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The article critiques the mainstream American invocation of constructivism as a kind of "commonsense," utilitarian approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA). Such a strategy allows social scientists to seem "modern" while remaining resolutely antipostmodernist. Revisionism is also questioned, however, for countering rather than confronting positivism & social scientism. These "counterhegmonic moderates," while rejecting positivism, remain as bound by rationalist objectivity as are conservatives. Postmodernist constructivism for FPA requires more than listening; it also entails a radical subjectivity & participation. 8 References. K. Coddon

InPolitical Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

This article explores the concept of "human security" as an academic & fledgling policy movement that seeks to place the individual -- or people collectively -- as the referent of security. It does this against a background of evolving transnational norms relating to security & governance, & the development of scientific understanding that challenges orthodox conceptions of security. It suggests that human security is not a coherent or objective school of thought. Rather, there are different, & sometimes competing, conceptions of human security that may reflect different sociological/cultural & geostrategic orientations. The article argues that the emergence of the concept of human security -- as a broad, multifaceted, & evolving conception of security -- reflects the impact of values & norms on international relations. It also embraces a range of alliances, actors, & agendas that have taken us beyond the traditional scope of international politics & diplomacy. As a demonstration of change in international relations, of evolving identities & interests, this is best explained with reference to "social constructivist" thought, in contradistinction with the structural realist mainstream of international relations. In a constructivist vein, the article suggests that empirical research is already building a case in support of human security thinking that is, slowly, being acknowledged by decisionmakers, against the logic of realist determinism. 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask "How do we know there are material objects?" and not "How do you know which are the female beetles?" Similarly,moralepistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.

Constructivism is regarded as increasingly important in International Relations. More often than not the approach is related to the issue of identity. Constructivism and identity are, however, in a dangerous liaison. This article argues that Alexander Wendt's constructivism needs identity as a central concept but that this very concept threatens to undermine the possibility of his constructivism. It is further suggested that this problem has some relevance to other constructivist approaches positioned in the middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist theorizing. The argument is illustrated with a consideration of the debates around the redefinition of the role of the Federal Republic of Germany to include the possibility of German military involvement abroad.

If evaluators do not borrow from the natural and social sciences for their methods, what do their enquiries look like? Many who seek to answer that question pursue naturalistic or case study or qualitative approaches, conceived of as a reaction to scientism to produce a more faithful response to the social and political nature of the world being evaluated. Among those approaches is constructivism, familiar in the philosophy of science, science education and psychology. This is a general critique of science for its failure to acknowledge that theories and realities are not 'out there' waiting to be discovered or uncovered, but are constructed in the minds of individuals or in the discourses of groups. This article looks critically at constructivism as it has appeared in the field of evaluation and presents it as an overreaction to the problems of objective reality.