Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This essay argues that Rawls's recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a "political not metaphysical" account which is also not "political in the wrong way".

Facilitated communication, a technique that is said to enhance the communicative abilities of individuals with severe language impairments, has engendered much controversy. Biklen and Duchan (1994) and Green and Shane (1994) present two sides of this controversy. Biklen and Duchan argue that from a constructivist's perspective, the primary issue is the underlying cultural presuppositions regarding mental retardation and science rather than the efficacy of facilitated communication. Green and Shane present research evidence challenging the efficacy of facilitated communication within a positivist's framework. We present a brief review of science as viewed through positivists' and constructivists' lenses. Using the framework of social constructivism adopted by Biklen and Duchan, we disagree with them on three points: (a) even though the process of constructing scientific knowledge is strongly affected by human social, emotional, and cognitive processes, it also involves matters of fact that cannot be ignored; (b) social constructivists' accounts of science can be accepted as descriptive without being prescriptive; (c) although we cannot prove that belief systems, including positivism and social constructivism, are true or false in the larger sense, belief systems have differential consequences for technological changes of the type that are valued by persons with severe impairments of communication.

This article reviews recent work in socio-historical technology studies. Four problems, frequently mentioned in critical debates, are discussed—relativism, reflexivity, theory, and practice. The main body of the article is devoted to a discussion of the latter two problems. Requirements for a theory on socio-technical change are proposed, and one concrete example of a conceptual framework that meets these requirements is discussed. The second point of the article is to argue that present (science and) technology studies are now able to break away from a too academic, internalistic perspective and return to the politically relevant "Science, Technology & Society" issues that informed much of this work more than a decade ago.

Argues that in the area of speech perception there are many indications that constructivism is inadequate. Examines research on infants, capacities in the initial state and language acquisition. (SJO)

THE AUTHOR CONSIDERS THE CRITICISM OF CONSTRUCTIVISM AND RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AS PRESENTED IN THE POLITICAL THEORY OF F.A. HAYEK. HAYEK'S THESIS IS THAT GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALITY IN POLITICS IS COUNTER-FINAL. THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF THIS PAPER IS THAT, ON CLOSE EXAMINATION, HAYEK APPEARS TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVIST HIMSELF. THE PURPOSE OF HAYEK'S ANTI-RATIONALISM IS PRIMARILY IDEOLOGICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL. HE WANTS TO INDUCE CERTAIN ANTI-RATIONALISTIC BELIEFS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES RATIONALISM HAS BAD CONSEQUENCES. YET THIS VERY PROJECT CAN BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALITY. FURTHERMORE, HAYEK MIXES ABSTRACT PHILSOPHICAL DOCTRINE WITH EMPIRICAL THEORY. IN HIS CRITIQUE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM, HAYEK CONFUSES TWO NOTIONS OF "RATIONALITY." ON THE ONE HAND, HE ARGUES AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGICAL RATIONALISM ASSOCIATED WITH DESCARTES AND, ON THE OTHER, HE ARGUES AGAINST THE SUBJECTIVISTIC, ACTION-ORIENTED NOTION OF RATIONALITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IDEA OF "ECONOMIC MAN." ARGUMENTS AGAINST CARTESIAN RATIONALITY DO NOT, HOWEVER, IMPLY THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALISM IN POLITICS. THE SO-CALLED INFORMATION PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED AT AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEVEL. IT IS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, WHICH HAYEK HAS CERTAIN IDEAS ABOUT SOLVING. THEREFORE, HAYEK'S THESIS OF "TACIT KNOWLEDGE" IS NOT AN EXPRESSION OF SKEPTICISM AS IS OFTEN BELIEVED.