The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will open new trade routes between China and the European Union (EU) and increase competition pressures on smaller EU member states. This article ranks where states like Estonia stand internationally in terms of innovativeness (and consequent competitiveness) by conducting an econometric study of patent development, education policy and research and development (R&D) expenditure policy. The authors claim that small member states such as Estonia should follow the example of countries such as Germany and adopt policies which focus more on increased public spending on R&D and innovation in public universities of science and technology, and raise support for high tech startups with a strong focus on international patenting. Member States must go further and subsidise R&D activities by focusing, inter alia, on filing of foreign patents such as triadic patents. ; The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will open new trade routes between China and the European Union (EU) and increase competition pressures on smaller EU member states. This article ranks where states like Estonia stand internationally in terms of innovativeness (and consequent competitiveness) by conducting an econometric study of patent development, education policy and research and development (R&D) expenditure policy. The authors claim that small member states such as Estonia should follow the example of countries such as Germany and adopt policies which focus more on increased public spending on R&D and innovation in public universities of science and technology, and raise support for high tech startups with a strong focus on international patenting. Member States must go further and subsidise R&D activities by focusing, inter alia, on filing of foreign patents such as triadic patents.
Model novog javnog menadžmenta sadrži javne politike za tržišno usmjerene institucionalne reforme. Zemlje koje su primijenile ovaj model općenito su među prvih dvadeset na globalnim ljestvicama vezanima uz ljudski razvoj, ljudsku slobodu, ekonomsku slobodu, lakoću poslovanja, deregulaciju tržišta, konkurentnost, antikorupcijsku transparentnost i liberalnu demokraciju. Dok su nordijske zemlje uvele vanjsko ugovaranje usluga (outsourcing) i tržišno natjecanje unutar svojih sustava države blagostanja, a Njemačka se snažno usmjerila na privatizacije, anglosaksonske zemlje, a posebice Sjedinjene Države, ugovaraju čak i dijelove nacionalne sigurnosti s privatnim vojnim i obavještajnim pružateljima. Međutim, model novog javnog menadžmenta ne zanemaruje ulogu države, već potiče njezino smanjivanje i otvaranje za tržišno natjecanje, privatizaciju, deregulaciju i transparentnost. Dok je Novi javni menadžment uključiv prema zajednicama i tržištima, primjena ovog modela može poboljšati institucije i upravljanje stvaranjem pretežito horizontalnih struktura, koje osiguravaju veze među različitim dijelovima organizacije i koherentan okvir javnih politika. U konačnici, reforme javnog upravljanja ovise o kritičkom razmišljanju, temeljem multidisciplinarne ekspertize, koja doprinosi inovativnim i inkluzivnim institucijama usmjerenim na rješavanje problema, s dovoljnom razinom građanskih vrlina i društvenog povjerenja. ; The New Public Management model contains public policies for market-driven institutional reforms. Countries that applied this model are generally among the TOP 20 in global rankings concerning human development, human freedom, economic freedom, ease of doing business, market deregulation, competitiveness, anti-corruption transparency and liberal democracy. While the Nordic countries introduced outsourcing and competition within their welfare systems, and Germany strongly focused on privatizations, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and especially the United States, outsource even parts of their national security to private military and intelligence contractors. However, the New Public Management model does not undermine the role of government, but encourages its downsizing and opening for competition, privatization, deregulation and transparency. While the New Public Management is inclusive toward communities and markets, the application of the model can improve institutions and governance by creating predominantly horizontal structures, which ensure connections between different parts of organization and coherent public policy framework. Finally, public management reforms depend on critical thinking, based on the multidisciplinary expertise, which contributes to innovative and inclusive problem-solving institutions, with sufficient level of civic virtues and social trust.
The author analyzes the concept of the New Public Management, a common term for a series of public sector reforms being put into practice in the last 20 years in most OECD countries, as well as in developing & transitional countries. The role of the state is expected to be modified with these reforms & would no longer be that of the standard-bearer of progress but of an agent & catalyst of the process of development. A special place belongs to GB, which has a long tradition of a highly esteemed civil service (state administration). The New Public Management used to be linked to Margaret Thatcher's political platform, but outlived her administration. Nevertheless, with time, this "revolution" has proved to have its limits, while privatization & market competition have not boosted GB's macroeconomic indexes. Thus, it is not altogether clear why this model of reform had to be applied in underdeveloped countries. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
The author analyzes fundamental concepts of the school of rational expectation (RATEX, an offspring of the Chicago school of economics). Theoretical foundations of the neoclassical macroeconomy are set out: the hypothesis of rational expectations in the circumstances of perfect competition & the principle of strategic interdependence. Central to these are the hypotheses of variants, misallocation of resources, & neutrality of economic policy. Outlined are rent-seeking & direct unproductive profit-seeking as well as alternative models in the new theoretical economy: economic constitutionalism, deficitarians, the theory of political business cycles, & supply-side economics. 22 References. Adapted from the source document.
Croatia, together with some 30 countries, is waiting to be admitted into the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO is the first step in membership in CEFTA & one of the overture steps in joining the European Union. Apart from the undeniable benefits that WTO membership brings, there are numerous pitfalls & sacrifices facing Croatia, which at the beginning may have a detrimental effect on some sectors of economy. Among the sectors most vulnerable to global competition is that of agriculture & food production. Its position on the local market will be significantly weakened, since it is uncompetitive even at the present level of protective tariffs. The central issue in the negotiations for admitting a country or a group of countries into this organization are protective tariffs in this sector. There is no doubt that Croatia will have to reduce these protective measures to the level required by the WTO. What is that going to mean for Croatian agriculture? To what extent is Croatian agriculture (un)prepared to meet these demands? What are the possible consequences in light of the strategic importance of agriculture for any country, Croatia being no exception? 1 Table, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.
Protectionism is a system of measures used for the purpose of protecting domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. It has emerged simultaneously with the international exchange of goods. The contemporary protectionist policy and practice imposes the necessity of studying this phenomenon in the light of the current situation and conditions. Agricultural protectionism seems to be a particularly significant issue in the international exchange of commodities. ; Protekcionizam označava sustav mjera ekonomske države sa ciljem zaštite domaće proizvodnje u odnosu na konkurenciju inozemnih proizvođača. Javlja se nakon pojave međunarodne razmjene. Međutim, suvremena protekcionistička politika i praksa obavezuje da se istražuje fenomen protekcionizma u suvremenim uvjetima. Posebno je u suvremenoj teoriji za međunarodnu razmjenu značajan agrarni protekcionizam.
The author regards his book Karl Marx and the Political Economy of Modernity, as a summarized polemical autobiography. For him, above all, Marx is an extremely successful key for a new understanding of the classical political and political-economic theory and for its applicability in future analysis and projections of ways out from the actual world crisis. Even though in his book he documented and elaborated ways of completing Marx's critique of political economy in accordance with Marx's plan from Das Kapital, and demonstrated also the possibility of founding a critical political theory on the basis of the critique of political economy. For Dag Strpic, a critical political theory, contradictory to Marx's planning, would be required already in building a concretized theory of markets and prices in the "competition of a multitude of capitals" on the "surface of civil society" -- based on Marx's methodology. Somewhat aside from that, in this article Strpic is focused on an extended clarification of the Modern Normal's meaning. The Modern Normal (MN) in his book was constructed in an analysis based on a combination of classical modern and contemporary political and political-economic theory. But also on analytical use of results of all social sciences and humanities in principle, and science as a whole -- especially by necessity of problem-solving public policy. With a fundamental and implementational focus on an integral political science. In this, Strpic holds on to the basic scheme of the Modern Normal, Fl, from his book. Strpic's Modern Normal in this basic form is designed as a cross-section view of a corridor of cyclical movements of changing orders and fluctuating processes in mutually structurized elements of modern nation-states and their world-system. Those orders and elements developed various foundations on classical modern political and political-economic principles. With various centers of gravity or normals and different formating dominants in a structure of sequential political/political-economic counterpoints of development in series of historically different variants of the Modern Normal. Strpic observes the conjunctures and crises of development of those processes and orders, and also the actual worldwide economic, political, social and cultural crisis, through cycles of the Modern Normal as a whole. This is most evident in semi-centennial and (multi)centennial cycles, and most striking in great crises and pics of conjunctures. Adapted from the source document.
U kontekstu globalnih društvenih promjena u sustavu odgoja i obrazovanja važno je mijenjati pristup stjecanja temeljnih kompetencija učenika s posebnim naglaskom na razvoj njihove prirodoslovne i digitalne pismenosti. Današnje učenike, pripadnike allways on line generacije, karakterizira intenzivno korištenje Interneta za socijalne interakcije, ali i za obrazovanje. Upravo stoga potrebno je implementirati IKT-u u nastavnu praksu, a jedna od mogućnosti je e-učenje. S ciljem istraživanja ostvarenosti ishoda učenja prema kognitivnim razinama zadataka obzirom na primijenjene postupke poučavanja i učenja, tradicionalnu nastavu i e-učenje, provedeno je istraživanje u nastavi Prirode i Biologije osnovne škole na uzorku od osam razrednih odjela. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju podjednaku uspješnost učenika eksperimentalne i kontrolne skupine u ostvarenosti ishoda učenja te se e-učenje pokazalo jednako uspješnijim kao i tradicionalna nastava u kojoj su korištene suvremene nastavne strategije rada. Stoga se e-učenje može koristiti i u situacijama, poput bolesti, odlaska učenika na višednevna natjecanja, života u izdvojenim sredinama, kada ne postoji mogućnost da učenici nazoče redovnoj nastavi. Istraživanje je pokazalo kako učenici kontrolne i eksperimentalne skupine jednako uspješno/neuspješno rješavaju zadatke prve, druge i treće kognitivne razine. Dobiveni rezultati mogu poslužiti kreatorima obrazovne politike te biti smjernica učiteljima praktičarima za oblikovanje nastave. ; In the context of global social changes in the education system, it is important to change the approach to acquiring basic students' competencies, with special emphasis on the development of their natural and digital literacy. Today's students, members of always on line generation, are characterized by the intensive use of the Internet for social interaction as well as for education. Precisely for this reason, it is necessary to implement ICT in teaching practice, and one of the options is e-learning. For the purpose of achieving learning outcomes, according to the cognitive levels of applied teaching and learning, traditional learning and e-learning methods, a research in teaching Nature and Biology in elementary schools, using a sample of eight classes, was conducted. The research results show the same success of the experimental and control groups of students in achieving the outcomes, and e-learning proved to be just as successful as the traditional curriculum, where contemporary teaching strategies were used. Therefore e-learning can also be used in situations such as illness, student's absence for multi-day competitions, life in distinguished environments, in cases where there is no possibility for students to attend regular classes. The research has shown that both control and experimental groups were equally successful / unsuccessfully in solving the tasks of the first, second and third cognitive level. The results can be used by the creators of educational policy, and serve as a guideline for teachers- practitioners at devising their teaching.
Rad se bavi analizom zadovoljstva poslom u sektoru trgovine, kao važne komponente sveobuhvatne socijalne i društveno odgovorne politike zapošljavanja u regiji Zapadnog Balkana. Cilj istraživanja je da se na temelju empirijski prikupljenih podataka i provedenog testiranja definiraju indikatori zadovoljstva poslom zaposlenih u sektoru maloprodaje Srbije, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine, Slovenije i Crne Gore s posebnim osvrtom na odnos između zemalja članica EU i zemalja koje nisu članice EU. U radu se testira hipoteza o statistički značajnoj povezanosti između indikatora zadovoljstva poslom, kao što su: plaće i naknade, uvjeta rada, sustava nagrađivanja, razvoja karijere, sigurnosti posla, kolegijalnosti i komunikacije kao pokazatelja zadovoljstva poslom i analiziranih država Zapadnog Balkana. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo 356 maloprodavača iz najvećih supermarketa Zapadnog Balkana. Dobiveni rezultati su pokazali da postoji statistički značajna povezanost između analiziranih indikatora i država. Na temelju danih rezultata kreiran je model zadovoljstva poslom zaposlenih u sektoru maloprodaje Zapadnog Balkana. Praktičan značaj istraživanja je u tome da može pomoći menadžerima da upoznaju date indikatore kako bi utjecali na motiviranost, zadovoljstvo i produktivnost svojih zaposlenika i tako trgovinske tvrtke regije zapadnog Balkana što bolje pripremili za borbu s međunarodnom konkurencijom i ulazak na tržište Europske Unije. Rezultati pokazuju i važnost budućih istraživanja o mogućim odstupanjima glede utjecaja promatranih pokazatelja u utvrđenom modelu zadovoljstva poslom. ; The paper analyses the job satisfaction in the trade sector as an important component of a comprehensive social and socially responsible employment policy in the Western Balkans. The aim of the research is to use the empirically collected data and conducted tests for defining indicators of job satisfaction of employees in the retail sector in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Montenegro with a special emphasis on the relation between EU members and non-EU countries. This paper tests the hypothesis on a statistically significant correlation between indicators of job satisfaction, such as salaries and benefits, working conditions, reward system, career development, job security, collegiality and communication, and the analysed countries of the Western Balkans. The study included 356 retailers from the largest supermarkets in the Western Balkans. The results showed statistically significant correlation between the analysed indicators and countries, and served as the basis for defining the model of employees' job satisfaction in the Western Balkans retail sector. Practical significance of the research is that it can help managers influence motivation, satisfaction and productivity of their employees, and thus better prepare trading companies in the Western Balkan countries for international competition arena and entry to the European Union market. The results indicate the importance of further research on possible discrepancies in the impact of the observed indicators in the established model of job satisfaction.
Društveno dogovorno poslovanje (DOP) u suvremenome poslovanju sve više postaje alat tvrtkama za diferenciranje u odnosu na konkurenciju, stjecanje konkurentske prednosti te izgradnju imidža poželjnoga poslodavca i ponuditelja roba i usluga. Mnoge tvrtke društveno odgovorno poslovanje u praksi često povezuju sa sponzorstvima i donacijama, a puno rjeđe s cjelokupnim poslovanjem (odnos prema zaposlenicima, kupcima, drugim dionicima, utjecaj na okoliš, politiku zapošljavanja ili poštivanje ljudskih prava). Upravo zato potrebno je postići sinergiju među tvrtkama, medijima i potrošačima pri čemu tvrtke trebaju biti iskrene, etične i odgovorne, mediji posvećuju pažnju sadržaju koji čine dostupnim, a potrošači uzimaju u obzir sve segmente pojedinoga proizvoda pri odabiru. Autori će u ovome radu prikazati povezanost marketinških kampanja i društveno odgovornoga poslovanja tvrtke, posebno u segmentu kampanja koje se obraćaju djeci kao najmanje zaštićenomu i najmanje kritičnomu dijelu medijske publike. Osim toga, prikazat će kako se, unatoč zakonom reguliranim pravilima o tržišnome komuniciranju kojih bi se trebali pridržavati marketinški stručnjaci i mediji, ta pravila krše posebno kada je riječ o djeci te koje su negativne posljedice takvih marketinških kampanja. Uz primjere i iskustva iz drugih zemalja, autori će na primjerima marketinških kampanja usmjerenih na djecu u Hrvatskoj dati osvrt i na domaća iskustva. Na primjeru nekoliko tvrtki bit će prikazan pokušaj utjecaja na najmlađu populaciju te će biti navedeni rezultati provedenih istraživanja koji pokazuju u kojoj je mjeri učinkovit i dugoročno štetan ili koristan utjecaj marketinga na djecu ; Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in contemporary business operations are increasingly becoming a tool used by companies for differentiation compared to the competition, gaining a competitive advantage and building an image of a desirable employer and supplier of goods and services. Many companies often in practice associate corporate social responsibility with sponsorships and donations, and less often with overall business operations (relations with employees, customers, other stakeholders, impact on the environment, employment policy or respecting human rights). It is precisely for this reason that it is necessary to achieve a synergy between companies, media and consumers, whereby companies create honest, ethical and responsible companies, media dedicate attention to the content that they make available, and consumers take into consideration all of the segments of a specific product during selection. In this paper, the authors will show the connection between marketing campaigns and corporate social responsibility in companies, especially in the segment of campaigns directed at children as the least protected and critical part of the media audience. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated how, despite the legally regulated rules on market communication that marketing experts and media must follow, these rules are often broken, especially when in question are children and the negative consequences of such marketing campaigns. In addition to examples and experiences of other countries concerning marketing campaigns directed at children in Croatia, the authors shall provide an overview of domestic experiences. On the example of a few companies, shown will be their attempt to influence the youngest population, and the findings of conducted research will be provided, showing to what extent the effects of marketing on children are effective and damaging or beneficial long-term.
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAU prošlome dvobroju pisali smo na temu "Treba li osuvremeniti Nacionalnu šumarsku politiku i strategiju?" očekujući odgovore na postavljena pitanja. Nismo ih još dobili, a nema niti najave o široj stručnoj raspravi, osim što čujemo kuloarske pohvale kako je to prava tema za raspravu. Znači i dalje ćemo probleme u struci rješavati nesveobuhvatno nego po nametnutoj nam potrebi "iz rukava". Napomenuli smo, kako sigurno ima još pitanja i nismo trebali dugo čekati argumente za pitanje iz naslova. Naime, ovih dana čitamo u Poslovnom dnevniku, kako drvoprerađivači traže od Trgovačkog društva Hrvatske šume d.o.o. smanjenje cijenu sirovine za 15 % i produženi rok plaćanja na prvotno 90 dana, a prema zadnjoj informaciji čak na 120 dana te kako će Hrvatske šume d.o.o. ovih dana "vagati" rezanje cijena. Ta potreba tumači se padom cijena drvoprerađivačkih proizvoda na tržištu za 20 % i narudžbi za 25 % pa se od Države traže kompenzacijske mjere. Najviše su kaže se pogođeni proizvođači peleta i paletiziranog ogrjevnog drva, dakle proizvoda s malom dodanom vrijednošću. O tim proizvodima (kao i o parketu proizvodu iz tzv. "dorade" te finalnim proizvodima) smo više puta pisali, ističući kako je sirovina posebice za pelete ponajprije otpad finalne prerade drva, dakle suho, a ne mokro drvo čije sušenje na potrebnu vlažnost bitno podiže troškove proizvodnje. Oni su upravo kompenzirani do sada, moglo bi se reći brutalno "jeftinom sirovinom", a sada se traži i njeno smanjenje i produženje roka plaćanja. Ako je to 90 dana onda je to obrtaj kapitala 4 (za 120 dana to je okruglo 3 - dakle katastrofalno) i tu nema osiguranja postojećeg stanja a kamo li razvoja, no jeli to važno kada sve to plaća šuma! Naravno, zagovornici netržišnog poslovanja iz Drvnog sektora sugeriraju u odnosnom tekstu, kako Vlada "nakon ozbiljnih intervencija u brodogradnju i kroz konsolidaciju strateških tvrtki, ima priliku usvojiti hitne sektorske mjere kroz poslovanje Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o." Uz prethodno spomenuto smanjenje cijena od 15 % i produženje roka plaćanja na 120 dana, od 7 predloženih mjera Vladi, interesantna je ona, značajna sastavnica tržišnog poslovanja o ukidanju maloprodaje u Hrvatskim šumama d.o.o. – znači uklanjanje konkurencije. Komparirajući prodajne cijene glavnih drvnih sortimenata s tržištima u okruženju (Austrija, Italija, Mađarska, BiH i Srbija) s onima po kojima Hrvatske šume d.o.o. prodaju drvne sortimente našim drvoprerađivačima, dolazimo do brojke od oko 500 mil. kuna godišnje, kojim Država već potiče drvoprerađivače. Koliko i kako pak drvoprerađivači pripomažu Hrvatskim šumama d.o.o. kod rješavanja pitanja zaliha drvne sirovine, to je posebno pitanje? Kada im treba sirovina, vrši se pritisak na dobavljača da im se ona osigura bez obzira na vremenske uvjete i nastanak šteta na šumskom tlu. Kada ima viška drvne zalihe to nije njihov problem, bez obzira na potpisane ugovore! O nenaplaćenim potraživanjima Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. od kupaca nećemo ovom prilikom. Isto tako predstečajne nagodbe nećemo niti spominjati, kao i tumačenja odgovornih kako su tim mjerama spašavali radna mjesta u preradi drva, a ne pogodovali velikim dužnicima. Država daje potporu, ali "upravljačka ekipa" koja je dovele firmu u to stanje ostaje i dalje na njenom čelu! Što reći nakon svega ovoga nego upitati se, kako to politika zagovorom netržišnog poslovanja u šumarstvu štiti šumu kao nacionalno bogatstvo naroda, a pripomaže razvoju primarne, a posebice finalne prerade drva? Evo im rezultata! Uredništvo ; EDITORIALIn the last double issue we raised the question whether the National Forestry Policy and Strategy should be modernised. While still waiting for some answers, we have only heard that the topic deserves a wide specialist discussion. This means that such issues will continue to be treated individually when they occur, instead of being solved on a global level. We hinted that there certainly were some more questions, and we did not wait long for the reaction; in the Business Diary (Poslovni dnevnik) we have read that the wood processors require from the trading company "Hrvatske šume" a 15% decrease in timber prices and prolonged payment terms of the former 90 days, or, according to the latest information 120 days. The demand accounts for 20% price decrease in wood products on the market and 25% decrease in orders, which calls for compensation measures from the Government. It is said that the most affected are the manufacturers of pellets and pellet-formed fuelwood - the products with low added value. We wrote about these products (as well as about parquet and final products) on several occasions, pointing at the fact that pellets are primarily the waste material from final wood processing, the dry wood, while the moist wood requires price-raising drying to achieve a required degree of moisture. So far they have been compensated by the brutally "cheap raw material"; now both price reduction and payment terms are required. If it is 90 days it means a turnover of 4 (for 120 days it rounds up to 3 - which is a catastrophe). There would be no insurance of the existing situation, not to mention the development. Indeed, does it matter anything at all when forests are here to pay the bill?! The advocates of non-market business from the wood sector suggest that the Government after serious interventions in ship building and through the consolidation of strategic firms has the opportunity to accept urgent sector measures through the business of the Croatian Forests Ltd. With the mentioned price decrease of 15% and the payment prolongation of 120 days, of the seven measures proposed to the Government a significant component of the market business operation is the interesting one - the elimination of the retail sale in Croatian Forests Ltd., which means the elimination of the competition. Compared to the selling prices of the main wood assortments on the markets in the region (Austria, Italy, Hungary, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia), the prices at which Croatian Forests Ltd. is selling their wood assortments to our wood manufacturers amount to round 500 million hrk a year, by which money have the wood manufacturers already been encouraged. Another question is how the wood manufacturer helps Croatian Forests Ltd. with solving the issues of raw wood stock. When they need raw material they exert pressure upon suppliers without considering weather conditions and the damage upon the forest soil; When there is stock surplus, it is not their problem in spite of the signed contracts! To the unpaid credits and debits to Croatian Forests we shall refer on another occasion. We shall not even mention the pre-bankruptcy settlements as well as the explanations of the responsible parties saying that these measures are saving the jobs in wood processing instead of doing favour to the big debtors. A firm with significant rent status as to raw material asked for Government intervention. They received encouragement but the whole "management team" that brought the firm to this situation stayed in charge! What can be said after all this but wonder what kind of policy which supports non-market business in forestry protects the forest as national wealth while encouraging the development of both primary and final wood processing? The answer is in the results! Editorial Board
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.