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AbstractHow does the presence of a mediator change the dynamics of a dispute and help move disputants toward agreement?

In this article, the authors develop and empirically evaluate a general model of the linkages between domestic and international conflict behavior. Much of the literature on domestic international interactions has focused on the structural constraints of the international and domestic systems on leaders' foreign policy decisions. Rather than focusing on structural constraints, the present authors model the influence of the behavior of domestic and international rivals on leader decision making. The impact of rivals' behavior on conflict across the domestic-international nexus has been neglected relative to the role of structural factors. This study helps redress that imbalance. The authors test their model with a statistical analysis of Zaire during the period 1975 to 1992 and find substantial support for the model.

Examines influence of behavior of domestic and international rival leaders on their foreign policy decision making; 1975-92, chiefly.

Prior research suggests that there is enough residual uncertainty in conflict situations so that a person's attitude towards risk may influence his or her conflict behavior. This paper explores the level of dyadic conflict arising from negotiation between partners having different combinations of risk propensities. Dyadic conflict was measured as the sum of each dyadic partner's conflict score using the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory‐I. Risk propensities of negotiators were induced The results from the experiment provide clear evidence in support of the research hypothesis that in a dyad, the greater the disparity between the negotiating partners in their risk‐taking propensities, the greater will be the levels of dyadic conflict. The result suggests that conflict models of negotiating under uncertainty need to include risk propensities of the players to expand their descriptive power.

It has been speculated that the conflict behaviors of Chinese and Japanese managers are more or less the same since both cultures are considered as collectivistic and high-contextual; and they inherit Confucian teachings as the cornerstone of their social and moral codes. The purposes
of this study were to investigate whether there was a difference between the way that the managers of these two countries handle conflicts and whether the conflict behavior of these managers was influenced by traditional Confucian values. The results indicated that there was little difference
found between them in terms of value orientations even though Japanese managers tended to employ more assertive styles than the PRC Chinese managers do in dealing with conflict situations.

Most previous treatments of conflict style have focused upon five strategies: avoiding (withdrawing), forcing (competing), smoothing (accommodating), compromising, and confronting (collaborating), purported to lie in a two-dimensional (assertion and cooperation) space. The factor structure of conflict style in self-reports by 158 public-and private-sector managers and in reports by their subordinates (total N = 927) on Howat and London's (1980) 25 behavioral statements was determined. These data indicate a three-dimensional structure which was essentially the same for self-and subordinate reports, i.e., openness, distribution, and control, although self-and subor-dinate reports were correlated at only a very low level. Concern for the interest of both parties was a component of both openness and distribution. The implications for conflict management were discussed.

The question of cooperation is examined in terms of both the theory of rational choice and the theory of social norms. Is it possible for rational individuals to bring about cooperation, or is normative behavior needed to maintain cooperation? Through the development of the Learning-Bayesian PD game, the following propositions are obtained. First, cooperation is maintained by farsighted and perfectly rational individuals who have the expectations of reciprocity. Second, however, this cooperation is not stable; disturbance or deviant behavior overthrows cooperation. Third, even under the existence of disturbance, if individuals behave normatively, they can maintain cooperation; normative behavior works as a stabilizer. Finally, if they behave not only normatively but morally (i.e., according to a categorical imperative), they can even transform noncooperation into cooperation; moral behavior works as a catalyzer of the transformation.