Constitution making is a topic of increasing scholarly and practical interest. Focusing on a set of important case studies, yet also featuring classic articles on the subject, this research review is a critical assembly of theoretical literature. Ensuring wide geographic and historical coverage the research review provides an essential overview of the myriad of circumstances in which constitutions can be made.--Résumé de l'éditeur
Abstract This Article will examine an important - but largely ignored - approach to constitution- making: The use of restored constitutional orders as the basis for the creation of a new constitutional order. Looking at this 'restoration constitution-making' in post-communist constitutional transition, it will describe how restoration held both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, restoration improved the politics of constitution-making by helping to avoid the elite manipulation of extraordinary institutions during constitutional drafting. On the other hand, the restoration of decades-old constitutions also led to restored laws that privileged past generations and undermined broad popular participation. Finally, restoration was an important part of gaining international recognition for independence. This international component suggests that constitution-making is about more than just domestic politics. These findings are an important first step in understanding the potential of restoration to ensure a successful constitutional transition.
An alternative to the George W. Bush administration's strategy for establishing democratic institutions in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is presented. It is contended that the Bush administration did not want to facilitate the creation of a populist democracy in postwar Iraq since a populist democratic model would have permitted the incorporation of Islam into the nation's democratic institutions. However, it is stressed that the Bush administration's Iraqi policy has determined that one of two governments will likely be established in postwar Iraq: an undemocratic constitutionalist government or a populist democracy. Indeed, the agreement between the Coalition Provisional Authority & the Governing Council that was selected to govern postwar Iraq to hand over authority to a provisional Iraqi government was deemed a significant mistake. The extent to which the UN's Feb 2004 diagnosis of the Iraqi political situation addressed the shortcomings of the aforementioned agreement is then considered; it is predicted that the Governing Council's interim constitution will not last for an extended period of time & that the UN report should have acknowledged this. It is concluded that the inclusion of a minority veto provision in the interim constitution could jeopardize national stability & reignite hostilities toward the US. J. W. Parker
A strange assortment of lobbyists is converging on the British Parliament at Westminster. They include partisans of French language and culture in Quebec, support ers of local control over oil and gas resources in Alberta, and advocates of native rights in the Yukon. Since it has been assumed for many years that Canada is an independent country, one is justified in asking why any of this is the business of M.P.s from Birmingham, Glasgow, and Londonderry.The business is the Canadian constitution, and, legally speaking, there is no more appropriate forum for it. The Canadian constitution–more precisely the British North America Act of 1867 as amended–is a statute of the United Kingdom, and its amendment is within the authority of the body that enacted it.