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"Constructivism" published on by Oxford University Press.

The article critiques the mainstream American invocation of constructivism as a kind of "commonsense," utilitarian approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA). Such a strategy allows social scientists to seem "modern" while remaining resolutely antipostmodernist. Revisionism is also questioned, however, for countering rather than confronting positivism & social scientism. These "counterhegmonic moderates," while rejecting positivism, remain as bound by rationalist objectivity as are conservatives. Postmodernist constructivism for FPA requires more than listening; it also entails a radical subjectivity & participation. 8 References. K. Coddon

The author of this chapter defines the tension within Oakeshott's philosophy on socio-political construction & deconstructs his conceptualization of constructivism & relativism in relationship to truth. Although Oakeshott's philosophy can relate to a strong constructivism, his anti-rationalism & conceptualization of truth preclude his acceptance of the "rational" constructivist political agenda. Various philosophers' views on truth (Hacking, McCullagh, Sellars, Goldman) are applied as problematizations of Oakeshott's worldview. Oakeshott's ambiguous relativism is recognized to have a misplaced skepticism & inconsistent relativism (Podoksik) emanating from the irreducible pluralism based on the distinct spheres of knowledge generated by separate domains of modes. The severe critiques of the sociological arenas of politics, education & science exemplify this misplacement. The irreducible plurality of his modes (science, history) require different methods of inquiry to produce knowledge, thus forbidding cross disciplinary commonalities leading to an assumption of coherentism that should direct Oakeshott to relativism. But, reciprocal relations between conceptual creativity & nature are excluded by his separation of modal knowledge. 60 References. J. Harwell