It appears that elections increase chances for a smooth transition to democracy only in competitive authoritarian regimes where political instability already exists. This essay explores the process the author calls 'competitive clientelism' whereby elections supply ruling elites in authoritarian regimes opportunities to compete over limited sets of state resources that they then distribute to local elites a structure that reduces demand for any change to democracy. Adapted from the source document.
Abstract: This article reconsiders the relationship between authoritarian elections and democratization. Examining legislative elections in the Middle East, it argues that elections are best understood as "competitive clientelism," a competition between elites over privileged access to a limited set of state resources that they can then distribute to their clients. This drives the behavior of voters and candidates in systematic ways that promote proregime parliaments and allow incumbent elites to manage elections largely through institutional rules rather than extralegal manipulation. The article concludes by considering mechanisms that may more effectively help to foster democratization, given the logic of authoritarian elections.
Conflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
AbstractConflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
Ghana's Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer programme has been widely characterised as 'home grown'. This article challenges such accounts of the LEAP by showing how donors used their financial muscle to shape the LEAP both at the level of programme adoption and implementation. However, the extent to which donor interests and ideas influenced the programme's design and implementation depended on the degree to which such interests were aligned with those of domestic political elites. While it was donors who first pushed cash transfers on the agenda of the Ghanaian government, electoral calculus took centre stage in driving the programme's subsequent expansion and institutionalisation. The article suggests the need to move beyond the donor-driven versus state-led type of arguments to explore the complex ways in which transnational factors and the formal and informal aspects of domestic politics interact to produce different levels and types of commitment to social protection in Africa.
The success of Kenya's garment export sector relative to other African countries challenges a growing pessimism regarding the prospects of devising and implementing industrial policy in contemporary Africa, particularly in contexts characterized by Competitive Clientelism. Kenya became sub-Saharan Africa's fourth largest exporter of garments by value during the last two decades, catching up with major players like Lesotho and South Africa while converging on the two largest exporters, Mauritius and Madagascar. Nuancing existing explanations for the sector's growth, which emphasize external factors like trade regimes and donor interventions, this article assigns a central role to the state and the balance of power that underpins it. The interests of key actors within Kenya's political settlement aligned in a way that allowed the country's Export Processing Zones (EPZ) programme to be relatively insulated from political pressures, giving the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) sufficient autonomy and coordination capacities to administer a highly-conducive business environment for predominantly foreign garment firms. However, while the sector's employment and foreign exchange contributions have ensured ongoing political support, the resulting increase in garment firms' holding power has made them more assertive in demanding policies that are not only decoupled from learning processes, but detrimental to other industry players.
