Using modern methods for analyzing multi-level data, we find that, by and large, citizens of OECD countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if more environmental policies are in place and if environmental quality is higher. We also document that parents care about carbon dioxide emissions more than non-parents and that those with a high willingness to pay for environmental quality deplore intervention through government policies.
Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling.
This essay extends theoretical arguments pertaining to single (uniplex) networks on how to solve coordination and cooperation problems associated with institutional collective action to multiplex networks constituting both formal and informal relationships formed by policy actors. While coordination problems reflect difficulties for actors in arriving at jointly desired policy outcomes, cooperation problems mean that actors have conflicting interests and, thus, face incentives to defect on each other. We propose multiplex versions of bridging and bonding networks, which have been found suitable for solving coordination and cooperation problems in single networks. Although our approach is limited to the simultaneous analysis of formal and informal relationships in policy networks, the arguments we present should aid researchers interested in analyzing policy networks beyond these manifestations of inherently complex relationships.
Introduction -- From 'good governance' to governance that works -- The country contexts -- Maternal health : why is Rwanda doing better than Malawi, Niger and Uganda? -- The politics of policy incoherence and provider indiscipline -- The space for local problem-solving and practical hybridity -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- index.
In: Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly: journal of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 783-804
In seeking to understand how nonprofits participate in policymaking at the state level, scholars of the third sector tend to overlook or assume a barrier to this activity: collective action problems. I show that such problems suppress charter school participation in their trade associations. An analysis of original survey data and informant interviews combined with Internal Revenue Service data for the complete set of charter membership associations in the United States demonstrates that schools' participation in these collectives follows a classic pattern of collective action problems: In states where the number of potential members is high, participation rates are lower. Across states, the size of the population of schools eligible for membership better explains variation in participation than other factors typically deemed important by scholars, such as organizational resources and policy environments. The finding supports the argument that large numbers inhibit participation in associations that pursue collective goods for their industry.