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Research demonstrates that the physical traits of leaders and political candidates influence election outcomes and that subjects favor functionally different physical traits in leaders when their social groups face problems related to war and peace, respectively. Previous research has interpreted these effects as evidence of a problem-sensitive and distinct psychology of followership. In two studies, we extend this research by demonstrating that preferences for physical traits in leaders' faces arise from an integration of both contextual and individual differences related to perceptions of social conflict and that these effects relate only to leader choices. Theoretically, we argue that increased preferences for facial dominance in leaders reflect increased needs for enforced coordinated action when one's group is seen to face threats from other coordinated groups rather than from random natural events. Empirically, we show that preferences for dominant-looking leaders are a function of (1) contextual primes of group-based threats rather than nature-based threats and (2) political ideology (a core measure of perceptions of group-based conflict) such that, across contexts, conservatives prefer dominant-looking leaders more than liberals. For the first time, we demonstrate that the effects of these contextual and individual differences are non-existent when subjects are asked to choose a friend instead of a leader: irrespective of ideology and context, people strongly prefer non-dominant friends. This finding adds significantly to the results of past research and provides evidence of the existence of a distinct psychology of followership that produces leader preferences that are independent of preferences for other social partners. ; Research demonstrates that the physical traits of leaders and political candidates influence election outcomes and that subjects favor functionally different physical traits in leaders when their social groups face problems related to war and peace, respectively. Previous research has interpreted these effects as evidence of a problem-sensitive and distinct psychology of followership. In two studies, we extend this research by demonstrating that preferences for physical traits in leaders' faces arise from an integration of both contextual and individual differences related to perceptions of social conflict and that these effects relate only to leader choices. Theoretically, we argue that increased preferences for facial dominance in leaders reflect increased needs for enforced coordinated action when one's group is seen to face threats from other coordinated groups rather than from random natural events. Empirically, we show that preferences for dominant-looking leaders are a function of (1) contextual primes of group-based threats rather than nature-based threats and (2) political ideology (a core measure of perceptions of group-based conflict) such that, across contexts, conservatives prefer dominant-looking leaders more than liberals. For the first time, we demonstrate that the effects of these contextual and individual differences are non-existent when subjects are asked to choose a friend instead of a leader: irrespective of ideology and context, people strongly prefer non-dominant friends. This finding adds significantly to the results of past research and provides evidence of the existence of a distinct psychology of followership that produces leader preferences that are independent of preferences for other social partners.

Governments often take unpopular measures. To minimize the political cost of such measures policy makers may strategically time them to coincide with other newsworthy events, which distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis using data on the recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks on both sides of the conflict with data on the content of evening news for top U.S. TV networks, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out when the U.S. news are expected to be dominated by important (non-Israel-related) events on the following day. In contrast, we find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks. The timing of Israeli attacks minimizes the next-day news coverage which, as confirmed by comprehensive video content analysis, is especially charged with negative emotional content. We also find that: i) strategic timing is applied to retaliation only in periods of less intense fighting, when the urgency of retaliation is lower; ii) strategic timing is present only for the Israeli attacks that bear risk of civilians being affected; and iii) Israeli attacks are timed to newsworthy events that are predictable.

Governments often take unpopular measures. To minimize the political cost of such measures policy makers may strategically time them to coincide with other newsworthy events, which distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis using data on the recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks on both sides of the conflict with data on the content of evening news for top U.S. TV networks, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out when the U.S. news are expected to be dominated by important (non-Israel-related) events on the following day. In contrast, we find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks. The timing of Israeli attacks minimizes the next-day news coverage which, as confirmed by comprehensive video content analysis, is especially charged with negative emotional content. We also find that: i) strategic timing is applied to retaliation only in periods of less intense fighting, when the urgency of retaliation is lower; ii) strategic timing is present only for the Israeli attacks that bear risk of civilians being affected; and iii) Israeli attacks are timed to newsworthy events that are predictable.

Governments often take unpopular measures. To minimize the political cost of such measures policy makers may strategically time them to coincide with other newsworthy events, which distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis using data on the recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks on both sides of the conflict with data on the content of evening news for top U.S. TV networks, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out when the U.S. news are expected to be dominated by important (non-Israel-related) events on the following day. In contrast, we find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks. The timing of Israeli attacks minimizes the next-day news coverage which, as confirmed by comprehensive video content analysis, is especially charged with negative emotional content. We also find that: i) strategic timing is applied to retaliation only in periods of less intense fighting, when the urgency of retaliation is lower; ii) strategic timing is present only for the Israeli attacks that bear risk of civilians being affected; and iii) Israeli attacks are timed to newsworthy events that are predictable.

Governments often take unpopular measures. To minimize the political cost of such measures policy makers may strategically time them to coincide with other newsworthy events, which distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis using data on the recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks on both sides of the conflict with data on the content of evening news for top U.S. TV networks, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out when the U.S. news are expected to be dominated by important (non-Israel-related) events on the following day. In contrast, we find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks. The timing of Israeli attacks minimizes the next-day news coverage which, as confirmed by comprehensive video content analysis, is especially charged with negative emotional content. We also find that: i) strategic timing is applied to retaliation only in periods of less intense fighting, when the urgency of retaliation is lower; ii) strategic timing is present only for the Israeli attacks that bear risk of civilians being affected; and iii) Israeli attacks are timed to newsworthy events that are predictable.

Рассмотрены особенности речевого общения в ситуации политического конфликта холодной войны на материале выступлений американских политиков ХХ в. Политический дискурс определен как текст с тематикой утверждения и выражения интересов субъектов политики и рассмотренный в ситуации общения в ситуации борьбы за власть и действий по формированию общественного мнения. Факторы речевого общения соотнесены со структурой конфликтной ситуации (участники «говорящий» и «слушающий», косвенная сторона «слышащий», окружающая среда «канал связи» и др.). На речевом материале проиллюстрированы две основные стратегии поведения в конфликте партнерства и напористости. ; The article considers speech communication in a situation of political conflict (Cold War) as based on public speeches of the 20th century American politicians. Political discourse is defined as a text with the thematization of statement and expressing political subjects' interests. It is a text considered in a communication situation in a situation of racing for power and actions on public opinion formation. Speech communication factors correlate with the conflict situation structure (participants "the speaker" and "the listener", indirect party "the link, etc.). Speech material illustrates two main strategies of conflict behavior partnership and aggressiveness.

This article analyzes the use of historical analogies to interpret and explain foreign policy behavior, focusing on the South China Sea conflict. In reviewing coverage in the international English-language press, we find a range of historical analogies, from the conflict between Athens and Sparta to the 1938 Munich agreement, to interpret China's strategy and motivations in the region. While analogies are powerful tools for interpreting international events, their use has dangers as they are often deployed to justify decisions rather than analyze options. This article has two goals. First, we argue that relying excessively on Western analogies for understanding China can be misleading; instead, we suggest visiting examples from China's past that offer alternative readings of its current ambitions. Second, we suggest a way to overcome the deterministic application of historical analogies by not taking them individually, but rather taking them as sets of alternative scenarios. This way, they can provide important insights for generating critical debate and informing tactful diplomacy.

"Ziel des Forschungsvorhabens "Nachhaltiges Konsumverhalten durch ökologische Dienstleistungen
und organisierte Gemeinschaftsnutzungen im großstädtischen Wohnumfeld" war,
neue Nutzungsstrategien in einem spezifischen Kontext umzusetzen, praktisch zu erproben
und zu untersuchen. Dabei wurden sowohl die Möglichkeiten und Hemmnisse der Umsetzung
von neuen Nutzungsstrategien im Wohnumfeld als auch ihr Beitrag zu nachhaltigerem
Konsum bzw. einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung erkundet. Der Ansatz des Projektes greift Ergebnisse der Debatte zu den Genderaspekten von nachhaltigem Konsum auf, die auf den fehlenden Bezug auf die Handlungskontexte der privaten Haushalte als ein Defizit von Strategien zur Verbreitung von nachhaltigen Konsummustern verweisen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist ein wesentliches konzeptionelles Element des Vorhabens, der Berücksichtigung von Alltagsanforderungen und den Bedingungen der Umsetzung von nachhaltigen Konsummustern im Alltag einen hohen Stellenwert beizumessen und zwar sowohl in seinen anwendungsorientierten als auch in seinen wissenschaftlichen Teilen: Über die Beteiligung der BewohnerInnen an der Gestaltung von neuen Nutzungsstrategien im Wohnumfeld wurde der Versuch unternommen, Interessen und Anforderungen von (potenziellen) NutzerInnen in die Planung und Umsetzung mit einzubeziehen. Gleichzeitig wurden
damit die Möglichkeiten partizipativer Prozesse für die Erfassung von Alltagsanforderungen
überprüft. Anhand detaillierter empirischer Untersuchungen der Nutzung von Gemeinschaftsnutzungsangeboten und ökologischen Dienstleistungen wurden Hemmnisse und Potenziale
der Integration dieser nachhaltigen Konsumalternativen in den Alltag bestimmt. Die
empirisch erhobenen Nutzungsmuster stellen eine wichtige Grundlage für die Abschätzung
der Nachhaltigkeitseffekte der untersuchten Maßnahmen dar, da die Art und Weise der Umsetzung
im Alltag erheblichen Einfluss auf die Nachhaltigkeitseffekte einer Nutzungsstrategie
hat." (Textauszug)

Abstract
The Catholic Church often plays a policy and mobilization role in American politics. We assess the degree to which the Catholic Church hierarchy — including national and state conferences of bishops — can provide uniform information to parishioners about political participation. Using a textual analysis of information distributed to parishioners in Florida in the 2012 election, we evaluate how much political information is conveyed to parishioners, the sources of this information, and the factors associated with higher or lower levels of information. While we find that most parishes provided information related to the election, there is wide diversity in the types and sources of information. And, while the Catholic hierarchy attempted to provide messaging about the importance of political participation, not all parishes complied with these efforts. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the local community and hierarchical structure combine to shape the behavior of the parishes.

Las familias han sido y son un tema de debate en la criminología y la sociología del delito en lo relativo a su influencia directa y/o indirecta en las infracciones que cometen los adolescentes. El presente artículo se inserta en este debate analizando historias familiares de adolescentes en conflicto con la ley en la Ciudad de México. El objetivo no es culpabilizar ni mostrar la cuota de responsabilidad familiar en los ilícitos, sino dar cuenta del contexto familiar que hace posible el "proceso de orillamiento" de los adolescentes a tener una mayor exposición al riesgo de cometer una infracción. El artículo busca dar cuenta de la incidencia de la familia en la infracción de los adolescentes y realizar una crítica al proceso judicial en lo referente a la activación de la paradoja de la familia como origen y destino.

Patriotic behavior in the journalistic coverage of conflicts is usually related to the coverage of wars and terrorist attacks. Such behavior is characterized in the literature by various practices which deviate from the objective or neutral model of journalism and which are more closely related to the 'our news' or 'our war' mode of coverage. This study suggests an analytical framework that classifies the indicators of patriotic journalistic coverage in two categories: appealing to public emotions, and appealing to public cognition. This framework is tested in the analysis of two related events: the killing of a terrorist by a state, and the revenge action carried out by a terrorist organization. Both types of patriotic indicator were found in both events. While the authors' findings enhance the view that journalists take sides in national conflicts, they undermine the assertion that journalists use different practices of patriotic coverage depending on whether 'their side' is the aggressor or the victim in the conflict.

The reasons are explored why the empirical study of the process of negotiation may not always help to resolve soc conflict. The theory of games (as in J. von Neumann & O. Morgenstern, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 1947) provides one kind of framework for giving advice to a practicing negotiator. It is shown that: (1) negotiations can be readily conceptualized as games having optimal strategies only if the behavior of the opponent is predictable, & (2) the behavior of the opponent in such games cannot be predicted. Negotiating behavior, under some circumstances, is quite unstable. On the basis of some theories of conflict resolution & soc-psychol'al res, exp's were conducted with 2 groups, 1 of which was a control group identical with the exp'al group except that it did not receive certain instructions. Each group consisted of 40 teams. Some negotiators of the exp'al group were told that their opponents were tough, others that they were soft, & still others were given no information at all. Toughness was the dependent variable of the analysis. The objective was to predict variation in toughness from the negotiator's background, ie, his age, sex, race, & personality. It was hyp'ed that a team which was told that its opponents were tough would become soft & vice versa. This hyp was not confirmed by the results of the exp's; there were even indications that the relationship might be the reverse. The introduction of information did, however, strongly affect the negotiating behavior. It completely reversed the relationship between a negotiator's sex, race, & personality in r with his toughness. Being Caucasian, well-adjusted & M led to softness under normal (control) conditions & to toughness under exp'al conditions (when information on the opponent was given). It is argued that diff's in negotiating behavior tend to be associated with cultural diff's. Well-adjusted M Caucasians who generally tend to be cooperative, it is suggested, became tough when given instruction because the latter in effect destroyed the moral superiority of cooperativeness, creating a morally neutral climate, & in this new climate new guide-lines were needed. It is concluded that simple exp's with non-professional negotiators are of little help in arriving at generalizations about professional negotiators, because the most important ingredient, the professional code, is missing from the exp's. What can be studied is the process of professionalization, ie, the development of norms & beliefs about the negotiation itself. M. Maxfield.