Suchergebnisse

In development cooperation, trilateral cooperation (TrC) is increasingly seen as having potential not only to achieve impacts in the beneficiary countries, but also to contribute to improved cooperation relationships and partnerships on the strategic level - especially between DAC donors and emerging countries. This evaluation of TrC in German development cooperation examines the extent to which the objectives and expectations of the stakeholders are being achieved. Alongside an analysis of the German TrC portfolio and the relevant literature, extensive case studies in Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa serve as the data base.

Result of a joint research project conducted by the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM), the volume "Cooperation in Eurasia: Linking Identity, Security, and Development" aims to shed light on the drivers and on the rationale behind regional cooperation in Eurasia. In particular it investigates and ponder the weight of identity issues, security perceptions, and economic development needs for interstate cooperation in the Eurasian context, by taking into account both supra-national frameworks and regional scenarios. Accordingly, the book is divided in two parts, focusing respectively on "Cooperation and Competition at Multilateral Level" and on "Regional Case Studies".

"Intelligence Cooperation" published on by Oxford University Press.

The cooperation of agencies as first responders to domestic abuse has attracted increased interests among researchers. Recent international guidelines, particularly the Istanbul Convention, prescribe such networking between law enforcement, local support agencies, social services, health care and other relevant professionals as a precondition for improved response towards crimes committed in families and intimate relationships. The article describes the urgency to combat domestic abuse by means of interagency cooperation, and continues with a description of the Istanbul Convention, and explains the basic dimensions of such cooperation, e.g., concerning referrals between responder agencies. The article concludes with a brief overview of present research activities in the field by a project carried out by 16 partners. The project 'IMPRODOVA' runs from 2018 to 2021 and is funded by the European Union Horizon 2020 programme.

AbstractThe evolution of cooperation scholarship develops evolutionary stable theories that explain the presence of cooperation when there are many reasons to defect from cooperation. In this analysis, these theories are tested using the relations between states. Focusing on the direct reciprocity strategies of Tit-for-Tat and Win-stay/Lose-shift and the indirect reciprocity strategies of Cooperative Reputation and Tag, Tit-for-Tat and Cooperative Reputation are found to be robust, while Tags have mixed results. In the end, it is the direct cooperative action by states and their cooperative reputation and not shared characteristics that are most likely to elicit cooperative action in return.

Trends in international development cooperation point to the increasing networking of initiatives and programmes, facilitated by information and communications technology (ICT). This allows many more people and organizations from around the world to contribute to a given project, as with the case of online volunteers. There are various types of networks active in development cooperation, but network management needs to be incorporated by involved organizations in order to extract the expected benefits from their involvement. Network analysis practices will help determine if they are set up and managed ppropriately.

Most definitions of cooperation provide sufficient but not necessary conditions. This paper describes a form of minimal cooperation, corresponding to mass actions implying many agents, such as demonstrations. It characterizes its intentional, epistemic, strategic, and teleological aspects, mostly obtained from weakening classical concepts. The rationality of minimal cooperation turns out to be part of its definition, whereas it is usually considered as an optional though desirable feature. Game-theoretic concepts thus play an important role in its definition. The paper concludes by answering concrete questions about what should and should not be called cooperation.