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"Industrial Policy and Development in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.

In a developing country like Bangladesh, the devolved local government system is widely recognized as one of the key institutional forms for the citizen-centric public service delivery system and ensuring democratic governance at the grassroots level. However, the democratic nature of local governments and their effective role in rendering services are contingent upon the political and institutional environments of the country. Competitive electoral process is key to local democratic governance. The purpose of this article is to analyze the implications of contemporary political order and institutional environments for the proper functioning of the Union Parishad (council), the lowest tier of the local government system in Bangladesh. More specifically, this study will reflect on how political clientelism, partyarchy and institutional environments have stymied competitive electoral politics at the local level which may result in democratic backsliding.

AbstractDrawing on studies from across the social sciences, this study explores a possibility that brokers affect vote choices via a psychological channel. Given that the information a broker utilizes for the efficient delivery of private transfers affects voters' expectations of receiving those transfers, neglected voters may defect from voting for the broker's boss out of anger resulting from frustrated expectations, and this is likely to be the case particularly in a competitive election and among indifferent voters. Results from a lab experiment are consistent with the proposed possibility.

AbstractTo what extent, if any, do the issue priorities of elites overlap with that of the public under competitive authoritarianism? While previous studies examined the overlap of the priorities of elites and ordinary citizens in democracies, our knowledge is still limited when we move beyond these contexts. This article aims to contribute to the democratisation and legislative politics literature by testing congruence of issue priorities under competitive authoritarianism. Analysing more than 10,000 legislative texts from the 2012 Moroccan parliament, we found high levels of congruence between the issue priorities of legislators and citizens, especially in non-legislative activities (i.e. parliamentary questions). Moreover, contrary to earlier studies on clientelism and citizen-elite linkage in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, our results demonstrate a higher correlation between the priorities of the two largest political parties and the mass public, when compared with those parties' core supporters.

Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. But, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines this key - and often overlooked - component of clientelism. The author draws on elite interviews and original survey data collected during his years of field research in Lebanon and Yemen; two Arab countries in which political constituencies follow sectarian, regional, and tribal divisions. He demonstrates that voters in internally-competitive communal groups receive more, and better, payoffs for their political support than voters trapped in uncompetitive groups dominated by a single, hegemonic leader. Ultimately, politicians provide services when compelled by competitive pressures to do so, whereas leaders sheltered from competition can, and do, take their supporters for granted.

Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli.

Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli

Presenting Belize as an illustrative and critical case of clientelist democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean, this thesis explores the origins of clientelist politics alongside the pre-independence birth of political parties, analyses its rapid expansion after independence in 1981 and assesses its implications for democratic governance. Based on qualitative research, including interviews with major political leaders, the thesis contends that, despite Belize's positive post-colonial reputation for consolidating formal democracy, the concurrent expansion of clientelism, as both an electoral strategy and a mode of participation, ranks high among the worrying challenges affecting the quality of its democracy. Although intense party competition in a context of persistent poverty is central to explaining the trajectory of clientelism in Belize, the Westminster model of governance, the disappearance of substantive policy distinctions among parties and the embrace of neoliberal economic policies fuelled its expansion. Small-state size and multi-ethnicity have also been contributing factors. Even though the thousands of monthly dyadic transactions in constituencies are largely rational individual choices with short-term distributive benefits, the thesis concludes that, collectively, these practices lead to irrational governance behaviour and damaging macro-political consequences. Political participation is devalued, public resources are wasted, governance reform becomes more difficult and political corruption is facilitated. As a parallel informal welfare system has become embedded, politicians and citizens alike have become trapped in a 'big game' of mutual clientelist dependency. A comparative analysis of post-independence political developments in other Commonwealth Caribbean states shows that the expansion of political clientelism in the context of competitive party politics is significantly path dependent. Besides contributing to the political historiography of modern Belize, this thesis demonstrates that national studies of small clientelist democracies can provide valuable insights into the ways in which informal political practices interact with a state's formal institutions to shape the quality of democracy itself.

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced great oscillations in democratic progress and retreat. Authoritarian modernization has taken root, notably in Ethiopia and Rwanda. No paradigm captures the complexity and volatility. Some argue that autocratic governance produces development outcomes while competitive clientelism encourages corruption and social distress. Nigeria presents a paradox of reform and dysfunction, of growth and discordant development, of minority affluence and mass poverty. The northern region has undergone economic and political decline. The failure to defeat Boko Haram reflects the prebendalist corrosion of state institutions. The February 2015 election is a dismaying hurdle for the Nigerian system of conglomerate governance.

Extant literature links intergroup disparities, or horizontal inequalities, in Sub‐Saharan Africa to the unequal representation of ethnic groups in central power, who accumulate wealth at the expense of politically marginalized groups. Over time, these politically‐induced inequalities have trapped some ethnic groups in positions of relative disadvantage. Group‐based, or horizontal, redistribution can help redress these inequalities yet require popular support if they are not to contribute to intergroup tensions. In this article, we examine how people's experiences of political exclusion, on the one hand, and their attributional beliefs about the causes of political exclusion, on the other, condition support for government policies aimed at eradicating economic inequalities between different ethnic groups. We argue that people are more likely to be supportive of horizontal redistribution either when (H1a) they belong to ethnic groups that have not had access to central power, and/or (H1b) feel that their ethnic group is politically marginalized (and thus stands to gain); or when (H2) they attribute the political exclusion of the politically marginalized group(s) that stand(s) to benefit from these policies to the legacies of colonialism and clientelism (thus seeking to foster equity). To test our hypotheses, we examine these issues in the context of Kenya, a society with politically salient ethnic cleavages and a history of clientelism. Based on a unique online survey involving 2,286 Kenyans, we show that, notwithstanding group self‐interest being at play, there is strong support for horizontal redistribution across groups.

Why do some authoritarian states have competitive elections? This study shows that whenever there is a balance of power between candidates, competitiveness will ensue. Electoral fraud is often widespread in autocratic states, but if no single candidate or party is in a position to monopolize electoral support the result will be competitive. The contribution here is to analyze the relative strength of all the actors involved in a parliamentary election and to show that electoral returns reflect the district level balance of power, even in autocracies. Three main sources of candidate-level electoral power are identified: state, market, and society. State affiliated candidates in authoritarian states perform well due to favorable treatment by state institutions. Market actors perform well due to financial resources. These actors arise when market reforms create a class of entrepreneurs that defend their interests by running for public office, often challenging state sanctioned candidates. The strength of candidates using social cleavages, here mainly 'clan' and ethnic, is found to be exaggerated in the literature. The study also confirms that competitiveness did not result from an active civil society. Competitive elections matter because they can severely destabilize the regime, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. However, electoral competitiveness that is the result of an intra-elite balance of power should not be confused with democracy. This form of self-interested competitiveness where clientelism is pervasive and accountability mechanisms are weak is an affront to the democratic ideal. For those of us who advocate democracy and genuine political participation competitive authoritarian regimes can be used as an informative cautionary tale. Power matters, and especially so in authoritarian states. Understanding the logic behind competitive authoritarianism helps us revise strategies for lasting democratic reforms.

The power of elections in Africa revisited / Staffan I. Lindberg -- The relative powerlessness of elections in Latin America / Jennifer L. McCoy and Jonathan Hartlyn -- Elections as levers of democratization: a global inquiry / Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius -- Post-Cold War political regimes: when do elections matter? / Philip G. Roessler and Marc M. Howard -- Harbinger of democracy: competitive elections before the end of authoritarianism / Jason Brownlee -- All elections are not the same: why power-sharing elections strengthen democratization / Pippa Norris -- Sources of competition under electoral authoritarianism / Andreas Schedler -- Opposition parties and incumbent presidents: the new dynamics of electoral competition in Africa / Lise Rakner and Nicolas van de Walle -- Legislative elections in hegemonic authoritarian regimes: competitive clientelism and resistance to democratization / Ellen Lust-Okar -- Opposition versus dictators: explaining divergent electoral outcomes in post-Communist Europe and Eurasia / Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik -- Judicial complexity empowering opposition? Critical elections in Armenia and Georgia / Bryon Moraski -- The contingent power of authoritarian elections / Andreas Schedler -- A theory of elections as a mode of transition / Staffan I. Lindberg

Since the Fourth Republic was inaugurated in 1993, politics in Ghana has been increasingly characterized by competitive clientelism. Ruling coalitions are characterized by a high degree of vulnerability in power due to a strong opposition party, by strong lower-level factions within the ruling coalition due to their importance in winning elections, and by a high degree of fragmentation among the ruling elite. These characteristics, combined with a weak domestic capitalist class and high inflows of foreign aid, have led the ruling elites across political parties to pursue and implement policies that have a short time horizon, that do not significantly shift the allocation of resources towards building productive sectors, and which are often plagued by problems of enforcement. The results have led to growth without economic transformation. In particular, the country has witnessed recurrent macroeconomic instability, a haphazard process of privatization of state-owned enterprises, and no serious attempt to build up productive sectors outside of cocoa and gold.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface / Maxfield, Sylvia / Schneider, Ben Ross -- Part I: Concepts And Arguments -- 1. Business, the State, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries / Schneider, Ben Ross / Maxfield, Sylvia -- 2. Theories of Business and Business-State Relations / Haggard, Stephan / Maxfield, Sylvia / Schneider, Ben Ross -- Part II: Business Organization, Firm Structure, And Strong States -- 3. State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation / Evans, Peter -- 4. The Political Economy of Sectors and Sectoral Change: Korea Then and Now / Shafer, Michael -- 5. Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan / Fields, Karl -- 6. Business Elites, the State, and Economic Change in Chile / Silva, Eduardo -- Part III: Collective Business Action And Weak States -- 7. Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform: Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico / Schneider, Ben Ross -- 8. A Historical View of Business-State Relations: Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela Compared / Thorp, Rosemary / Durand, Francisco -- 9. Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand / Doner, Richard F. / Ramsay, Ansil -- 10. Economic Governance in Turkey: Bureaucratic Capacity, Policy Networks, and Business Associations / Biddle, Jesse / Milor, Vedat -- References -- Index