With an introduction by James N. Hyde, this is an examination of some of the negotiations which states have carried on under the auspices of internat'l org. Specific cases in which mediation, conciliation, & good offices were used as techniques are presented. They represent situations of power politics as tempered by the effect of internat'l org, or the beginnings of a growing body of procedural or objective law. The United Nations Charter places primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace upon the Security Council. Some settlement-of -dispute patterns have begun to emerge which will influence the law of the future. Developments of the cold war led to a turning to the broader role of dispute-settlement culminating in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. The Charter gives increased power to the Secretary-General in that he is permitted to bring certain questions to the Security Council & to include items on the Assembly's provisional agenda. Nations are granted the right of individual & collective defense. Any nation may bring to the attention of the Council or Assembly any matter which might lead to internat'l friction. The Assembly & Council have followed a liberal policy in inviting non-member states to participate in their respective discussions. In serious situations the Council or Assembly usually undertake provisional measures either to restore peace or prevent a further deterioration of the situation. A majority of the questions coming before both bodies are referred to a subsidiary group for detailed investigation or conciliation. Both bodies have been reluctant to create permanent subsidiary machinery for the settlement of disputes. There has been a trend toward the use of single mediators & representatives. The manner of approvals of the parent organ & the composition of the subsidiary group have played a major part in influencing the confidence of the parties in the group's operations. The effectiveness of the UN would probably be increased through greater development of peaceful settlement processes through regional org's. The major problem is to find ways of increasing its power & prestige. B. J. Keeley.
There are 2 general types of collective labor disputes: (1) disputes of a legal character involving the interpretation of an already existing legal rule; (2) disputes of a conflict of interest, or econ disputes, referring to working conditions not specified by existing rules. Some contemporary systems of law give an optional & some a compulsory character to their settlement. There is a tendency to avoid compulsory arbitration. A privileged position in the settlement of disputes is given to those institutions set up by the parties. Techniques followed in consensual conciliation procedures are scattered throughout a large number of collective conventions. The bodies entrusted with the settlement of collective disputes (CD 's) may be permanent or temporary & composed of civil servants or independent professional persons. A problem arises over whether it is desirable to set up successive stages in the settlement procedures. In this there has been a tendency to extend the powers of the federal authorities. The representation of staff in enterprises is one of the essential features of modern labor law. Conciliation is compulsory for the settlement of all CD's. The problem of mediation is much more delicate, the mediation enjoying considerably larger powers. When it is a question of procedure by agreement, the parties organize a completely informal procedure, though the spirit of legal procedures is diff in cases of an imposed settlement. Though the gov has the right to apply to the body entrusted with settling disputes, it is sometimes reluctant to exercise it. Once the mediation body has been applied to, the parties must be induced to participate in the process. Precise rules for conciliation procedure are generally avoided, & problems of settlement are seldom legal in character. The mediator must win the confidence of the parties, divest the dispute of its emotional features, & establish psychol'al conditions for success. Conciliators or mediators can make use of various soc, pol'al, & econ pressures in bringing the parties to agreement. The mediator's recommendations may be accepted either by the professional org's or through a referendum organized among the employees. Recent studies on dispute settlements are listed. B. J. Keeley.
A theoretical analysis of the causes of fam conflict & of means of preventing & resolving conflicts is presented. Causes include: (1) 'compulsion'--eg, the inability of hostile fam members to withdraw from the field, (2) 'intimacy' of contact between fam members, (3) the small size of the group which facilitates the polarization of factions, & (4) the rapidity of developmental alterations in whatever equilibria may be established. 'Normative mechanisms' for preventing fam conflict include: (1) avoiding probable sources of conflict by discouraging incompatible marriages & minimizing contact between 'dangerous' fam members, (2) allocating rights & duties to particular roles. according to prescribed cultural patterns which narrow the area open for debate, & (3) culturally prescribed rules for fair treatment of fam members, esp those calling for equal treatment of children when they arrive at the same age. 'Instrumental mechanisms' for resolving fam conflicts include: (1) providing increased facilities for fam living (such as a 2nd car), (2) enacting priority systems for the use of limited facilities (eg, establishing a budget or TV schedule), (3) enlarging areas of autonomous decision-making within the fam as by giving the marriage partners financial allowances to spend as they see fit, & (4) providing opportunities for tension-reduction as by temporary vacations from the fam. Processes of resolving fam conflict include: (1) discussion leading to consensus, compromise, or concession, (2) mediation by a 3rd party, & (3) accommodation. In the event of failure to achieve any of these, more drastic withdrawal from the field may be the only remaining means of ending open conflict. AA.
There is a need for permanent mechanisms of conflict resolution (CR), ie mechanisms that can decide who is the winner & who is the loser, & distribute sanctions, punishments & rewards among the parties & terminate a conflict. 12 mechanisms of this kind are discussed: mechanisms where both parties participate (regulated warfare, fights, duels, legal duels, verbal duels, debates, mediation/arbitration, court processes & voting). They function sometimes as mechanisms of direct CR: the winner also wins in the underlying conflict & the loser loses both places. Thus, ordeals were used to distribute property. But the mechanisms were also often used in a more indirect or independent way: they focused the attention of the parties to a conflict on something new, they functioned as a safety-valve, & they brought some kind of compensation to the loser. 15 conditions seem important for the instit'ization of a CR mechanism. It is pointed out that these conditions are probably complementary in the sense that if some of them are satisfied, the others are less necessary; the mechanism will be more firmly rooted the more conditions are satisfied. Some consequences of this principle are pointed out. Finally, the possibility of instit'ized CR in the field of internat'l conflict is discussed, & a mechanism based on a combination of world-wide TV debates between spokesmen of the parties to the conflict, voting by the whole world pop, & a set of well-known rules of internat'l behavior is analyzed. The propositions are illustrated by means of scattered reports on the various mechanisms, with a concentration on ordeals, legal duels & common-sense knowledge of court processes. IPSA.
In a comparison of studies on problems of compromise by R. H. Lowie (see SA 2143-iB0690) & C. Moraze (see SA 2143-B0694) sponsored by the Liternat'l Soc Sci Council (UNESCO, UN), it is emphasized that the dyadic roles of reciprocity in the interplay of soc instit's follow the `law of exchange' in primitive as well as modern societies. There is no gap in intelligence or reasoning between primitive & modern peoples - but, the range of situations responsive to rational treatment is wider in modern groups. Studies were conducted by specialist assistants of Lowie on certain 'primitive' civilizations which showed that all societies are concerned with self-preservation, & in the face of conflict, adopt varying techniques of compromise depending on the value placed on 'conciliation & flexibility of customs & laws.' Eg, (1) Islam; although believed to oppose compromise, the Koranic law contains various clauses with the `spirit of conciliation' (including references re the equality of women), & Moslem Legislation favors prevention of conflicts. (2) India; caste, cultural diversity, & the religious trends of non-violence & asceticism foster compromise. (3) China; mediation through skillful negotiators in the feudal period established a tradition of compromise through reconciliation. P. D. Montagna.
A distinction is drawn between internat'l disputes, tensions, & conflicts. The discussion & data concern the latter concept. A typology of behavior leading to the resolution of internat'l conflicts is delineated & illustrated with diplomatic examples. The forms of behavior analyzed are avoidance, conquest, deterrence, compromise, awards, & passive settlement. 77 internat'l conflicts, divided into 2 20-yr periods (1919-1939 & 1945-1965), are analyzed in the framework of the typology. Results indicate that the number of conflicts resolved through behavior associated with conquest & deterrence has decreased signif'ly since 1945; that the number of passive settlements has risen rapidly since the same date; & that the number of award settlements has declined from the high %O found in the 1919-1939 period. Each conflict was also classified according to the main formal procedures used in attempts at settlement: bilateral bargaining, mediation, multilateral bargaining, judicial decisions, & action by internat'l org's. Results show that, contrary to popular belief, most conflicts are not resolved through bilateral procedures, but involve action by internat'l org's. However, it was found that in terms of a ratio of settlement attempts to successful settlements, bilateral negotiations are still the most effective bargaining procedure in conflict resolution. The study concludes with an analysis of conflict resolution through judicial awards & presents some hyp's which may help to explain why gov 's are reluctant to submit conflicts to internat'l judicial agencies. AA.
Conciliation proceedings (CP's) includes any type of proceedings whereby courts or admin'ive authorities are authorized to assist in a friendly conciliation of private law disputes. The present Code in the Federal Republic of Germany requires special conciliation in only 2 cases: in petitions for divorce & in actions for the restitution of conjugal rights. Obligatory CP's are prescribed for all matters which come before Labor Courts. The states of the Republic are entitled to create or recognize special conciliation offices. CP's coming before the ordinary trial have existed in Switzerland since the beginning of the 19th cent, & are entrusted to justices of the peace, who are not qualified lawyers, but have wide jurisdiction in western Switzerland. In central & eastern Switzerland their main function consists in preventing litigation. CP's in Austria appear in 2 forms: (1) in the district courts an attempt at conciliation must proceed legal proceedings & each party may demand it before an action is brought into an ordinary court, (2) obligatory CP's are provided only in cases of a petition for divorce. The court may encourage the conclusion of a compromise at any stage of the proceedings. Special conciliation offices exist in certain communes of Austria; in general the proceedings are voluntary. In Denmark there is a general conciliation commission for each district, as well as special commissions. Members of the commission do not act in a judicial capacity. If the proceedings fail, the case is referred to a competent court. Obligatory conciliation is unknown in Sweden except for certain types of matrimonial cases. The Finnish law of civil procedure is similar to that of Sweden. Norwegian conciliation councils consist of elected lay justices. A council conducts obligatory proceedings prior to the initiation of legal proceedings. Special CP's are unknown in the English law of civil procedure except in the case of matrimonial matters. In the US, though CP's do not appear in the laws, pre-trial proceedings often lead to a compromise & may be regarded as CP's. The US courts must have at all stages of the proceedings a willingness of the parties to compromise. B. J. Keelev.