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The present article explores a series of time issues that have been largely ignored in democratic theory. It begins with discussing a defining feature of democratic rule: its temporal delimitation. Democracy is government pro tempore. Parting from this core assumption, the article discusses, among other things temporal, the timing of elections; the time requirements of efficient and accountable government; the interaction of electoral cycles at different levels and their interference with other societal cycles; the democratic ambivalence of term limits; the time scarcities of both politicians and citizens; the temporal logics of direct democracy; the value of governmental stability; and the complexities of generational renewal. The article concludes with some reflections on some neglected themes and pending challenges.

Covenants not to compete are often included in employment agreements between firms and employees, justified by each party's voluntary "freedom to contract." However, noncompetes may also generate externalities for all individuals in the market, including those who have not signed such agreements. We theorize that enforceable noncompetes increase frictions in the labor market by increasing uncertainty and recruitment costs and by curtailing entrepreneurship. We find that in state-industry combinations with a higher incidence and enforceability of noncompetes, workers—including those unconstrained by noncompetes—receive relatively fewer job offers, have reduced mobility, and experience lower wages. The results offer policymakers a reason to restrict noncompetes beyond axiomatic appeals to a worker's "freedom of contract" and highlight labor market frictions that may impact firm-level human capital strategies.