Suchergebnisse

A discussion of the argument that changes in military technology are destablizing, which attempts to prove theoretically that this effect is not likely or, at least, not necessary. The concept of stabilized deterrence is defined & the military & technological aspects are considered, followed by an examination of some pol'al considerations. It is concluded that technology itself is subject to characteristic patterns of development, involving a cycle of concept-development-approval-deployment which can be exploited to minimize destablizing effects. Because of the long delays & the opportunities for countermeasures, there is a very good chance that appropriate & timely adjustments can be made. Quite revolutionary changes in weaponry & strategic concepts may occur without an unstable transition. The effects of technological change are great, but they can be controlled. M. Maxfield.

Problems in the use of decision theory (DT) are considered as a theoretical tool for predicting & explaining the behavior of nat'l decision-makers. Some evidence indicating the possible importance of nonpragmatic, so-called `irrational' factors in decision-making are reviewed. The signif of the unconscious or partly conscious nature of many nonpragmatic motives is indicated. It is pointed out that writers who use DT to explain nat'l decision-making have tended not to take account of utilities which are not deliberately considered & weighed by the decision-maker. While DT could incorporate partly conscious motives into its theoretical framework, there are formidable operational problems of measuring partly conscious utilities. These measurement problems complicate already serious operational problems encountered by a decision theory analysis-problems of gaining access to the data required to assess the subjective variables of utility & subjective probability. An alternative, though similar, analytic approach is proposed which makes use of J. W. Atkinson's theory of motivation (AN INTRODUCTION TO MOTIVATION, Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1964). The variables of motivational disposition, incentive, & expectancy in this theory are also ultimately subjective variables. However, it is argued that they are easier to estimate by objective methods than is the variable of utility. Other advantages of the res strategy proposed are that it enables us to analyze separately the effects of situational & personal variables, & it may be of more help in simulation studies. AA.

A systematic, but not exhaustive, review of empirical studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, a 2-person, non-0-sum game. It is noted that game-theoretical analyses & `rationality' models cannot provide a solution for this game. Empirical studies are reviewed under the following headings: (1) manipulations of the payoff matrix, (2) personality variables, (3) strategy of the `other,' (4) possibilities for COMM, & (5) other independent variables. General findings from empirical studies indicate that competition predominates in these games, & becomes intensified as the game progresses. The level of competition will vary, within limits, according to the independent variables that are used. It is concluded that the high level of competition may be a function of the small or imaginary rewards used in these studies, & a series of exp's utilizing meaningful rewards are suggested. AA.

L. F. Richardson in THE STATISTICS OF DEADLY QUAR- RELS formulated mathematical models dealing with the occurrence & prosecution of wars, showing that wars arise from measurable relations between nations & groups. It is concluded that, except for chance fluctuations, wars have been occurring at a constant rate throughout the 120 yr period 1820-1939. The role of chance processes in history is discussed. The application of a probabilistic model of group formation to the size distribution of war alliances extends this concept & explains the observed size distribution in the nations which fought in these tions joining & leaving war alliances with certain specified probabilities, obtained as follows: There is a fixed probability over time that any nation entering a war will fight by itself. The probability of it joining an alliance containing a particular N of nations is proportional to the N of nations already in alliances of that size. The probability of a nation leaving an alliance is independent of the alliance's size & occurs only when the entire alliance breaks up. Such a stochastic process eventually reaches an equilibrium distribution of sizes of alliances. Resulting from these assumptions is the Yule distribution, & the observed distribution of the N of war alliances with 1, 2, 3, etc, nations on a side fits the Yule distribution very closely. The rules for formation & dissolution are in accord with our intuitive assumptions concerning the dynamics operating in aggressive & peaceful groups. Such random processes play an important role in soc dynamics & in the occurrence of large scale historical events. Historians, recognizing this fact, could develop more quantitative historical laws. Modified AA.

The relationship between PO & foreign policy decisions is explored. It is stated that nat'l decision-makers need to know more about both domestic & foreign PO. Nat'l strategists must become increasingly concerned with the soc-psychol'al effects of their policies on both enemies & allies. PO surveys in this context must focus on 3 major points: (1) the pol'al feasibility of a specific military strategy; (2) its pol'al results; & (3) otherwise unanticipated possibilities, eg, sudden reversal of opinion & the revelation of underlying trends & imminent changes or instabilities. Predominant US strategic security issues are examined & specific res designs are suggested for specific topics. A hyp'al model for an exploratory survey to determine the relative pol'al feasibility for US decision-makers of 2 alternate military responses to limited aggression is established: (a) limited strategic retaliation, & (b) tactical local defense. A table illustrates survey indicators, estimated weighting factors, & costs for the US. The figures are explained & analyzed Various approaches to such a survey are discussed, & the importance of measuring the pacifist opinion as to number, distribution, intensity & sources is pointed out. Several major problems were encountered in sketching out illustrative survey designs. They include: (i) making policy alternatives intelligible to mass publics; (ii) the `uncertainty principle' in which observation changes what is being observed; (iii) the choice of identifying military strategies by their `normal' costs or by their most unpleasant possible results; (iv) finding reliable definitions for such concepts as `pacifism,' & distinguishing between interpersonal influence & the impact of events as factors changing the intensity & distribution of public att's toward military alternatives. M. Maxfield.