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AbstractThis paper has two aims. First, I critically discuss Daniel Whiting's (Philos Stud 195(9):2191–2208, 2018) recent proposal that a reason to ϕ is evidence of a respect in which it is right to ϕ. I raise two objections against this view: (i) it is subject to a modified version of Eva Schmidt's (Ethics 127(3):708–718, 2018) counterexample against the influential account of reasons in terms of evidence and 'ought', and—setting aside judgments about specific cases—, (ii) it is also in an important sense uninformative. Interestingly, it turns out that this last objection cannot be helpfully understood in terms of circularity. This leads to a more general question about the criteria of adequacy for reductive accounts of reasons: In what sense, if any, should such accounts be informative? The second aim of this paper is to clarify one such sense, which is suggested by reflection on Whiting's proposal. In particular, I argue that successful reductive accounts naturalize the contributory—by which I mean, roughly, that they explain the specifically contributory nature of reasons in fully non-normative terms. Moreover, I explain how views that fail this criterion are unable to meet certain key explanatory desiderata for reductive accounts of reasons. After broaching some of the wider implications for the project of understanding the notion of a reason in other terms, I conclude that the notion of naturalizing the contributory is a helpful notion for structuring the debate over reductive accounts of reasons.

Cover -- Half-Title Page -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- I.1. Tricky words relating to the transformation of the living world -- I.2. Wear, aging, disappearance: the inescapable fate of matter? -- I.3. Is a positive future accessible? -- I.4. Is the search for a new alliance with nature driven by the crisis of meaning? -- I.5. An unavoidable gamble? -- I.6. A technoscience to be reinvented? -- I.7. General argument of the work -- I.8. Style and general structure of the work -- 1 The Major Dualities in How Things are Perceived -- 1.1. Examples to illustrate the ongoing transition -- 1.1.1. Intelligent textiles -- 1.1.2. From the solar system to the infinitely small -- 1.1.3. The collective intelligence of working groups -- 1.1.4. Medicine as a playing field for this duality -- 1.2. Our relationship to power is in question -- 1.3. Our relationship to language is in question -- 1.4. The epistemological mutation of the sciences -- 2 Science and Sense, Places and Links -- 2.1. The salutary crisis of meaning -- 2.2. The duality of places and links -- 2.2.1. The duality of place and link in our relationship to all things -- 2.2.2. The place/link duality and the noosphere (global network of consciousness) -- 2.2.3. The place/link duality and the biosphere -- 2.3. The metamorphosis of science as a cultural object -- 2.4. The crisis of joy -- 3 Contributory Metamorphosis in the Conception of Systems and the Sciences -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.1.1. When Einstein, Wiener and Turing make us dance on a volcano -- 3.2. The hypothesis of a science claiming to explain everything about visible reality -- 3.3. From the digital revolution to the quantum revolution -- 3.3.1. Poetic prose of the wave and the corpuscle -- 3.3.2. The digital revolution -- 3.3.3. The quantum mystery.

Machine generated contents note: 1. A schematic of international investment law; 2. A definition of defence; 3. A theory of causation for international investment law; 4. Mismanagement; 5. Investment reprisal and post-establishment illegality; 6. A restatement of contributory fault and investor misconduct in international investment law.