The Democratic Constraint
In: Democracy and Public Management Reform, S. 267-276
In: Democracy and Public Management Reform, S. 267-276
In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 208-213
ISSN: 0190-292X
A model of affirmative action constraints is defined, according to which economic, political, & administrative/labor pool constraints have impact on a state's ability to attract minority employees in state & local government. Estimation of this model with 1975 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data indicates that political constraints are least important. The impacts of twelve environmental variables on both this measure (minority penetration) & the Gini index of inequality (minority stratification) at the same bureaucratic level are assessed. Minority penetration is likely to be increased only through long-run economic factors, while minority stratification is likely to be attainable more rapidly & with fewer economic constraints. 2 Tables. W. H. Stoddard.
In: University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Forthcoming
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Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.
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In: 84 University of Chicago Law Review 2213 (2017)
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In: Contemporary politics, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 203-217
ISSN: 1469-3631
In: Starr, E., Frake, J., & Agarwal, R. 2019. Mobility constraint externalities. Organization Science, 30(5), 961-980.
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In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 171-192
ISSN: 1475-6765
Abstract. The rational choice assumption is already disputable at the individual level of decisionmaking. At the level of collective decision‐making unitary rational action is an unrealistic assumption. It neglects the transitivity of collective preferences issue, the logic of collective action and freeriding, the agency problem, and the human tendency to agree with each other irrespective of the facts. While unitary rational action is rejected as a basis for theorizing on international relations and war, the idea of decision‐making under constraints seems as valid in the interstate context as in economics. The most important constraints on national security decision‐making are the anarchical character of the international system and the corresponding need for self‐help, the security and the territorial delimitation dilemmas, the presence or absence of plausible blueprints for victory, and the presence or absence of domestic constraints on bellicosity. A simple explanatory model of war built on these ideas is suggested and tested with dyadic data for the 1962–1980 period. In addition, there is some discussion of why collective security is doomed to fail, and why hegemony rather than balance improve the prospects of peace.
In: Criminal Law & Philosophy, Band 15, S. 373
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