 and the support of the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the government of Catalonia. ; Peer reviewed

Groups are of fundamental importance to economic, social, and political outcomes. Group formation among the poor may affect poverty directly, via improved income generation, or indirectly via empowerment and political action. Groups can be important vehicles for representing and promoting the interests of their members. In a number of significant ways, however, the chronically poor are disadvantaged in group formation, and this may form a significant part of the vicious circle and dynamics of chronic poverty. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI4; CAPRi ; EPTD

In development studies, collective action often appears as a condition for achieving long-term ownership of development-oriented actions. Here, collective action is considered as a condition for the expansion of individual strategies. We also view collective action as a product of individuals getting together to achieve some common goal and thus accepting the constraints linked to collective action.This paper explores the conditions for collective action to generate inclusion when agriculture transforms. Changes related to agricultural transformation have often led to urban migration for those rural and agricultural populations that could not cope with "modernization." In the coming decades, agricultural transformation in rural areas may lead to more varied responses such as new farming patterns including more labour and thus require a broader diversity of collective action.We consider households as the basic level where decisions are taken regarding domestic and economic activities: any improvement in one of these spheres will benefit the other. Improvements in households will also depend on other levels of investment: in local communities, in various interlinked sectors and by developing vertical linkages with other levels of organization, up to national policy level.Based on a range of theoretical and empirical references, we propose a framework that goes beyond sector-oriented perspectives, linking several interconnected domains where collective action can make a contribution towards inclusion. In each of these domains, collective action could usefully focus on three main areas that potentially influence those domains: public goods provision, expanding opportunities (livelihood diversification and community infrastructure), and challenging current norms and behaviours.We then explore how to operationalize this collective action framework to generate inclusion at local level across sector-oriented interventions, including by developing linkages with higher levels of organization, up to social movements. What is at stake is the ability of research and policymaking to support initiatives that cut across sectoral frontiers, favour interactions that open local people up to new ideas and beliefs, and look to bridge gaps in social status and between local and global thinking.