Dangerous Disputes: A Study of Conflict Behavior and War
In: American journal of political science, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 664
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 664
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 965-987
ISSN: 1468-2478
Past studies examining the international conflict behavior of parliamentary democracies have reported inconsistent findings and produced some empirical puzzles. One of the main puzzles is that, despite a strong theoretical basis for expecting coalitional majority cabinets to be less conflict prone than single-party majorities, most studies found no difference in their conflict behavior. Still others report coalitional governments to be more conflict prone than single-party ones. In this study, I show that these empirical inconsistencies can be resolved once we take into account the ideological composition of the cabinet. The main contention is that relatively marginal coalitional partners may have a disproportionate influence when the government faces risky decisions, such as the initiation of international disputes. The key lies in their greater bargaining leverage in intra-coalitional politics, which is subsequently reflected in their influence over foreign conflict decisions. More generally, this study shows how different degrees of ideological diversity or cohesion abate and/or accentuate a state's conflict behavior. The expectations are tested empirically, and the findings more robustly predict the conflict behavior of parliamentary regimes than do the results of previous research. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of Interamerican studies and world affairs, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 267-294
ISSN: 2162-2736
The growing importance of third world countries in the international system brings their potential for conflict and cooperation to the forefront. Given the fact that the East-West conflict tends to intensify the North-South conflict, a general tendency toward more warlike antagonisms is becoming evident within the Third World. In view of this trend, Latin America as a region becomes particularly interesting; conditions here have always led to conflict situations between the various countries, but specific historical factors seem to have kept these conflicts from erupting to the same extent that they have in other regions of the Third World.Conflicts between two states do not suddenly occur. Their virulence rather gradually develops from a mixture of border conflicts, historical animosities, economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races, and certainly, the influence of the big powers.
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Working paper
In: International area studies review: IASR, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 33-60
ISSN: 2049-1123
I argue that decision-making processes by the president and the national security establishment and a conception of past US military operations as credibility-establishing precedents for future US military actions have tended to result in a fixation on political developments occurring in a relatively small number of nations. Together, these foreign-policy making routines produce a high degree of regularity in US military activities whose importance is not often appreciated in studies that emphasize more variable domestic political forces, such as diversionary theory, or traditional security concerns, such as realism. I use both a zero-inflated, negative binomial model and a proportional hazards model to illustrate the impact of past US militarized dispute behavior on the prospects for future military activity. I find that past US conflict behavior exercises the most important influence in both models.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 45-71
ISSN: 1552-3829
In this article, the authors develop and empirically evaluate a general model of the linkages between domestic and international conflict behavior. Much of the literature on domestic international interactions has focused on the structural constraints of the international and domestic systems on leaders' foreign policy decisions. Rather than focusing on structural constraints, the present authors model the influence of the behavior of domestic and international rivals on leader decision making. The impact of rivals' behavior on conflict across the domestic-international nexus has been neglected relative to the role of structural factors. This study helps redress that imbalance. The authors test their model with a statistical analysis of Zaire during the period 1975 to 1992 and find substantial support for the model.
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In: European journal of international relations, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 377-406
ISSN: 1460-3713
We explore and define the concept of a `rogue' state based on a state's domestic patterns of behavior. We combine measures of domestic gender equality, ethnic discrimination and state repression to identify characteristics of rogue states. Once we have identified rogue states, we perform logistic regression to predict whether rogue states are more likely to be the aggressors during international disputes — whether they are more likely to use force first during interstate conflict, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. This research adds to a growing body of scholarship in International Relations regarding the behavior of states involved in conflict, which demonstrates that states with higher levels of inequality, repression and violence exhibit higher levels of violence during international disputes and during international crises. This argument is most fully developed within feminist scholarship; however, research in the field of ethno-apolitical conflict has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 10, Heft 1, S. 65-73
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 45-71
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 31, S. 45-71
ISSN: 0010-4140
Examines influence of behavior of domestic and international rival leaders on their foreign policy decision making; 1975-92, chiefly.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 24, Heft 4, S. 706-741
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
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In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 965-987
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 10, Heft 1, S. 41-64
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
A replication of an earlier work (R. J. Rummel, 'The Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,' General Systems Yrbk, 1963, 8, 1-50) to obtain additional evidence relative to the dimensions of conflict behavior (CB) & the relationship between domestic & foreign CB. Data were collected across 83 nations on 9 domestic & 13 foreign measures of CB for 1958, 1959, & 1960. From a factor analysis of these data there emerged 2 domestic dimensions: turmoil, & internal war-& 3 foreign dimensions-war, diplomatic, & belligerency. The turmoil dimension compares favorably with a similar dimension derived from the 1955-57 data, while the internal war dimension subsumes the revolutionary & subversive dimensions from the 1955-57 study. The 3 1958-60 foreign dimensions are quite similar to the 3 derived from the 1955-57 foreign measures. From a factor analysis of domestic & foreign CB, the domestic measures separated themselves from the foreign variables, implying only a small relationship between the 2. This relationship was investigated still further with multiple regression. Representative variables were selected on the basis of high r with the dimensions, & those which indexed domestic & foreign dimensions were regressed upon each other to discover the relationship between domestic & foreign CB. The regression yielded a small relationship that increased with a time lag. 3 error variables were used to discover the extent to which systematic bias might distort the conclusions. 2 of these, N of cards per nation in Deadline Data & N of embassies or legations in a country, were found to r highly with the protest variable & also to have high pattern values on the diplomatic dimension. It was concluded that the level of world interest in a nation is related to the tendency for a nation's protests & (to a lesser extent) its expulsion of ambassadors to be reported. Hence, propositions about these 2 conflict measures should be qualified to the extent that the data of nations in which little interest is expressed may not be included in the is from which the propositions are inferred. Modified AA.
In: European journal of international relations, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 377-406
ISSN: 1354-0661
World Affairs Online