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With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda-two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries-we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal-agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal-agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted. Adapted from the source document.

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms' lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

Antimicrobial resistance is a global collective action problem with dire consequences for human health. This article considers how domestic and international legal mechanisms can be used to address antimicrobial resistance and overcome the governance and political economy challenges that accelerate it.

Several economic criteria may help policy-makers in choosing between public and private enforcement of competition law. The welfare losses caused by infringements of the cartel prohibition may be better internalized by imposing fines rather than by bringing damages actions. Public agencies may possess information advantages and they may also be able to remedy the difference between the private and social motive to sue. Private enforcement may complement public enforcement by increasing deterrence and guaranteeing compensation. Both direct and indirect buyers should be given standing to bring damages actions. Given the reluctance to introduce US-style class actions, European policy-makers favour collective opt-in actions and representative actions brought by consumer associations. However, the participation rate of opt-in collective actions may remain too low and actions by consumer associations are also vulnerable to principal-agent problems. Moreover, private enforcement of competition law by consumer associations will remain suboptimal if the funding problem is not solved. This paper argues in favour of an optimal mix of public and private enforcement of competition law and suggests some remedies to overcome the above mentioned problems.

Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates - deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates – deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics.

AbstractIn recent years, there has been an intense public debate about whether and, if so, to what extent investments in nuclear energy should be part of strategies to mitigate climate change. Here, we address this question from an ethical perspective, evaluating different strategies of energy system development in terms of three ethical criteria, which will differentially appeal to proponents of different normative ethical frameworks. Starting from a standard analysis of climate change as arising from an intergenerational collective action problem, we evaluate whether contributions from nuclear energy will, on expectation, increase the likelihood of successfully phasing out fossil fuels in time to avert dangerous global warming. For many socio-economic and geographic contexts, our review of the energy system modeling literature suggests the answer to this question is "yes." We conclude that, from the point of view of climate change mitigation, investments in nuclear energy as part of a broader energy portfolio will be ethically required to minimize the risks of decarbonization failure, and thus the tail risks of catastrophic global warming. Finally, using a sensitivity analysis, we consider which other aspects of nuclear energy deployment, apart from climate change, have the potential to overturn the ultimate ethical verdict on investments in nuclear energy. Out of several potential considerations (e.g., nuclear waste, accidents, safety), we suggest that its potential interplay — whether beneficial or adverse — with the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most plausible candidate.

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability