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Abstract
This essay argues that Rawls's recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a "political not metaphysical" account which is also not "political in the wrong way".

Facilitated communication, a technique that is said to enhance the communicative abilities of individuals with severe language impairments, has engendered much controversy. Biklen and Duchan (1994) and Green and Shane (1994) present two sides of this controversy. Biklen and Duchan argue that from a constructivist's perspective, the primary issue is the underlying cultural presuppositions regarding mental retardation and science rather than the efficacy of facilitated communication. Green and Shane present research evidence challenging the efficacy of facilitated communication within a positivist's framework. We present a brief review of science as viewed through positivists' and constructivists' lenses. Using the framework of social constructivism adopted by Biklen and Duchan, we disagree with them on three points: (a) even though the process of constructing scientific knowledge is strongly affected by human social, emotional, and cognitive processes, it also involves matters of fact that cannot be ignored; (b) social constructivists' accounts of science can be accepted as descriptive without being prescriptive; (c) although we cannot prove that belief systems, including positivism and social constructivism, are true or false in the larger sense, belief systems have differential consequences for technological changes of the type that are valued by persons with severe impairments of communication.

This article reviews recent work in socio-historical technology studies. Four problems, frequently mentioned in critical debates, are discussed—relativism, reflexivity, theory, and practice. The main body of the article is devoted to a discussion of the latter two problems. Requirements for a theory on socio-technical change are proposed, and one concrete example of a conceptual framework that meets these requirements is discussed. The second point of the article is to argue that present (science and) technology studies are now able to break away from a too academic, internalistic perspective and return to the politically relevant "Science, Technology & Society" issues that informed much of this work more than a decade ago.

Many normative theorists have advocated constructivism as a way of overcoming skepticism and nihilism. They have produced three types of constructivism that correspond to three conceptions of rationality: formal (Hare and Gewirth), instrumental (Gauthier), and ideal (Rawls). In this book, T.K. Seung examines these three types and vindicates Rawls' claim that only the constructivism of ideal rationality - which accepts Kantiam ideals as its basis - is viable. Unlike Rawls, however, Seung traces Kantian ideas to Platonic forms. Without this Platonic move, he shows, ideal constructivism cannot avoid collapsing to normative positivism. Seung maintains that Platonic forms are the obects of normative intuition and that they are only schematic ideas and principles that must be articulated into a system of concrete normative standards. This process of articulation is normative construction. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that constructivism and intuitionism are in competition with each other, Seung demonstrates the necessity of their natural dependence. That is, their happy union alone can provide a secure foundation for normative theories and save them from the twin evils of scepticism and nihilism