A review of the past year in Workmen's Compensation in Tennessee must of necessity take into account any legislative change in the Compensation Act itself' as well as trends disclosed through the decisions of the courts. The modern development and growth of this new theory, that of liability without fault, make pertinent the inquiry. Although a development of one generation, the theory of Workmen's Compensation is now almost universal in application. Under it, industry bears its fair share of the cost of injuries to workers, without any reference to fault or blame or negligence, where there is a reasonably apparent relationship of the injury to the job. Its adoption was a revolt from the disastrous results to the injured worker in an overwhelming majority of industrial accident cases of a strict application of the common law rules of contributory negligence, fellow servant's negligence and assumption of risk. Faced with more than a century of judicial precedent that one person's liability to another was based on fault or negligence, the courts at first tended to a strict construction of such enactments; but the modern trend is to construe the compensation acts liberally to protect the worker and his dependents. Tennessee courts long ago joined with the majority of courts of other jurisdictions in adopting this rule of liberal construction to effectuate the humane objects of such enactments, resolving in favor of the injured employee any reasonable doubt as to whether the injury to such employee arose out of or in the course of his employment. This approach is evident in several of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court hereinafter referred to.
In this article the authors discuss recent legislative and judicial developments in workmen's compensation law. They note that the Act will be completely reviewed in July 1979 but discuss the topics of payment of attorney's fees, coverage, changes in compensation benefits, offset provisions and changes in the rules of procedure.
A massive wave of corporate fraud at the beginning of the twenty first century exposed the failure of corporate gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation accordingly targeted gatekeepers, primarily auditors, by imposing strict regulation and enhanced independence guidelines. This legislative remedy is of disputable benefit while its costs have been huge. This paper maintains that a certain type of auditor incentive compensation could work better than regulation. Under such an alternative scheme, auditors would defer a portion of the payment they receive from the client firm, which would be used to purchase shares in the client after their tenure as auditor has ended. Instead of making them simply independent, this compensation structure would cause auditors to fend against inflated share prices. This type of auditor compensation could, therefore, serve to counterbalance recent trends in executive compensation that cause managers to overstate earnings. Modern accounting standards that augment management's scope of discretion make the suggested type of auditor compensation even more beneficial. Thus, the paper advocates calls for the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a safe harbor that would facilitate such compensation schemes, which current independence guidelines do not allow.
This dissertation focuses on how executive compensation is designed and its implications for corporate finance and government regulations. Chapter 2 analyzes several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrates two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions on CEO compensation would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. Chapter 3 examines how executive dividend protection affects corporate payout policy. I find that the dividend protection on executive restricted stock and option grants is associated with higher dividend payouts and lower share repurchases. Using the 2003 tax reform as an exogenous shock in dividend payouts, I provide further evidence that executive dividend protection causes changes in dividend payout policies. Chapter 4 studies a special subset of CEOs who works for a one-dollar annual salary. Rather than being the sacrificial acts they are projected to be, our findings suggest that some adoptions of one-dollar CEO salaries are opportunistic behavior of the wealthier, more overconfident, influential CEOs. Overall, these findings support the literature which claims that CEOs employ camouflage in compensation schemes to reduce the likelihood of public outrage over private benefits.
We generalize the classic concept of compensating variation and the welfare compensation principle to a general equilibrium environment with distortionary taxes. We derive in closed-form the solution to the problem of designing a tax reform that compensates the welfare gains and losses induced by an arbitrary economic disruption. In partial equilibrium, average taxes simply increase or decrease to counteract the revenue gains or losses caused by the disruption. In general equilibrium, the compensation features three elements that depart from this benchmark and respectively account for (i) the incidence of the initial exogenous shock, and the fact that the tax reform itself induces indirect welfare effects caused by (ii) the non-constant marginal product of labor and (iii) the skill complementarities in production. This leads to a progressive compensating tax reform, with average tax rates increasing at a rate given by the ratio of the elasticity of labor demand and the elasticity of labor supply net of the rate of progressivity of the pre-existing tax code. We also derive a closed form formula for the fiscal surplus of the wage disruption and the compensation, thus generalizing the traditional Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Finally, we apply our formula to the compensation of automation: in the U.S., one additional robot per thousand workers requires a reduction (resp., increase) in the average tax rate at the 10th (resp., 90th) percentile of the income distribution equal to 2 percentage points (resp., 0.5 pp). ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).
Le changement climatique est en marche et ce depuis la révolution industrielle. Les scientifiques sont aujourd'hui quasi unanimes pour affirmer que ce phénomène est en lien direct avec les activités humaines. Ces dernières augmentent la concentration de certains gaz à effet de serre et accentuent ainsi le réchauffement naturel de l'atmosphère. La volonté d'inverser cette tendance induit une évolution des comportements à l'échelle mondiale et demande l'implication politique des pays. C'est dans ce sens que des accords internationaux s'instaurent lors de conférences sur le thème du réchauffement planétaire. Les pays commencent ainsi à intégrer dans leur politique des mesures restrictives de leurs émissions. La compensation carbone est l'une de ces actions. Cette démarche est basée sur le principe que l'émission de gaz à effet de serre produira le même effet sur le climat quelque soit sa provenance. Il est alors possible de réduire des émissions ici pour compenser là-bas. Des marchés du carbone sont donc créés afin d'assurer ce mécanisme. Ils consistent à échanger des crédits de carbone entre les pays ou entre entreprises. Ils sont volontaires, ou obligatoires pour les pays qui se sont engagés à réduire leurs émissions. La préoccupation environnementale est au coeur des démarches de qualité et de management de L'ENSTIB. Un bilan carbone de l'école a déjà été réalisé et fait l'objet d'une étude d'amélioration. De cet outil de mesure ressortent des postes émetteurs de gaz à effet de serre tels que le transport des personnes et l'utilisation des énergies. Des actions de réductions ont été réalisées et peuvent encore être développées et améliorées. Cette recherche bibliographique permet de proposer un plan de compensation carbone de l'ENSTIB.
Congress has demonstrated interest in toxic compensation legislation, but not enough agreement to make significant progress. Advocates of reform claim that the legal system is heavily weighed against victims who seek compensation through the courts. Proposed reforms include a compensation fund and a cause of action in federal court. Critics have questioned whether these changes in the law would represent an improvement. Existing income replacement, medical cost reimbursement, and survivor insurance programs largely cover the losses of individuals with chronic disease. Thus, the need for an additional compensation is not clear. Furthermore, experience with compensation funds such as the Black Lung Fund suggests that political rather than scientific criteria may be used to determine eligibility. Finally, under the proposed financing mechanisms the compensation funds that are being debated would not increase incentives for care in the handling of hazardous wastes or toxic substances.
"June 2007." ; "Carla Tighe Murray of CBO's National Security Division wrote the study."--Pref. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction and summary. Defining military compensation ; Comparing military and civilian compensation ; Factors that complicate military-civilian comparisons -- Military pay, promotions, and rank -- Estimates of military compensation. Total compensation for enlisted personnel by years of experience ; Cash earnings for selected occupations -- Comparing increases in military and civilian pay. The "gap" between changes in basic pay and civilian earnings ; Issues in using the "pay gap" to evaluate military compensation ; Increases in regular military compensation versus the employment cost index -- Comparing levels of military and civilian pay. Cash compensation ; Noncash and deferred benefits ; General limitations of military-civilian comparisons -- Linking military compensation to recruiting and retention. Effectiveness of using pay to resolve occupational shortages or surpluses ; Effects of cash and noncash compensation on recruiting and retention -- Options to increase the visibility and efficiency of military compensation. Integrating the components of total compensation ; Increasing cash relative to noncash compensation -- Appendix A: Total compensation for the median enlisted member -- Appendix B: How pay changes with deployment -- Appendix C: Types of occupation- or skills-based compensation. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Redundancy is an unpleasant aspect of working life. Employers, from time to time, find they have too many staff or staff with the wrong skills, and accordingly lay employees off. A recent survey of 400 firms indicated that 9,507 employees had been made redundant in the past year (Russell, McVeigh et al., 1995). Ferguson (1992) identifies various legislators' attempts to tip the balance in favour of employers over the matter of redundancy compensation.
In den USA wird bereits seit mehreren Jahrzehnten öffentlich über mehr Transparenz im Bereich Vorstandsvergütung debattiert. Dennoch nahm die Bedeutung dieser Thematik signifikant nach den Corporate-Governance-Skandalen zur Jahrtausendwende zu, da die Krise teilweise durch leistungsabhängige Vergütung beeinflusst wurde. Obwohl die Wertpapierpreise stark sanken, kam es dennoch weiterhin zu Vergütungserhöhungen. Darüber hinaus, stiegen die Gehälter bis zur Finanzkrise 2008 weiter an. Deswegen reagierten die Gesetzgeber mit dem Erlass neuer Regeln, Gesetze und Standards, die zu mehr Transparenz im Bereich Vorstandsvergütung führen sollten. Dennoch sind zwischen verschiedenen Ländern auf Grund von kontinentalen und historischen Unterschienden auch signifikante Differenzen im Bezug auf Vergütungsberichterstattung entstanden. Aus diesem Grund, werden im Rahmen dieser Arbeit Unterschiede zwischen der deutschen und US-amerikanischen Vergütungsberichterstattung ermittelt.Zunächst werden in einem theoretischen Teil Grundlagen der Vergütung und damit verbundene ökonomische Probleme dargestellt. Im Anschluss, folgt die Darstellung spezifischer Regeln, Gesetze und Standards. Den Abschluss der Recherchearbeit bildet ein Überblick über wichtige empirische Studien zum Thema Vergütungsberichterstattung in den USA oder Deutschland. Anschließend folgt eine neue empirische Erhebung, die mit Hilfe von Vergütungsberichten aus 10 Dow Jones und 10 DAX Unternehmen durchgeführt wurde. In der Studie wurden Berichtslänge, Position im Geschäftsbericht, Vergütungshöhe, Vergütungsstruktur, variable Leistungsindikatoren und Informationsnützlichkeit untersucht. Abschließend werden auf Grund der Ergebnisse Vor- und Nachteile der verschiedenen Systeme diskutiert und ein Vorschlag zur Verbesserung erarbeitet. ; The US public discourse about executive compensation exists for several decades. However, executive compensation increased significantly until the 2000s Corporate-Governance scandals which were partly influenced by a pay-for-performance compensation approach. Furthermore, executive compensation did not decrease as significant as share-prices dropped during the crisis. Additionally, compensation increased continuously until the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, legislators enacted several rules, laws and standards in order to enforce executive compensation transparency. Nevertheless, jurisdiction discrepancies between countries occurred because of historical and continental differences. On account of this fact, also the implementation of proper executive compensation disclosure differs substantially. How German and US legislations differ from each other and which improvements could be recommended, will be investigated in the course of this thesis.Thus, the examination of compensation theory and its economical problems is necessary and will be conducted firstly. Subsequently, specific rules, regulations and standards in German and US compensation reporting systems will be described. In the next step, an empirical review of previous studies on executive compensation disclosure regarding these two countries will be executed. Hence, the theoretical part and empirical review provide the basis for this thesis empirical research. The research was conducted by analysing compensation reports of 10 Dow Jones and 10 DAX companies with regard to report length and location, compensation height and structure, variable performance indicators and information usefulness. On the basis of the empirical results interpretation, an overview of the systems advantages and disadvantages will be illustrated. Furthermore, the thesis finishes with a recommendation on how the compensation reports could be improved in order to increase information usefulness and report usability. ; Johannes Ahammer ; Abstracts in Deutsch und Englisch ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Masterarbeit, 2016 ; (VLID)1341257
Over the last quarter century, Congress has clearly recognized the importance of expanding public participation in federal administrative agency proceedings. It has expressly required that many agencies solicit citizen input and facilitate active public involvement in administrative processes while commanding governmental officials to consider thoroughly in their decisionmaking the views of all interests that might be affected. Congress has attempted to develop some mechanisms for promoting increased citizen participation in agency processes, but the legislative branch has been relatively unsuccessful in actually enhancing public involvement. Because citizen participants, such as public interest groups or individual consumers, have comparatively few resources for participating in administrative decisionmaking, congressional inability to promote their involvement has effectively rendered hollow the right to participate. These phenomena appear to be most problematic in rulemaking proceedings, perhaps the preeminent procedure for developing administrative policy. There is, however, one cost-effective measure for facilitating citizen involvement in agency processes with which numerous prior Congresses and several previous administrations have experimented: public participation funding. Participant compensation was instituted during the Republican administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford, was comprehensively experimented with during the Democratic administration of President Carter, and was applied, albeit more narrowly and in a somewhat altered form, during the Republican administration of President Reagan. Now that the 101st Congress and the Bush administration are confronting the pragmatic realities of governance in the modern administrative state, they should seriously consider this valuable technique for promoting participatory democracy to ascertain whether participant reimbursement warrants revitalization and, if so, how it can be revived most effectively. This article is meant to provoke discussion of participant compensation's worth and to stimulate new, rigorous experimentation with the concept. The first section of this article briefly recounts the origins and development of citizen reimbursement and describes experimentation with that mechanism. The second part evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of public funding. Because this assessment indicates that the measure is a cost-effective approach for improving agency decisionmaking and for enhancing citizen participation in administrative proceedings, the third section offers suggestions for reinstituting participant compensation.
