1994 workshop with the Dynamic Non-Member Economies ; [this document presents the main papers and summary of the proceedings of a Workshop on Competition Policy held in Paris on 1st and 2nd December 1994 ...]
"Competition policy has been said to lie at the heart of the German social market economy and to have been a key influence on the EC competition regime. This chapter assesses the impact of Europeanization on the competition law policy domain in the light of earlier claims that suggest a marginalization of the Federal Cartel Office. The question is pursued through three case studies that involve three different Europeanization dynamics-those of domestic assimilation of EU policy provisions, of informing policy change at the EU level, and of 'collision' between national and Commission policy preferences. The cases cover three distinct policy issues-the Europeanization of domestic competition law, attempts to shape changes to the EC regime's Regulation 17/62 and efforts of the DG Competition to prohibit the fixed-book price agreement between Austria and Germany. While those cases leading to domestic policy change suggest a considerable degree of national 'resilience', the example of 'informing EC policy change' points to the declining influence of the German approach vis-à-vis other national competition law experiences, Commission preferences, and changing competition policy 'ideas'. Moreover, while earlier claims suggesting a marginalization of the Federal Cartel Office require some qualification, wider changes in the German political economy have challenged the previous predominance of competition policy in German economic policy." (author's abstract)
Policy regarding trade and foreign investment in oligopolistic industries is a difficult subject both in theory and in practice. Developed and developing countries often perceive that they have differing interests, but controversies and conflicts among the developed countries themselves often arise as governments create some sort of preference for national firms over foreign rivals (“strategic trade policy”). Multinational firms and their home-countries governments want “National Treatment ” for their firms abroad. Foreign firms should be treated the same as domestic firms, host-country governments should honor all pre-investment agreements, and should enforce contracts and property rights. Host countries and their national firms want “Competition Policy”, which protects them from restrictive business practices of foreign multinationals and/or protects their market shares. In this project, I will draw on a familiar model to shed light on the question of whether or not restrictive policies or liberalizing policies (national treatment) benefit producers and consumers. Results indicate that there is the usual unilateral motive for protecting the domestic market from both imports and inward investment, and a strong motive to force open foreign markets for domestic firms. In general, a mutual exchange of market access improves the welfare of both countries, and in many cases improves firm profits along with consumer surplus.