Suchergebnisse

Amer-Soviet bargaining behavior in the postwar disarmament negotiations was investigated in terms of the impact of military strength & confidence in deterrence. It was hyp'ed that the greater the confidence in deterrent capabilities, the less the propensity to negotiate seriously on disarmament. Confidence in deterrent capabilities was measured in terms of changes in military expenditures, in which it was assumed that an increase in expenditure indicated a lack of confidence & a cutback showed considerable faith in existing capabilities. Additional evidence of the level of confidence was derived from an examination of PO polls taken in the US concerned with expectation of war. Propensity for serious negotiation was indexed by the concessionmaking behavior of the US & the USSR over the past 15 yrs. It was found that concessions tended to be made by both the US & the USSR during periods of lack of confidence in deterrent capabilities. When a state feels confident, there is not the incentive to look seriously at other alternatives for nat'l security. Since concession scores were also found to be dependent upon the number of concessions made by the other side, it was argued that a position closer to parity in which both sides lacked some confidence in deterrent capabilities would be the ideal climate for successful negotiations. AA.

"In all civilizations, men have evinced dramatic collective behavior--the craze, the riot, the revolution. In Theory of Collective Behavior, the author applies the insights of contemporary sociology in the first work to unify the subject of collective behavior under a single, coherent sociological theory. The treatment is new and controversial. It marks a radical departure from the European social-psychological tradition of Le Bon, Trotter, MacDougall, and Freud, as well as from the American tradition of Ross, Park, and Blumer. Smelser explains why collective episodes occur where they do, when they do, and in the ways they do. He discusses the distinctive social conditions that accompany collective seizures. He also studies the kinds of beliefs that spark collective behavior and explores the relations among simple beliefs of hysteria and wish-fulfillment and the more complex beliefs envisioning the reconstruction of social norms and cultural values. The explanations are based on a theoretical scheme that permits classification and analysis of the social strains that underlie collective outbursts--strains such as ambiguity, deprivation, conflicts of norms, and conflicts of values. The greater part of this volume is devoted to empirical and comparative applications of Smelser's theory to several types of collective behavior. Individual chapters treat isolated phenomena such as the panic and the craze (including the financial boom and certain types of religious revivals); in these chapters the author has drawn from the literature of sociology, history, anthropology, and psychology, integrating the provocative but unorganized material hitherto available"--Jacket. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).

A systematic, but not exhaustive, review of empirical studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, a 2-person, non-0-sum game. It is noted that game-theoretical analyses & `rationality' models cannot provide a solution for this game. Empirical studies are reviewed under the following headings: (1) manipulations of the payoff matrix, (2) personality variables, (3) strategy of the `other,' (4) possibilities for COMM, & (5) other independent variables. General findings from empirical studies indicate that competition predominates in these games, & becomes intensified as the game progresses. The level of competition will vary, within limits, according to the independent variables that are used. It is concluded that the high level of competition may be a function of the small or imaginary rewards used in these studies, & a series of exp's utilizing meaningful rewards are suggested. AA.

An article examining USSR-US concession-making during the postwar disarmament negotiations. A weighted index of the propensity of the 2 sides to compromise was developed. In charting the concession scores through several rounds of negotiations, a strong tendency toward reciproaction was demonstrated. It was also shown that the US tended to make its concessions during the early part of a round of negotiations & the Soviets waited until the negotiations were about to dissolve. 82% of the US concession score was made during the 1st 33% of the round whereas the Soviets made 75% of their concessions during the last 33% of the round. Not only did the US show a greater concern for making concessions early, it also tended to reward compromising behavior more readily than the Soviets either by approving the behavior or by offering a concession. The Soviets rejected 45% of all concessions made by the US as contrasted with the US rejection score of 12%. An index showing the level of agreement on various issues of disarmament was also constructed. Here it was found that consensus has increased over the yrs, but with occasional setbacks. AA.

A discussion of intrapersonal conflicts arising from competitions among incompatible tendencies to act, based on the assumption that ambivalent & unambivalent behavior are not diff in kind but fall at diff points on the same continuum. 3 assumptions re prediction of conflict resolutions are presented: (1) the 2 tendencies summate algebraically, (2) one tendency does not weaken the alternative response will be elicited by the stimulus, & (3) the 2 tendencies, in competing with each other, generate an emotional state having certain of the functional properties of drives, & thus behavior will be determined by new variables. The variables affecting the strengths of competitiory tendencies are considered with respect to the 3 major groups of conflicts: spatial, discrimination-induced, & temporal conflicts. A brief review is then offered of the attempts made to extend this type of conflict theory to the behavior of individuals in soc situations. I. Taviss.

'Derivations from the theory of cognitive dissonance, (Diss) which postulate a drive to reduce discordant beliefs, behavior, & preceptions, can be exp'ally tested with respect to problems of attitude change' (AC). Specifically, publicly stated views that differ from private opinions produce Diss which increases as the general importance of the guiding cognitions increases & as the balance between opposing cognitions equalizes. Res indicates that (a) when alternative modes of reducing Diss are controlled the Diss aroused is directly related to AC; (b) the person's subjective perception of his choice in exposing himself to an undesirable event may be a mechanism through which rewards operate in producing AC; (c) only when high effort in comprehending persuasive communications is required is Diss aroused which leads to AC; (d) Diss arousal produces information seeking behavior; & (e) mere commitment to action without actual behavior may be sufficient to produce Diss reducing AC. Limitations are discussed of the generalizations of Diss & AC which stem from the 'specificity of decision,' 'psychology of choice,' 'conflict vs Diss,' & 'alternative modes of Diss reduction.' Implications are discussed for understanding opinion change processes which pertain to (a) revaluation & selective exposure to information in mass media as a means of Diss reduction; (b) the size of inducements most likely to produce AC; (c) the attitude toward the communicator & resultant AC; (d) the relation of effort in communication to AC; & (e) the importance of free choice in Diss arousal. C. M. Couahenour.